

**International Trade Centre**  
Final Evaluation Report v3a  
April 2016  
**Final Evaluation of Sector Competitiveness & Export Diversification in The Gambia**



Partner of the Centre for Global Competitiveness and Performance of the World Economic Forum: Sierra Leone & Liberia

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27 April 2016

Dear Miguel,

## **Revised Final Evaluation Report: Final Evaluation of Sector Competitiveness & Export Diversification in The Gambia**

Greetings. We are pleased to submit our revised final evaluation report for your consideration. This incorporates the clarifications received on the responsibility of the EIF Board for action on recommendations arising from the evaluation.

*Thank you for your investment in our services.*

Yours sincerely,



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Enclosures



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## Acronyms

ACA	African Cashew Alliance
ASPA	Agribusiness Service Plan Association
ASSET	Association of Small Scale Enterprises in Tourism
AU	African Union
CAG	Cashew Alliance of The Gambia
CN	Cashew Nut
CPMS	Cooperative Produce Marketing Societies
DCP	Division for Country Programmes (within ITC)
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
ES	EIF Secretariat
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
FSQA	Food Safety & Quality Authority
GAP	Good Agricultural Practices
GCCI	Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
GGC	Gambia Groundnut Corporation
GN	Groundnut
GOTG	Government of The Gambia
GTA	Gambia Tourism Authority
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
ITC	International Trade Centre
MIE	Main Implementing Entity
MNS	Market News Service (of ITC)
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOTIE	Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration & Employment
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
NARI	National Agricultural Research Institute
NAWFA	National Women Farmers' Association
NCCI	National Chamber of Commerce & Industry
NCFA	National Cashew Farmers' Association
NCSPSC	National Codex SPS Committee
NES	National Export Strategy
NIU	National Implementation Unit (EIF)
NSC	National Steering Committee (EIF)
PRPs	Pre Requisite Programmes
PRSP	Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper

SCED	Sector Competitiveness & Export Diversification (Project)
SS	Sesame
TcCs	Trainers-cum-Counsellors
TFM	Trust Fund Manager (UNOPS)
TGSB	The Gambia Standards Board
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WAQP	West African Quality Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation



## Executive Summary

### E1. Summary Description of the Object of the Evaluation

1. The Sector Competitiveness & Export Diversification (SCED) project was initiated in June 2012 and scheduled to end in April 2015. It aimed at responding to some of the trade-related development priorities of The Gambia as identified in its Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). The project's development objective is to reduce poverty through activities that:
  - a) Strengthen targeted sectors' competitiveness;
  - b) Promote new business opportunities in domestic, regional and international markets; and
  - c) Generate additional incomes and create employment.
2. The project deliverables include:
  - Agri-sector specific support for cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame. A key focus will be on finding new export opportunities, product diversification, improved value-addition, quality enhancement and strengthened sector support institutions (Component A).
  - Provision of sector cross-cutting assistance in the areas of trade information (Component B) and inclusive tourism (Component C).
3. The SCED further aims to achieve long-term sustainable impact by strengthening national capacities and Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) ownership throughout the implementation phase.
4. Due to the existing development challenges in each of the areas of intervention, the project further aims at leveraging additional resources from other development partners.
5. The project will contribute to achieving the following results:
  - Increase of sales of cashew nuts (CN), groundnuts (GN) and sesame (SS) in domestic, regional and international markets by 3% through Component A1 (Development of sector strategies for Cashew-nut & Sesame) and Component A2 (Quality enhancement of Groundnut, Cashew-Nut & Sesame sectors).
  - Establish a functional Trade Information Reference Centre within the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) with trade information resources made available to both public and private sectors and related skills and capacities strengthened (Component B: Trade Information).
  - Design a project document ready for funding on the development of inclusive tourism in The Gambia on the basis of a feasibility study (Component C – Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study).
  - The project aims to build sustainable local capacities within the National Implementation Unit (NIU) and other trade support institutions (at national and sector level) through their active involvement in each step of the project cycle and thus enabling The Gambia to exert effective ownership of its trade-related development agenda.
6. A Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) report was issued in October 2014, covering the period to June 2014. The MTE concluded that the SCED was well designed and relevant. All components had made significant progress, but were hampered by persistent delays and a consequent focus on outputs rather than impacts. A heavy reliance on weak public sector bodies for implementation of a market-facing intervention was a contributory factor to delays. The overall effectiveness of the SCED was likely to be seriously diluted by a delay in a planned international accreditation of a key public sector quality control laboratory. The laboratory was intended to certify exports and facilitate greater market access and sales values. The MTE concluded that it was not attainable within the project

lifetime; and called for an extension of the SCED timeline. The MTE concluded that the SCED had a roughly 50/50 potential for successful impact. After the MTE, the project completion date was extended to 31 December 2015.

7. This Final Evaluation assesses whether the programme has achieved the targets set and identifies the lessons to be learnt from the experience. It concludes that the extension succeeded in improving the overall effectiveness of the SCED, with additional – although not sufficient- progress being secured on the accreditation of the laboratory and other key outstanding deliverables. This Evaluation suggests that the likelihood of impact has increased to 70% and that national stakeholders are now in a position, given necessary commitment, to overcome the remaining hurdles to full effectiveness after the formal end of the SCED.
8. The project is funded by the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) Trust Fund, Tier 2. It has a budget of \$2,355,517 (USD). Other sources of funding included in-kind contribution from the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) in the amount of \$413,500 (USD). The Main Implementing Entity (MIE) is the International Trade Centre (ITC).

## **E2. Major Findings of the Evaluation**

### **E2.2 Attainment of the Objectives of the SCED**

#### *E2.2.1 Overall Objective of the SCED*

1. The overall objective of this project was:
  - Poverty reduction through activities that (a) strengthen targeted sectors competitiveness, (b) promote new business opportunities in domestic, regional and international markets and, (c) generate additional incomes and create employment.
2. Objectively verifiable indicators were:
  - Expansion onto new markets with adequate spread across markets in the respective sectors.
  - Increased of sales (domestic, regional and international markets) in the respective sectors by 3%.
3. Before concluding on the attainment of this objective (see E2.2.6), a review is presented –below – of the attainment of the related sub-objectives linked to the principal components of the project.

#### *E2.2.2 Component A1 – Development of Sector Strategies for Cashew Nut & Sesame*

1. The overall objectives of this component were:
  - An increased capacity of public and private institutions to support and stimulate exports of cashews and sesame through the provision of relevant and accessible trade support services.
  - Improved public and private dialogue in the cashew and sesame sectors to formulate and manage export development strategies that are relevant and realistic.
  - Empowered stakeholders in the cashew and sesame sectors capable of contributing to export development activities for their sectors, including female stakeholders.

The attainment of these objectives is evaluated in the rest of this sub-section.

2. *Increased capacity for the provision of relevant and accessible trade support services that stimulate exports.* The contributions of public actors to enhanced trade support services are all improved by

this project. As illustrated in the following paragraph, the overall assessment of the evidence suggests that this improvement may be positive but that it is not sufficient to fulfil the project's overall objectives.

3. There were significant delays in the finalisation and launch of the sector strategies due to public sector inertia. Further delays in their funding raises the risk of their obsolescence due to a changing operating environment. Trade information services managed by the Ministry of Trade (MOTIE) have yet to attain full effectiveness of service. Vital laboratory services from the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) were inordinately delayed and have yet to attain the goal of international accreditation. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has yet to confirm their take-over of the post-project management of the Farmer Field Schools (FFS)<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, The Gambia Standards Bureau (TGSB) appears to have met all objectives for quality frameworks and standards and is positioning itself for a desirable post-project role as a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) certifier, which should be encouraged. More work needs to be done to crystallise the policing role of the Food Safety & Quality Authority (FSQA) in relation to TGSB standards; but initial facilitation has been delivered by this project.
4. The Cashew Alliance of The Gambia (CAG) appears to have been the most effective of the non-state trade support organisations as evidenced, in part, by the preponderance of its outputs in the Trade Information website<sup>2</sup>. The role of the Agri-Business Service Plan Association (ASPA) appears to have been diluted by a change of government policy that displaced its coordinating function in the liberalisation of the groundnut sector. The National Women Farmers' Association (NAWFA) appears to be challenged in managing its sesame support services as evidenced by the unaccounted loss of tarpaulins supplied by the project and the unclear effect of the seed multiplication support delivered by the project. The conclusion must be that the improvement in non-state actors' capacity is broadly evident but not sufficient to deliver the overall project objectives.
5. *Improved public and private dialogue to deliver sector strategies.* The dialogue facilitated by the project was designed to result in good strategies being developed. The longitudinal literature evidence reviewed by the evaluation team suggests that the strategy development process resulted in significant and productive engagement of all actors. The cross-sectional interviews also supported this conclusion as did a review of the final strategies produced for the CN and SS sectors.
6. *Stakeholders empowered to contribute to export development for their sectors.* This objective is logically linked to the first two, assessed above. The conclusion is thus that much has been done, but more needs to be done by national stakeholders after the project – to seize the opportunities offered by the project activities.

#### E2.2.3 Component A2 – Quality Enhancement of CN, GN and SS Sectors

1. The overall objective of this component was:
  - Improving the incomes of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame farmers and firms along the value chain by increasing their export opportunities through enhanced quality management and a strengthened business support environment.
2. This objective has “means” and an “end”. The “end” is the improvement of incomes along the value chain. The “means” are the facilitation of enhanced quality management and the improvement of the

<sup>1</sup> However, see the stakeholder comment incorporated in E2.3.6

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.gambiatradinginfo.org/market-news-and-trend>

business support environment. Again, the integrated design of this project requires a look to the contribution of other components to this objective.

3. The improvement of the business support mechanisms was examined in E2.2.2 above. It concluded that positive, but insufficient progress had been made. The remaining journey must be completed by national stakeholders after the formal closure of the SCED.
4. The enhancement of quality management was the primary focus of the activities of component A2. This entailed work on cross-cutting sectoral regulation & quality certification, Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) and downstream intermediaries/firms. Much progress has been attained and a momentum has been built that leaves the related goals within reach. However, most related goals will not be secured within the formal lifespan of the SCED, leaving the initiative to national stakeholders to sustain focus until the ends are secured, post-project.
5. This brings us to the “end” sought by this component’s objective i.e. the increase in value chain incomes. Although the primary indicators of the log-frame rightfully focussed on this measure, it was not formally tracked by the M&E systems of the SCED – an important oversight that cannot be easily remedied by an evaluation coming at the end of a lengthy chronological change process. In the interviews conducted by the evaluation team with some firms that benefited from HACCP quality support, there was unequivocal assertion that the process had helped in the growth of their business and incomes. However, the extent of such improvement could not be readily quantified. The message from stakeholder meetings about the effect on upstream farmers was not as clear.
6. In conclusion, there is some indication that incomes have improved, even with the incomplete state of the delivery of the means intended to facilitate this improvement. In the absence of formal monitoring of this effect by the project during its lifetime, the extent of any improvement cannot be definitively identified.

#### *E2.2.4 Component B – Trade Information*

1. The overall objective of this component was:
  - To enable The Gambia’s private and public sector to access relevant trade related information through MOTIE’s information services, particularly in the first instance, to the sesame and cashew nut sectors.
2. The Trade Information (TI) system, network and website delivery medium are established but are yet to attain full functional effectiveness. The CN sector appears the more robustly responsive of the three primary produce targeted by the SCED for the TI system. The production and coordination mechanisms require fine-tuning, especially through the effective use of input and dissemination calendars. The demand-side monitoring of user satisfaction is markedly under-developed. Although the log-frame correctly focussed on demand-side indicators, they were not formally tracked by the project.
3. The objective of this component is within the grasp of national stakeholders, but will require a concerted effort, post-project to be realised in full.

#### *E2.2.5 Component C – Inclusive Tourism Study*

1. The overall objective of this component was:
  - A comprehensive feasibility study on inclusive tourism in The Gambia which includes an action plan and a fully-fledged project proposal for follow-up implementation of proposed activities.

2. The objective was met in full to the apparent satisfaction of all stakeholders. However, the national stakeholders requested that the MIE extend the objective to include the mobilisation of resources for the project proposal, within the lifetime of the project. Due to a difficult resource mobilisation context for The Gambia, this additional objective was not met. There is no evidence of any prospect of funding within the year following the project closure<sup>3</sup>. Prolonged delay in funding elevates the risk of obsolescence of the study due to changes in the strategic business environment.

#### *E2.2.6 Overall Objective of the SCED*

1. The overall objective of the project was stated in E2.2.1 above. The project seeks to increase incomes and reduce poverty.
2. The conclusions from the evaluation of the component objectives logically feed the assessment of the attainment of the overall objective. There is indicative, but inconclusive, evidence that some value-chain incomes (primarily intermediary firms) have improved, even with the incomplete state of the delivery of the means intended to facilitate this improvement. Sector sales revenues are not yet tracked by the Trade Information system or any available alternatives. Given the absence of formal monitoring of the objectively verifiable indicators identified by the log-frame, the extent of any improvement in sector sales, individual incomes and poverty reduction cannot be conclusively identified by the evaluation team.

### **E2.3 Assessment of the Effects of the SCED**

#### *E2.3.1 Introduction*

1. The effects of the project are presented, below, for each evaluation category required by the terms of reference. An overall conclusion on the effect of the project is presented in section E4 together with related recommendations.

#### *E2.3.2 Relevance*

1. The overall relevance of the project to the development needs and priorities of the Government and primary stakeholders in the country; and the interests of international stakeholders was positively affirmed at the MTE. This final evaluation agrees with that assessment, whilst providing a component based evaluation below.
2. The SCED is a tightly integrated project, with rational cause and effect relationships between the components that would amplify the overall effect of the intervention, in the event of successful implementation of all elements i.e. the whole would be larger than the sum of the parts. There is synergy or strategic reinforcement between the potential effects of implemented sector strategies (component A1), quality enhancement (component A2), trade information (component B) and an implemented tourism project (component C). As demanded by efforts to promote national competitiveness, it requires the enhancement of strategic cooperation between the public sector and the commercial sector.
3. The strategy development provided a long-term plan for two of the three targeted sectors i.e. Cashew Nut (CN) and Sesame (SS) and sought to reinforce existing plans for the third sector,

<sup>3</sup> The MIE has affirmed (see comment ID 16 on the draft report shown in Appendix 12 to this final report) that elements of the Tourism project may be included in other project proposals including the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund for The Gambia. This is as yet of uncertain timing, value and scope.

Groundnut (GN). This answered key strategic questions including the desirable future state of the sectors and how to migrate from the current state to that desired future.

4. The quality enhancement (QE) programme sought to address pressing short-term obstacles to the realisation of the long-term plans for the targeted sectors. QE spanned the full spectrum of the value chain in the three targeted sectors: from upstream farming activities, including cross-cutting regulatory oversight and quality certification, through to support for downstream intermediaries who process and/or trade for the domestic and export markets.
5. Similarly, planning and implementation of any kind, short or long-term, is only feasible when relevant information is available for taking strategic and tactical decisions in good time. The TI component was thus vital in the context of a poorly developed system in The Gambia.
6. The Inclusive Tourism study, if implemented, would provide immediate benefits to value chain actors through the improvement of market demand for their produce. However, it can be seen that this study does not, by itself, add to the systemic improvement actions offered by components A & B i.e. it is a desirable rather than a mandatory action. It is therefore seen as offering inherently lower relevance than the other components.

### E2.3.3 Effectiveness

1. Sector strategies (A1a) and the Tourism component (C) are studies, and are thus relatively easy to deliver in full compliance with an objective – hence they offer high levels of prima facie effectiveness. Implementation actions (the other components) are much more challenging; hence their attained effectiveness is generally lower.
2. The pilot implementation of sector strategies was hampered by the late development of the sector strategies, which were only formally launched in June 2014, well into the final phase of the project lifespan. This forced the MIE to take coping measures which lost some of the intended motivational linkages to the further implementation of the sector strategies. The late delivery of the strategies appears to be due to institutional uncertainties within the governance authorities that were beyond the control of the MIE. Some deliverables have been well received, such as the export packaging support to enterprises. Others have been poorly managed, such as the tarpaulin support to SS sector or of unclear benefit, such as the seed multiplication support to SS sector.
3. Support to regulatory institutions focussed on The Gambia Standards Bureau (TGSB) and the Food Safety & Quality and Authority (FSQA). The involvement of TGSB in establishing sectoral quality frameworks and standards appears to have been successful; with TGSB possibly positioning itself as a certification body for HACCP accreditation of enterprises after the end of the project. FSQA is expected to develop regulations and police the implementation of TGSB standards. Support was belatedly delivered in 2015 to FSQA for foundational activities in this regard. Despite logistical hurdles on the part of the MIE, they appear to have broadly met the set objectives of the support. Given the late start, the practical impact of their policing role will not be felt until after the end of the project and requires full support from the governance authorities.
4. SCED's Support for quality certification resulted in assistance to the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) for the upgrading of its laboratory to be able to meet international standards for certifying the content of aflatoxin in produce. This was a major concern at the MTE as it appeared unlikely to be fulfilled during the project lifetime. It was seen as an important hurdle to secure greater market access and value for Gambian produce, especially GN. Significant strides have been



made by the MIE, going beyond the agreed scope of intervention - in order to circumvent the inertia at NARI - and a basic level of operability has been established. The accreditation will not be secured within the project lifetime, but the momentum has been established for national stakeholders to reinforce to its conclusion within the near term. National stakeholders appear concerned at what they see as the ever tightening standards on aflatoxin tolerance by key Western markets. They appear to be tempted to circumvent this stricture by exploiting the emerging Chinese market (an opportunity that was not anticipated by the SCED) which currently has a lower level of intolerance.

5. Quantitative goals for FFS have been met. There is, however, no contextual information allowing the evaluation team to place the results in the context of the overall demand for such interventions in the sectors. Has demand been 10% met? 20%? What is the contribution of other interventions, past and present? The information systems of the project do not address these important questions. National stakeholders appear broadly satisfied with the intervention although there is some concern that the current markets for produce in The Gambia may not adequately discriminate in price between produce from farms that implement FFS standards and those that do not.
6. HACCP compliance support to downstream entities (i.e. firms that purchase from farmers) has been well received by beneficiaries and a few (3 or less) entities are poised to secure certification from an external body funded by the project<sup>4</sup>. This certification will not happen within the formal lifetime of the project and is expected in February 2016 at the earliest. The market effect of certification may prompt other entities to subsequently seek certification. The extent to which this happens will be subject to the speed with which TGSB secures certification body status, bringing down the costs of certification.
7. The supply-side goals of Trade Information appear to have been reasonably met through the establishment of the basic delivery infrastructure. The operation of input and output calendars to manage the regular and reliable collation and dissemination of information is still at an early stage. The actual trade information may be lop-sided with some evidence that the CN sector is far more active. Further, there appears to have been inadequate effort to secure demand-side evidence of the reception of the TI service, as expected by the log-frame indicators<sup>5</sup>.
8. Overall, most project objectives have registered reasonable, if insufficient, progress. It is considered reasonable given the challenging operating context of The Gambia. The momentum established should be sufficient for committed national stakeholders to take the project objectives to full fruition in the near term after the end of the project. Important quantitative indicators identified in the log-frame e.g. increase in sector sales, individual incomes and demand for trade information, have not been monitored by the project. This unsatisfactory situation makes it difficult to conclude on key measures of effectiveness, leaving only broad – but inconclusive – qualitative information (such as interview responses) for evaluation.

<sup>4</sup> Although the work of the Evaluation Team as documented in Appendix 5 indicates 2-3 likely certifications, the MIE (in its comments on the draft report – Appendix 12 comment ID20) has asserted that there are now four likely certifications.

<sup>5</sup> In its comments on the draft report (Appendix 12 comment ID 22), the MIE provided this information on demand-side evidence: *“The Trade Information Portal [www.gambiatradinginfo.org](http://www.gambiatradinginfo.org) is the dissemination channel of information services produced at the MOTIE. This Portal has been provided with the functionality of back-trace reporting. This means that the system can generate and keep records like frequency of visit, downloaded documents, time spent in the various pages, most requested contents, etc. In this case, demand-side’s evidence of reception does exist”*. As explained in the Evaluation team’s response (Appendix 12) we do not consider that this is sufficient for the revision of our conclusion.

#### E2.3.4 Efficiency

1. Time and cost are the major considerations in efficiency. Given the highly specific nature of the SCED activities, it was not practical to measure cost/benefit for components relative to external benchmarks. The overall administration cost to total project cost was budgeted at a reasonable 19%, within the 25% guideline ceiling identified from the experience of the evaluation team. However, the actual costs came in higher than budgeted, falling just short of 27%. This was still reasonably close to the 25% benchmark and may be attributable to the additional effort required to manage the complex challenges posed by time-related inefficiencies caused by national stakeholders.
2. Timeliness is a significant drag on the project deliverables. All components bar the Tourism study were much delayed in their implementation due to national challenges of coordination and action. This was highlighted in the MTE and continued to be a factor in the final stages of the project. There was some evidence of delays on the part of the MIE, as with the promised funding for the FSQA activities, but the activities appear to have been largely completed on time.
3. The Tourism study did not include a funding activity at the project design stage. However, the MIE accepted a call from national stakeholders for its inclusion. Due to a difficult external environment for funding of The Gambia, the targeted donors' conferences have not been secured in the project lifetime. There is no evidence that national stakeholders will be able to secure the funding in the near term. This is responsible for a significant reduction in the efficiency rating of the Tourism component.

#### E2.3.5 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment

1. The project information systems did not systemically track the established quantitative and qualitative indicators for this criterion. This made it difficult for the evaluation team to establish compliance with the project objective.
2. Some of the programme components formally have a high participation of women; such as that of the NAWFA which was a focal entity for the SS interventions. One of the seven enterprises selected for quality assurance support and eventual HACCP certification was led by a woman. However, it is not likely to secure HACCP status in the short term, although she expressed deep satisfaction with the benefits secured so far, from the SCED. She was convinced that, together with other past and current donor interventions, her domestic market competitiveness has been enhanced by the SCED.
3. Overall, the limited cross-sectional evidence gathered by the evaluation team was not sufficient, in the absence of the project's collation of evidence on the indicators identified in the log-frame, to allow for a conclusive statement on this evaluation criterion.

#### E2.3.6 Impact and Sustainability

1. There is a close relationship between the factors contributing to impact and sustainability in this evaluation, hence their combined assessment.
2. The Tourism study and the sector strategies may be compromised and risk some element of obsolescence for lack of timely funding for implementation. There is evidence that the MIE has established contacts for possible subsequent funding of sector strategy and related short term activities through the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), hence they attract a higher sustainability rating of strategies relative to the Tourism study.



3. Impact may be highest on the actions of TGSB, which has attained all sectoral goals for quality frameworks and standards. The amplification of those efforts may now rely on the policing efforts of the FSQA for which foundational support has been delivered but has yet to fully manifest itself on the sector markets. The eventual emergence of TGSB as a HACCP certifying body will also amplify the impact of the efforts delivered so far in preparing downstream entities for certification. The remaining uncertainty relating to the NARI laboratory has diluted the impact rating for component A2a.
4. FFS appear well received although the structures for maintaining the effort through Ministry of Agriculture do not yet appear completed<sup>6</sup>. The impact and sustainability of TI services must necessarily be subject to the quality of reception by users, for which adequate systems of monitoring are yet to be established. However, the medium term effort may be assured by the, already confirmed, inclusion of the service costs in the recurrent budget of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Employment & Regional Integration (MOTIE).
5. The overall impact of the project on incomes and poverty reduction cannot be conclusively established due to the omission from the project's information systems of measures to track the important indicators identified in the log-frame. The information secured by the evaluation team suggests positive effects, but are not a sufficient basis for definitive conclusions.
6. The sustainability of the project effects depends on the commitment of national stakeholders to take the remaining steps required (post-project) to secure full project effectiveness; and to maintain –and improve upon – such structures in the long term. This will demand increased commitment and improved timeliness of action than demonstrated during the project implementation period.

#### E2.3.7 Innovation, Replication & Scaling Up

1. By their nature, the studies offer less opportunities for these joint criteria, although they do offer scope for innovation in their development process and their output design. There is a pressing need for near-term funding of the sector strategies in full, hence a higher “scaling up” potential is accorded to the implementation sub-component of the sector strategies.
2. The policing activities of the FSQA need to be rapidly scaled up to provide an incentive for compliance with sector standards set by TGSB. Broadly, the literature on national competitiveness emphasises the importance of a positive cycle of setting, policing and elevating performance standards.
3. Within an effectively policed standards environment, the certification services offered by the NARI will have commercial value. This offers the opportunity for private sector competition in the provision of such services, possibly under a regulated/performance linked limited-term contract (subject to the scope for unbridled competition in the service<sup>7</sup>).

<sup>6</sup> Stakeholder clarification (comment ID 7, Appendix 12): The goal of the project is for institutions and stakeholders to have the knowledge and skills to manage and implement FFS. First, the FFS manuals were developed and handed over to the Minister of Agriculture by the Minister of Trade. During the handing over the Minister of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary all affirmed that the manuals will be used as a reference document for FFS for the sector. The manuals were also presented to all Agricultural Regional Directorates. In addition, 40 extension workers, 195 farmers from sector organizations were trained as trainers by the project and over 2000 farmers have been trained and skilled in FFS. With this fact there is reason to believe that there is sufficient capacity and skills to manage and implement FFS either by MOA of farmer organisations. At least 3 projects of MOA (Cowpea, NEMA and FSADEP) are implementing FFS and those trained in the project are the ones managing them.

<sup>7</sup> A feasibility study would be needed to establish the scope for private sector participation.

4. In principle, FFS offer the greatest scope for scaling up – subject to an assessment of the level of unmet demand in the sectors. In a properly policed environment, the demand for HACCP compliance by downstream actors is likely to escalate as it would affect access to both domestic and export markets. The establishment of TGSB as a local certification body would be an important pre-requisite.
5. Trade information is an essential lubricant to good and timely enterprise and policy-maker decision making. The TI is still at an embryonic stage of implementation. There is thus significant scope for generating further impact from this component.
6. Overall, the project does not offer innovative effects. Given The Gambia's low level of national competitiveness on an international basis<sup>8</sup>, the activities represent "low hanging fruit" that offer ready pay-offs to national income and productivity, if successfully implemented in full.

### **E3. Lessons Learnt & Best Practices**

1. Lessons learnt are consistent with the observations of the MTE.

#### ***Timeline of the SCED***

2. Given a lifespan of three years, the SCED started in June 2012, which a stakeholder described as untimely due to its coincidence with the busy season for the farmers targeted by the SCED. It reportedly had an adverse effect on activities undertaken at the onset with potential cascading impact. Sector strategies were not launched until June 2014 i.e. after two-thirds of the project lifespan, due to lethargy among key national actors. The important piloting of the sector strategies was deviated from design due to time constraints. The project had to be extended by eight months to increase the likelihood of impact.
3. The total effect of these considerations is that national context should inform project lifecycles. This would require a more demanding feasibility study leading up to the project plan. It would also demand greater organisational flexibility on the part of development partners. The possibility of suspension of activities whilst enabling conditions are re-established should be considered, if that will eventually support the difference delivered by the intervention.

#### ***Enhancing the optimal mix of public/private partnerships***

4. Key stakeholders highlighted the importance of ensuring that the institutional and management arrangements for the project to reflect the optimal mix of public and private responsibilities in attaining goals. The evaluators identified that the programme leadership and implementation was largely driven by national and international public sector actors. Especially in the West African region, the driving forces of the public sector and the commercial sector are poorly aligned and often are conflicting.
5. The challenges of instability in the management and outcomes of the groundnut sector were identified in the DTIS 2007 as primarily resulting from public-sector interventions. The design of the SCED did not include any mitigating actions, and the problem reportedly continued during the project lifespan. The appointment of implementation coordinating bodies for the CN & SS strategies was also reportedly significantly delayed and influenced by actions of the governance authorities. The launch of the sector strategies and the Trade Information Network was similarly delayed.

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<sup>8</sup> As measured by the annual Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum – [www.weforum.org](http://www.weforum.org)

6. The state-run NARI had reportedly been unable to meet expectations under the previous support from the West Africa Quality Programme, yet it was positioned as a key actor for SCED. Alternatives should be pro-actively considered in such a context.

#### ***Assessing the capacity of Trade Support Institutions (TSIs)***

7. Key stakeholders were concerned that inadequate assessment had been undertaken at the outset of the capacity of TSIs to provide the required interventions on a sustainable basis. For example, the baseline report identified that NAWFA had under a previous project received investments that created a large number of Farmer Field Schools, the greater part of which had disappeared by the time of the SCED9. The SCED had not clearly put in place mitigating actions to cope with capacity constraints of TSIs and the potential dilution of its impact.
8. The poor management of the tarpaulin support to the SS sector further illustrates the challenges of some TSIs. Their poor financial self-sustainability is also a major hurdle to their effectiveness outside of donor funding.

#### ***Good Practices***

9. The evaluation evidence suggests a rigorous and professional approach to the project management process by the MIE. The MIE maintains financial information on both a functional-basis and on an activity-based format<sup>10</sup>. The project management, monitoring, evaluation and control processes deployed by the MIE were broadly consistent with best practices expected by the MTE evaluators. However, this was diluted by the observed lapses in monitoring some key logframe indicators and the weaknesses observed in supporting management decisions with broader information on the operating context. All other things being constant, this should be a high impact project.

#### ***Constraints***

10. The evaluation team observed isolated occurrences of untimely action and delayed funding by the MIE that had a potential to dilute the effect of the intervention.
11. Project activities require the dedicated partnership of the MIE and the Gambia public and non-state sectors actors to attain the desired objectives. Although the programme seeks to deliver an impact on the international competitiveness of commercial (mainly non-state) sectors of the Gambian economy, the public sector is a critical partner in shaping the national business environment. The Gambian public sector operates in perennially elevated levels of environmental uncertainty with high rates of staff and ministerial attrition and redeployment. This intervention cannot be insulated from the effects of this uncertainty on absorption capacity and impact.

### **E4. Conclusions & Recommendations**

#### ***E4.1 Conclusions on the Overall Effect of the Project***

1. The SCED is a well-conceived project. Given a challenging situation at the MTE, much effort has been delivered to secure a strong foundation for all components. Critical elements such as the quality enhancement and Trade Information programmes are now within the grasp of full effectiveness by

<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that at least one stakeholder claimed that the beneficial effects of those earlier FFS interventions were sustained in the farming communities.

<sup>10</sup> However, it was noted during this Final Evaluation that the activity based information was manually generated at the request of the evaluation team and was not readily available for effective project management by the MIE.

national stakeholders – if they demonstrate the collective will to succeed. Delays and challenges encountered during project implementation are not sufficiently consistent with this collective will.

2. The Quality Enhancement (QE) and Trade Information (TI) programmes can be seen as short-term solutions that pave the way for the attainment of long-term objectives embedded in the sector strategies and the Tourism study. Those short-term actions are well within the capacity of national stakeholders to deliver, subject to continuing support for selected elements, possibly from the 11th European Development Fund (the MIE has undertaken preliminary discussions on this funding possibility). However, the funding of the long-term actions is very uncertain and needs to be crystallised before the strategies lose relevance over time.
3. Partial implementation of the short term actions will not be enough, as it is the full implementation of these deliverables that offer the synergistic effects on national competitiveness.
4. For example, “almost” securing international accreditation for the NARI laboratory will not be enough. Only full accreditation will deliver the desired effects of the related project component. Similarly, establishing TGSB standards will not be enough. They must be effectively policed by, inter alia, the FSQA. Policed standards will not be sufficient; there must be a cost-effective national certifier of HACCP processes to allow enterprises to implement FSQA compliant systems.
5. Previously rated at an overall likelihood of impact of 50% at the MTE, the likelihood at the final evaluation has improved, probably to a level of 70% - reflecting the greater momentum on offer to national stakeholders – after the project extension - from tactical actions of the QE and TI components that require full implementation, preferably within the next 12 months - for synergistic impact.
6. It is noteworthy that lapses in the Monitoring & Evaluation system outlined in E2.2.6 mean that it will be difficult to have conclusive evidence of impact, as key indicators specified in the log-frame for the overall objective and for component objectives were not monitored by the project.

#### **E4.2 Recommendations**

1. We offer seven recommendations within four cross-cutting themes in the summary table below.

Findings: Identified problems/issues	Supporting evidence/examples	Recommendations
<p><b>Cross-cutting issue #1/4:</b> Timeline of Projects: Given the issues that needed to be resolved before the fast-approaching end of the SCED, its implementation timeline was extended to 31 December 2015 as a response to the recommendation of the MTE. As at the final evaluation, key elements of some components are still incomplete. However, the additional time has allowed for the generation of momentum that should see the completion of outstanding activities, by committed national stakeholders, after the project closure. In general, we propose that the EIF should consider a flexible rather than a fixed timeline for the implementation of <i>future</i> projects. This would provide the space necessary for project managers to focus on impact driven action rather than input driven reaction. Project timelines should be tailored to the demands of impact in the country context rather than the convenience of the funding partner.</p>		
<p>[Theme: Timeline] The planned three (3) year lifetime of the project did not fully reflect the demands and uncertainties of the programme and the Gambian context and was too short to attain mission-critical goals.</p>	<p>- Management response to the MTE</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 1.</b></p> <p>Project timelines should be flexible and determined by a more rigorous baseline and in-project examination of the positive and negative risks posed by national contexts. There should be provision for temporary suspension of activities (and consequent extension of implementation timeline) where</p>

Findings: Identified problems/issues	Supporting evidence/examples	Recommendations
		<p>deemed necessary to optimise the impact of an intervention</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>ES &amp; TFM.</p>
<p><b>Cross cutting issue #2/4:</b> Enhancing the mix of public/private participation in projects. In West Africa, although policy makers publicly adhere to the principle of the private and commercial sectors leading economic growth and employment, in practice the sector is crowded out from economic space by the activities of the public sector. A prime consequence is the punishingly high cost of capital which was identified by the Gambia DTIS as a major constraint on long term investments and employment in the commercial sector. In principle, an intervention targeting the international competitiveness of the commercial sector should seek to attain an optimal mix of public and private sector participation that, in the national context, enhances the likelihood of attaining the desired project goals.</p>		
<p>[Theme: Optimising the public/private mix] For The Gambia, chronically elevated levels of staff and key person attrition and redeployment in the public sector may - in addition to the factors noted above - disrupt the effectiveness of the structures, systems and processes that are required for the timely implementation and the sustainability of the programme interventions.</p> <p>This can result from the unplanned loss of key staff from important public sector entities involved in the delivery of project outputs.</p> <p>Asymmetrical levels of influence over staff deployment &amp; attrition within the public sector may make this long term risk difficult to mitigate.</p>	<p>Contextual knowledge and experience of the evaluators; Project document; Stakeholder interviews &amp; questionnaires that indicate issues and delays arising from public sector influence over project objectives.</p> <p>The effectiveness of the SCED was severely threatened by extended delays in pre-requisite action by the National Agricultural Research Institute that was required to establish an internationally accredited laboratory for certifying the compliance of Gambian produce with tolerated maximum levels of aflatoxin for key markets. Although much progress was made after the MTE, the certification was still not attained within the project lifetime. The MIE resorted to considering alternative external sources of service, although these were too late to be realised in the project lifetime (MIE Progress Report January-June 2015).</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 2</b></p> <p>Wherever feasible, projects targeting the competitiveness of the non-state sector should be visibly led by that sector, perhaps through the housing of implementation support units within a national chamber of commerce.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>ES &amp; TFM.</p> <p><b>Recommendation 3</b></p> <p>Where public entities are known to be weak, options should be pro-actively examined - at the planning stage - for alternatives where they form an important element of the value chain of a targeted competitive sector.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>ES &amp; TFM.</p>
<p><b>Cross cutting issue #3/4:</b> Important deliverables are at an advanced stage of implementation and require sustained commitment of national stakeholders for ensuring their success delivery after the formal closure of the project on 31 December 2015. The Project Steering Committee should extend its lifespan until the all deliverables are attained.</p>		
<p>Although a lot of progress has been made since the MTE, there are important elements of each component that are yet to be fully attained. National commitment to their realisation is required after the formal closure of the project.</p>	<p>MIE Progress and Field Reports – June 2015, August 2015, September 2015:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sector strategies and Tourism study: mobilisation of resources for timely implementation</li> <li>• Quality enhancement (regulatory institutions): Realisation of TGSB as a HACCP certifying body; Effective policing of TGSB standards by FSQA. Feasibility study for a non-state actor to provide HACCP certification.</li> <li>• Quality enhancement (certification laboratory): international accreditation of NARI laboratory for aflatoxin testing; feasibility study for alternative sources of aflatoxin testing; realisation of alternative sources of aflatoxin testing.</li> <li>• Quality Enhancement (Farmer Field Schools): securing funding from 11<sup>th</sup></li> </ul>	<p><b>Recommendation 4.</b></p> <p>The Project Steering Committee should extend its lifespan until all deliverables have been attained, thereby acting as an enabler of national commitment. Costs of meetings should be met from the national budget.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>SCED project steering committee &amp; MOTIE</p>

Findings: Identified problems/issues	Supporting evidence/examples	Recommendations
	<p>EDF/FAO for sustaining and scaling up on the gains of the SCED.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality Enhancement (Farmer Field Schools): Agreeing the funding of short term FFS operating mechanisms by the Ministry of Agriculture.</li> <li>• Quality Enhancement (downstream intermediaries): Attainment of HACCP certification by the first set of Gambian enterprises; Regulatory incentives and sanctions to encourage HACCP compliance and certification once TGSB or other non-state body offers a national service.</li> <li>• Quality Enhancement (downstream intermediaries): ensuring fair rules of access to the use of packaging machines to operators who did not receive machines.</li> <li>• Trade Information: Full operation and accountability structures for timely attainment of input and output calendars (for production and dissemination of information respectively); All sectors fully participating in the information system; technology mechanisms for pushing information to key users beyond the current web-service (sms etc); Regular assessment of the service by users allows for fine-tuning to ensure relevance.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Cross cutting issue #4/4:</b> Project monitoring and evaluation systems must be designed to report on all indicators identified in the project logical framework. Wherever feasible, information must be presented within a wider national context in order to provide evidence of the contribution of a project to sectoral or national challenges or opportunities.</p>		
<p>There were repeated instances of project indicators, identified in the log-frame, that were not subject to monitoring and evaluation by the SCED systems implemented by the MIE.</p> <p>Some important project indicators operated at the output/[results] and outcome/[what was achieved] levels only. They were not reported within an environmental context that permitted the assessment of impact i.e. the difference made to total sectoral and national outcomes.</p>	<p>Examples of log-frame indicators not measured:</p> <p><b>For the overall objective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expansion onto new markets with adequate spread across markets in the respective sectors</li> <li>- Increased of sales (domestic, regional and international markets) in the respective sectors by 3%</li> </ul> <p><b>For component A1:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of stakeholders participating in activities organized during the sector design process; sex disaggregated</li> </ul> <p><b>For component A2:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Income levels of targeted beneficiaries increase from sex disaggregated baseline study</li> <li>- Increased unit and total value of exports or domestic sales in the respective sectors</li> <li>- (Exporter) client satisfaction towards rendered support services.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Recommendation 5.</b></p> <p>A checklist for project inception should include verification that log-frame indicators have been satisfactorily incorporated into a Project's Monitoring &amp; Evaluation (M&amp;E) system.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>ES &amp; TFM.</p> <p><b>Recommendation 6.</b></p> <p>A checklist for project inception should include verification that log-frame indicators include contextual information that allows for the effect of a project intervention to be compared to the overall demand or need for intervention.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p>


Findings: Identified problems/issues	Supporting evidence/examples	Recommendations
	<p><b>For component B:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased usage (of at least 25%) of MOTIE's information services.</li> <li>- User satisfaction increases from initial baseline established at start of project.</li> </ul>	<p>ES &amp; TFM.</p> <p><b><u>Recommendation 7.</u></b></p> <p>A checklist for project inception should include verification that project implementers have established contact with a national aid coordination office or, in their absence, with other projects. M&amp;E information should include relevant information on the work of complementary projects and systemic in-project learning and mutual support tools should be designed to optimise the likelihood of a positive outcome.</p> <p><b>Action by:</b></p> <p>ES &amp; TFM.</p>



## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background & Context: The Gambia

1.1.1. The Gambia is a small Anglophone country surrounded on three sides by francophone Senegal with a 60 km border on the Atlantic Ocean. The economy is limited by a small internal market, and poverty is a challenge.



**Figure 1: Map of The Gambia**

Source: Lonely Planet

1.1.2. The Gambia has, for decades, served as a regional trade-hub, using the river as a transportation link to the hinterland. Relatively low import taxes, well-functioning port and customs services, and limited administrative barriers served to reinforce The Gambia's position as a trading centre. About 80 percent of Gambian merchandise exports consisted of re-exports to the sub-region i.e. goods imported into The Gambia and transported unofficially into Senegal and beyond. The Gambian economy and especially its public finances were highly dependent on this trade because imported goods destined for re-export pay the normal import duties. Over the last decade, however, re-exports have declined due to a combination of tensions with Senegal, harmonisation of import and sales taxes in the region, and improved port and customs operations in Senegal and other neighbouring countries. This called for a strategy to build growth on a more secure foundation.

1.1.3. Groundnuts are the other traditional pillar of the economy, but the sector has perennially confronted severe domestic and international challenges, and exports have fluctuated sharply in recent decades, aggravated by the failed privatization of the mid-1990s. Contamination by aflatoxin has been an additional problem, markedly reducing the value of exports and access to markets. Fishing, horticulture, sesame and cashew nuts are promising areas of export diversification but so far progress has been limited. Tourism has been the one bright spot and has become easily the country's most significant foreign exchange earner. However, this sector was badly hit by the Ebola epidemic that affected Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea in 2014/15. Although The Gambia remained Ebola-free, the widespread media accentuated global panic led to major falls in tourist arrivals in the 2014/15 season. There are tentative hopes for a revival in the 2015/16 season.



## 1.2. Background & Context: Project Summary

Project title:	Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project (SCED)
Project reference:	GAM/4B/01A
Project category:	Technical assistance & capacity building (EIF Tier 2)
Grant recipient:	Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration & Employment (MOTIE)
Main Implementing Entity:	International Trade Centre (ITC)
Starting date:	June 2012
End date:	31 December 2015 (extended from 30 April 2015)
Total project costs:	US\$ 2,355,517
Source of funds:	Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) Trust Fund Multilateral
Other sources of funding:	In-kind contribution from the Government of The Gambia (GOTG)-US\$ 413,500
Purpose of this exercise:	Final Evaluation
Period covered by final evaluation:	1 June 2012 to 1 December 2015

**Table 1: Summary of the SCED Project**

## 1.3. Background & Context: The Sector Competitiveness & Export Diversification Project

1.3.1. The SCED Project of the GOTG is funded by a grant from the EIF Trust Fund. The SCED is being implemented by the ITC with support from the National Implementation Unit (NIU) housed in the MOTIE.

## 1.4. Background & Context: The Components of the SCED Project

1.4.1. The SCED includes three components.

### 1.4.2. Component A: Sector Strategies & Quality Enhancement

1.4.2.1. Component A includes sector strategy development for cashew nuts and sesame plus quality enhancement to increase export opportunities for the cashew nut (CN), groundnut (GN), and sesame (SS) sectors.

### 1.4.3. Component B: Sector cross-cutting assistance in the area of trade information

1.4.3.1. The overall aim of this component is to enable The Gambia's private and public sector to access relevant trade related information through MOTIE's information services, particularly, in the first instance, the cashew nut and sesame sectors.

### 1.4.4. Component C: Inclusive Tourism Development Opportunity Study

1.4.4.1. This component aims to identify and assess the potential for the development of inclusive tourism activities in The Gambia. It entails assessing the potential for developing inclusive tourism activities in The Gambia. In addition, horticulture and handicraft product value chains will be analysed, including an assessment of the demand from hotels, tour operators and tourists. The objective of this exercise is to identify parts of value chain where pro-poor project interventions can be implemented in order to integrate marginalised communities into income generating activities along the tourism value chain, given that tourism is a significant contributor to The Gambia's economy.

## 1.5. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

1.5.1. The objectives of the final evaluation are to:

1. Assess the performance, results and impact of the project, through a consultative and participatory process; the progress made towards addressing the MTE recommendations will be taken into consideration as well; and
2. Generate findings, recommendations and lessons useful for ongoing and future projects and programmes.

1.5.2. The final evaluation is expected to:

- assess all elements of the project design, implementation, and management including processes, operations, and results;
- cover the period from start of project implementation to 1 December 2015<sup>11</sup>;
- assess the management of the project cycle in relation to project delivery and timeliness, while considering roles, responsibilities and decision making processes;
- assess the extent to which results have been achieved;
- look at the overall contribution of the project to the project's direct beneficiaries and situate the benefits of the project in the national trade development context;
- assess the broader role of the ITC in supporting the identification of trade priorities, capacity building and/or transfer.

## 1.6. Scope of the Evaluation

1.6.1. The terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation exercise (see Appendix 1) include criteria for evaluation which are set out in categories with a list of pertinent questions for consideration by the evaluation team.

1.6.2. This final evaluation covers all activities from the start of the project on 1 June 2012 to the end of the extended period on 31 December 2015.

## 1.7. Methodologies used in the Evaluation

1.7.1. **Overview.** The evaluation team applied the following three steps:

1. *Assessment of the Management Response to the MTE recommendations.* This assessed the extent to which the project response is, in principle, adequate to address the concerns raised by the consultants; and to consequently enhance the likelihood of a positive project impact. In addition, we sought understanding of why the responses were what they were and to integrate Stakeholders feedback into the picture, when appropriate.
2. *Examination of the actions since 1 July 2014 and their consistency with the Management Response.* In this phase, we investigated how far, and how well, the SCED has implemented the actions required by the project response.
3. *Concluding on the final evaluation.* Drawing on the evidence of the management information systems made available to the evaluation team and on the verifications provided by our field interviews of stakeholders, we concluded on the seven evaluation categories detailed in the TOR

<sup>11</sup> Given that the Final Evaluation is being conducted between October and December 2015, it was agreed by the consultants and the ITC Evaluation Unit that the cut-off date for the evidence to be considered by the evaluation shall be 1 December 2015. The evaluation team shall also incorporate any significant new evidence that arises after this date and before the finalisation of the report.

(Appendix 1). This process included a holistic view of the performance of the project and its components since inception, identifying any new evidence – not present at the mid-term – which may influence the conclusions of this final evaluation. Documents reviewed as a contribution to this process are shown at Appendix 2.

4. *Recommendations for the improvement of future EIF projects in similar contexts.* The evaluation team considered the implications of this evaluation for the design and implementation of similar EIF projects in the future. Considerations included:

- What are the criteria of a successful project?
- What has been missing in the present project? Absorption capacity? Management capacity? Supply issues? Etc.
- What do we need to put in place that is acceptable and implementable for The Gambia, to obtain more successful projects?
- How does EIF put this in place: resources, approach, new elements, etc.

1.7.2. *Field Research & Data Analysis.* The MTE utilised semi-structured questionnaires for implementing partners and for beneficiaries. The information secured at that stage, just over a year ago, remains valuable. This final evaluation did not develop and administer new questionnaires. Instead, the evaluation team used the Investigatory Questions for the seven Evaluation Categories (Appendix 1) as a guide to group discussions with key stakeholders for each SCED sub-component (Appendices 7 to 10). Where feasible, these group discussions were held at the MOTIE office in Banjul. Where necessary, we had them at another venue that was more convenient to the stakeholders. In each case, we provided a brief on the MTE recommendations for the component, the management response and our assessment of actions since 1 July 2014. We facilitated holistic discussions on the performance of the related component.

1.7.3. In addition, we conducted in-depth case studies on selected beneficiaries (Appendix 6). These case studies provided complementary, qualitative and rich, evidence to the quantitative analysis done at the mid-term and to the other documentary and interview evidence collected for this final evaluation. This provides a robust perspective of the real effects of the project on the actors responsible for demonstrating the improved competitiveness that is at the core of the project objective.

1.7.4. In preparing our evaluation report, we considered the implications of these group discussion findings for the evidence gained from the desk review. Where clarifications were required on the content of our draft report, we had follow up one-on-one interviews of relevant persons. Appropriate amendments were consequently made to our draft report. This included, but was not limited to, the insertion of footnotes where this was required to communicate the particular perspective of individual stakeholders alongside the perspective of the evaluation team. The draft report was, in addition, presented to a meeting of the Project Steering Committee in The Gambia held on Tuesday 15 March 2016. The Lead Evaluator took questions from participants. There was general understanding and satisfaction with the findings and recommendations of the report.

1.7.5. Our sampling strategy of stakeholders was as shown below:

Group/Description	Number in group	Unit of Measure	No of Entities	Sampling strategy	Actual numbers interviewed
1. ITC staff	10	Persons	1	Individual discussions as required to clarify issues arising from the draft report	9
2. Consultants on various project components	32	Persons	-	National consultants were invited to participate in relevant component group meetings	-
3. Focal Points in The Gambia for the various project components	5	Persons	-	Focal points were invited to participate in relevant component group meeting	5
4. Companies & TcC in HACCP programme	15	Persons	7	Participants were invited to Quality enhancement component group meeting	4
5. Sesame Sector Development Committee Members	15	Entities	←	Participants were invited to sector strategies (SS) component group meeting	4
6. Cashew Sector Development Committee Members	18	Entities	←	Participants were invited to sector strategies (CN) component group meeting	6 plus attendees at the Annual General Meeting of the Cashew Alliance of Gambia
7. Groundnut Sector Development Committee Members	18	Entities	←	Participants were invited to sector strategies (GN) component group meeting	9
8. Trade Information Committee Members	8	Entities	←	Participants were invited to Trade information component group meeting	6
9. Quality Assurance Taskforce	10	Entities	←	Participants were invited to Quality enhancement component group meeting	-

1.7.6. We planned and executed five group meetings with stakeholders, spanning all sub-components of the SCED.

1.7.7. The evidence from the desk review and the interviews/discussions was assessed for the risk and opportunity posed to the project evaluation categories.

## 1.8. The Outcome of the Mid Term Evaluation (MTE)

1.8.1. The MTE found that the SCED is a well-conceived project with potentially significant impact on the international competitiveness of the targeted sectors and on enhancing incomes among vulnerable

groups including women. The MIE had deployed best practices in the management, monitoring and evaluation of the project. An unrealistic timeline of three years had materially diluted the potential impact. Institutional weaknesses in key national implementing partners posed a serious threat to the sustainability of the related gains realised at the point of the MTE.

1.8.2. The MTE judged that, as things stood, the SCED had a roughly 50/50 potential for successful impact. The crystallisation of the project objectives depended on the implementation of all related quality assurance processes including a certified laboratory and the credible policing of the QAFs and SSs for the local and international markets. There was a high risk that the critical accredited laboratory would not be available within the project lifetime.

1.8.3. The primary recommendation was an extension of the project. This extension, by 8 months to 31 December 2015, was subsequently agreed by the project stakeholders.

1.8.4. In total, 14 recommendations were included in the MTE and were the subject of a subsequent management response and subsequent action. Three related to two cross-cutting issues whilst 11 related to urgent matters that required action on the individual components. A cross-cutting issue indicated that the time allocated to project implementation may be too short. A second cross-cutting matter highlighted the need to enhance the design and mix of public/private partnerships in order to attain project goals.<sup>12</sup>

## 2. Analysis & Findings: Review of the Implementation of Activities & the Attainment of Results

### 2.1. Component A1: Output - Development of Sector Strategies for Cashew Nut & Sesame

#### 2.1.1. Objective & Design

2.1.1.1. The SCED facilitated sector strategy development for CN and SS and a pilot implementation programme for them plus the GN sector (see section 2.2 for the assessment of the pilot implementation). The objective was to provide national stakeholders with a commonly agreed roadmap for the enhancement of the competitiveness of the two emerging export sector & SS. As a relatively mature sector with several previous studies, it was not considered necessary to develop a sector strategy for GN. *Public and Private stakeholders would be enabled to own the development of inclusive sector strategies and be sufficiently motivated to follow up on their implementation through efficient dialogue and cooperation.*

2.1.1.2. The key target beneficiaries were selected groups of producers already exporting or interested in exporting the three types of produce. Sector associations such as the ASPA, The Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC), the NAWFA, and the CAG were also expected to contribute to, as well as benefit from, the development and implementation of sector export strategies.

2.1.1.3. Further, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the NARI, the National Codex and SPS Committee (NCSPSC) and other trade support institutions (TSIs) who provide technical assistance to the relevant sectors were also expected to benefit from the component.

<sup>12</sup> The full MTE report can be downloaded at:

[http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/About\\_ITC/How\\_ITC\\_Works/Evaluation/Midterm%20Evaluation%20of%20Sector%20Competitiveness%20Export%20Diversification%20in%20The%20Gambia%202014.pdf](http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/About_ITC/How_ITC_Works/Evaluation/Midterm%20Evaluation%20of%20Sector%20Competitiveness%20Export%20Diversification%20in%20The%20Gambia%202014.pdf)

2.1.1.4. It was planned that gender would be taken into account in the sector strategy process to ensure that women are adequately represented not only in the production but also in the commercialisation of the three selected products.

### 2.1.2. Targeted Key Indicators

2.1.2.1. The logical framework (Appendix 4) identified the following indicators of success:

- Number of stakeholders participating in activities organised during the sector design process; sex disaggregated;
- Number of public and private sector statements in support of export development;
- Number of exporters in the cashew and sesame sectors receiving relevant assistance from TSIs; ensuring that women are benefitting;
- Number of policies relating the cashew and sesame sector having been introduced or modified in support of export development;
- Amount of Aid for trade received and disbursed for export development activities relating to the cashew and sesame sectors.

### 2.1.3. Review of Implementation: Indicator Performance

Indicator	Remarks
Number of stakeholders participating in activities organised during the sector design process; sex disaggregated;	Not formally tracked by the project. However, the range of organisational stakeholders noted in Appendix 2 suggests a good spread of national stakeholders. The indicator suggests that individuals should also be tracked and gender participation noted. Again, this information was not formally measured by the project.
Number of public and private sector statements in support of export development;	Again, this was not formally tracked. However, the desk review indicates public and private support for the initiative in various meetings of stakeholders, including the formal launch of the strategies in June 2014. Field research undertaken during this final evaluation also supports this assessment of support for the programme.
Number of exporters in the cashew and sesame sectors receiving relevant assistance from TSIs; ensuring that women are benefitting;	Appendix 3 indicates the exporters and processors benefitting from the programme. The field research for the final evaluation suggests that some potential beneficiaries who did not participate were not always fully aware of the activities of the programme. This raises the question of how participants were selected and the effectiveness of the communication strategy. There was no formal tracking of gender noted in the records available to the evaluation team.
Number of policies relating the cashew and sesame sector having been introduced or modified in support of export development;	The published sector strategies, formally launched at the MOTIE headquarters demonstrate success in the adoption of policies.
Amount of Aid for trade received and disbursed for export development activities relating to the cashew and sesame sectors.	There is no evidence available to the evaluation team that the sector strategies have actually resulted in increased aid for trade or other implementation support. This may, in part, reflect the long planning cycle of programme support from development partners and, in part, the challenging context of development assistance to The Gambia. The MIE has asserted that the planners of the 11 <sup>th</sup> European Development Fund have expressed a preliminary interest in allocating resources from this

Indicator	Remarks
	pending programme.

**Table 2: Reported Indicator Performance for Development of Sector Strategies**

Source: Evaluation Team

#### 2.1.4. Review of Implementation: Disbursements

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Component A1a: Sector strategy formulation	ES	398,643	383,951.82	14,692.18

**Table 3: Budgeted vs Actual Disbursements - Development of Sector Strategies**

Source: MIE data

2.1.4.1. The detailed expenditure statement is shown at Appendix 11.

#### 2.1.5. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance

2.1.5.1. Component A1a has activities that are largely sequential steps in strategy development starting from a baseline study and ending in the official launch of the sector strategies in June 2014.

2.1.5.2. *Baseline study.* The Baseline report was well done and was an important instrument of monitoring and evaluation of potential impact.

2.1.5.3. *Value chain diagnostic.* The sector evaluations for cashew and sesame were satisfactorily completed in November 2012. The work plan expanded to include diagnostic workshops for groundnuts that were reportedly well received.

2.1.5.4. *Assessment of strategic & funding choices.* The consideration of strategic choices appears to have been well facilitated by the MIE, with full participation of national stakeholders leading to costed and prioritised action plans for sesame and cashew indicates that this is not a matter for concern.

2.1.5.5. *Finalisation of strategies.* The strategies were drafted by the first half of 2013 and validated in August 2013. In consultations with the NIU, the MTE evaluators were advised that the implementation bodies for both cashew (CAG) and sesame (NAWFA) were concluded in the first half of 2014 and secretariat staff hired. The staffs are reportedly being paid by the SCED until the end of the project, where-after the arrangements for their financing is unclear.

2.1.5.6. *Launch of sector strategies.* The strategies for the sesame and cashew sectors were officially launched at the MOTIE headquarters in June 2014, nearly a year after they were validated, suggesting a disconcerting element of institutional inertia among key national stakeholders.

2.1.5.7. *Post Launch actions.* The implementation coordination secretariats focussed on the development of project profiles for the funding of the sector strategies. However, the donor roundtable promised for 2015 under the facilitation of the MIE did not materialise<sup>13</sup>. Other

<sup>13</sup> Clarification received from the MIE in comment ID 36 on the draft evaluation report (Appendix 12): "The Round table was to be organized by the NIU and other national partners, with some support from the MIE."



attempts by the implementation secretariats to seek alternative funding through national institutions such as GIEPA, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance do not appear to be capable of producing results in the foreseeable term<sup>14</sup>. There were reportedly “challenging” donor and NGO conditions, with those entities focussed on rural development and with little interest in trade (MIE report for January-June 2015). The provision of strategy implementation monitoring tools to the secretariats in order for them to track activities by other actors that may cover strategic priorities were reportedly made difficult by the reluctance of project managers to share information. There is a real risk that the strategies may lose relevance for want of timely implementation<sup>15</sup>.

## 2.2. Component A1: Output - Pilot implementation of sector strategies

### 2.2.1. Objective & Design

2.2.1.1. It was planned that, after the completion of the sector strategies, market-oriented activities identified as “priorities” in the strategies action plans would be implemented as “quick wins” that would give impetus to actions to seek third party funding for the remaining strategy activities. The log-frame (Appendix 4, item 1.6) included a temporary sample of activities that were to be replaced once the strategies were prepared. The log-frame assumed that the full strategies would secure external funding during the lifetime of the project partly due to the demonstration effect of the pilot.

### 2.2.2. Targeted Key Indicators

2.2.2.1. The log-frame anticipated that the indicators would be generated from the activities selected from the completed sector strategies. In practice, the sector strategies took much longer than planned to be developed and launched, with the latter only happening in June 2014, well into the final phase of the project’s lifespan. Consequently, the link between the pilot and the strategies was partly lost.

### 2.2.3. Review of Implementation: Indicator Performance

2.2.3.1. Activities targeted under this facility were:

- MOU with NARI for sesame seed supply and seed multiplication training (MIE Report June 2013);
- Supply of tarpaulins to sesame stakeholders in collaboration with NARI and NAWFA (MIE Report June 2013);
- Various advisory services and backstopping support to ASPA (groundnut sector –which did not have a sector strategy under the project) – MIE Report December 2013;
- Export packaging support to selected cashew sector stakeholders plus packaging resource centre at the GCCI.

<sup>14</sup> Clarification received from the MIE in comment ID 37 on the draft evaluation report (Appendix 12): “The GIEPA has budget for the coordination of meetings and CAG has secured support from ACI. Again, 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund is looking in these sectors”.

<sup>15</sup> Clarification received from the MIE in comment ID 38 on the draft evaluation report (Appendix 12): “They might lose relevance, but as they are linked to the NES (GIEPA) framework of coordination, some support will be provided to maintain them alive”.



#### 2.2.4. Review of Implementation: Disbursements

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Component A1b: Sector strategy implementation	SC	306,405	196,608.61	109,796.39

**Table 4: Budgeted vs Actual Disbursements – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies**

Source: MIE data

2.2.4.1. The detailed expenditure statement is shown at Appendix 11<sup>16</sup>.

#### 2.2.5. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance

2.2.5.1. *Sesame seed multiplication.* This activity was deemed as “very important” by the PSC Monitoring mission of December 2013. Its objective was to increase the prevalence of a high quality “white” variety of SS and to establish mechanisms for ensuring purity in the variety through the farming and marketing cycle. The pre-existing market had been prone to mixed varieties that were in less demand. NAWFA was to share responsibility with NARI for sustaining the seed purity cycle.

2.2.5.2. The subsequent project monitoring reports appear to have overlooked this activity<sup>17</sup>. Informal evidence from the interviews of stakeholders during this final evaluation suggests that the inventory control mechanisms required for sustenance of this purity process may not be effective.

2.2.5.3. *Supply of Tarpaulins to Sesame stakeholders.* This activity is mired in controversy as at least 21 of the 50 tarpaulins supplied to NAWFA for sesame growers are missing. Investigations have been ongoing for over a year without an end in sight. The effectiveness of the use of the remaining tarpaulins is unreported<sup>18</sup>.

2.2.5.4. *Support to the Groundnut sector via ASPA.* This support took the form of a study tour of best practices to Malawi and other related actions<sup>19</sup>. The difference offered to the sector of this activity has not been clearly reported.

2.2.5.5. *Export packaging support.* This support has been targeted at the cashew sector. Post MTE activities included a sector roundtable for discussion on packaging machines and buyer requirements, which took place in November 2014. Export packaging received attention in the interviews of stakeholders by the evaluation team. Recipients of the support were uniformly

<sup>16</sup> There is disagreement within the MIE on the disbursements for component A1b. The MIE’s SC team asserts thus: “SC allocation \$306 405.00 (figure matching allocation from evaluation report); SC spending \$252 639.02; amount unspent transferred to MIE EC team \$53,765.98 – as agreed in correspondence from 28/01/2015”. The MIE SCED coordinating team (OA) responded as follows: The funds were reallocated from SC to EC for the implementation activities regarding the pilot implementation activities on packaging development. Whilst [we] understand the issue raised by [SC] to have SC exact allocation/expenditure be reflected into the evaluation report, we should notice that actual allocations and expenditures for all sections were not pre-planned for the report. Therefore the figures in the evaluation report should be kept as they are and OA takes responsibility for that.

<sup>17</sup> Clarification from the MIE (comment ID 41, Appendix 12): “...This [activity] faced major issues, and ITC was not able to resolve them due to unresponsiveness of the [Gambian] counterpart, despite of numerous tries”.

<sup>18</sup> Clarification from the MIE (comment ID 42, Appendix 12): The MIE asserts that it agreed clear procedures of planning, implementation and accountability with NAWFA and the NIU. Consequently, it would appear that the losses were the result of national lapses in accountability and oversight.

<sup>19</sup> Clarification from the MIE (comment ID 43, Appendix 12): Other supported groundnut sector actions included - 1. Pre-marketing event 20-21 October 2012 (MOU with ASPA) 2. Groundnut sector workshop, Jenoi, November 2012 (MOU with ASPA) 3. Groundnut sector and dissemination workshop Jenoi November 2013 (MOU with ASPA) 4. Two videos of the Malawi and South Africa study tour 2014 for dissemination purpose

effusive about the positive effects of the support on their business outcomes, especially when considered in combination with the quality enhancement initiatives associated with the HACCP process in component 2. Recipients appeared aware of the importance of making provision for the maintenance and eventual replacement of the equipment. Less clear were the arrangements being made for the access to the packaging service by other processors, raising the adverse prospect of an asymmetrical intervention in a competitive market<sup>20</sup>.

### 2.3. Component A2: Quality Enhancement of CN, GN and SS Sectors

#### 2.3.1. Objective & Design

2.3.1.1. This component sought to improve the incomes of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame farmers and firms along the value chain by increasing their export opportunities through enhanced quality management and a strengthened business support environment.

#### 2.3.2. Targeted Key Indicators

2.3.2.1. The log-frame identified the following key indicators:

- Income levels of targeted beneficiaries increase from sex disaggregated baseline study;
- Increased unit and total value of exports or domestic sales in the respective sectors;
- (Exporter) client satisfaction towards rendered support services.

#### 2.3.3. Review of Implementation: Indicator Performance

2.3.3.1. The indicators were not formally tracked and reported by the project, which is surprising. The evaluation team obtained some insight into the performance of these indicators from the interviews undertaken with beneficiaries. These do not provide a definitive evaluation as would have been secured from a longitudinal monitoring and evaluation by the project. However, the results are useful as an indication of results. They are reported in section 2.3.5 et seq.

#### 2.3.4. Review of Implementation: Disbursements

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Component A2: Quality enhancement	EC	492,803	428,545	64,258

**Table 5: Budgeted vs Actual Disbursements – Quality Enhancement**

Source: MIE data

2.3.4.1. The detailed expenditure statement is shown at Appendix 11.

<sup>20</sup> Clarification from the MIE (comment ID 45, Appendix 12): A result of the roundtable was that 3 machines were procured and handed over to the most competitive enterprises according to assessment. 3 enterprises are now using high-quality durable packaging for consumer markets that include informative labels with bar codes, feature to open and close and presentable looks.

### 2.3.5. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance – Introduction

Quality Enhancement activities for CN, GN & SS			
Upgrading NARI's lab (aflatoxin)			
sector standards		Packaging and labelling	
Develop Quality Assurance Framework (HACCP/ISO 22006) CN	Enhance quality sorting & segregation for GN, Farmer Field School Prog. GN, CN & SS	Implement HACCP for GN, CN & SS	Develop Quality Assurance Framework (HACCP/ISO 22006) SS

**Table 6: Structure of Quality Enhancement Interventions**

Source: Adapted from the EIF Tier 2 Project Proposal August 2011

2.3.5.1. The quality enhancement programme spanned the full spectrum of the value chain in the three targeted sectors: from upstream farming activities, including cross-cutting regulatory oversight and quality certification, through to support for downstream intermediaries who process and/or trade for the domestic and export markets.

2.3.5.2. This performance review relied on a number of sources of evidence:

- Documents provided by the MIE, including the regular project progress reports (see Appendix 2);
- Group and individual interviews with sector stakeholders (Appendices 6 to 9).

### 2.3.6. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance – Cross Cutting Regulatory Oversight & Quality Certification

2.3.6.1. Two institutions were the focus of support to regulatory oversight: The Gambia Standards Board (TGSB) and the Food Safety & Quality Authority (FSQA). Quality certification supported the work of the NARI in certifying the compliance of produce with applicable export requirements of key external markets, especially the permissible level of aflatoxin. Certification also supported individual (downstream) processor companies in the implementation of internal quality assurance processes that meet export requirements (HACCP).

2.3.6.2. The performance against targets for this element of quality enhancement is noted below.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Output 2.1 Enhanced capacity of technicians on testing &amp; Output 2.2: Accreditation against ISO/IEC 17025 of NARI's lab for groundnut, cashew nut and sesame</b>													
Number of samples tested per year for aflatoxin for each sector	To annually test 321 samples of groundnuts and its by-products at NARI aflatoxin laboratory by end of project	321	321	321		963	321	321			15 <sup>21</sup>	642	33%
Number of lab technicians trained on ISO17025 requirements	5 staff (100%) of baseline to be trained on testing aflatoxin by Dec. 2014	0	3	2		5	21	16	5			-16	420%
Quality documentation complying with ISO 17025 for groundnut, cashew nut and sesame	HIGH quality documentation to facilitate accreditation of NARI's Lab by December, 2013.	Low	High	High		2	2	1	1			1	50%

<sup>21</sup> Quality of testing was evaluated in the audit

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Output 2.3: Standards and regulations developed for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame</b>													
Elaboration of a procedure for the development of standards in The Gambia	Procedure developed	1				1	1	1				0	100%
Number of standards & regulations for the control of quality and food safety of GN, CN & S.	Standards and regulations are fully developed for quality and safety of sector commodities	0	3	1		4	21		1	20		-17	525%
List of stakeholders involved in the standards development process.	Members of the Codex Committee fully involved in the Standards Development process	11	20	25		56	51	11	20	20		5	91%
Number of operators sensitised on standards for each sector.	Operators within the value chain of the various sectors are fully sensitized on standards by Dec. 2014	5	20	20		45	45	5	20	20		0	100%
<b>Output 2.7 (2.10) : Quality Assurance Framework for the cashew nut and sesame sectors</b>													
Integrated quality assurance framework for cashew nut and sesame	Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) developed and available by 2014	0	1	0		1	1		1			0	100%

**Table 7: Activities relating to Cross-Cutting Regulatory Oversight & Quality Certification**

Source: MIE Progress Report for January to June 2015

2.3.6.3. *Certification of NARI Lab* (output 2.1). A major risk facing the quality of impact of the project appears to remain the international accreditation of the NARI laboratory for the certification of Gambian export produce. The project has considered innovative solutions to this pivotal problem, but it remains a significant challenge.

2.3.6.4. An expert mission to support the improvement of the NARI Laboratory was carried out from 7 to 19 September 2015<sup>22</sup>. This followed the mission carried out in 2014 during which it was not possible to activate the laboratory due to problems related to instrumentation and the lack of equipment needed to carry out the analytical work.

2.3.6.5. After this latest visit, the expert concluded thus:

- That the lab has been operationally activated.
- The performance of the lab meets the European standard for analysis of aflatoxins.
- The structure of the lab needs a complete renovation in order to meet the essential international trade accreditation UNI EN 17025.
- The technical staffs need more training on the HPLC technique and about the requirements imposed by UNI EN 17025.
- There are small problems of instrumental nature (“the configuration of the HPLC and the baseline noise of the derivatization pump”) which however do not affect the performance of the method.

<sup>22</sup> NARI Lab Final Report, September 2015 by Mauro Sbaraglia

- A future mission may be needed to solve these minor problems.

2.3.6.6. These conclusions show marked progress since the MTE. However, it may not be sufficient to meet the requirements of the project for assurance of impact. The key considerations for this evaluation team are:

- Can the trade enhancement objectives of the SCED be attained without the international accreditation? Our understanding is that the answer is probably “no”.
- Is there sufficient national commitment of resources to follow through the attainments of the SCED after the end of the project in December 2015 and to secure accreditation within a reasonable timeframe within 2016? Our perception, given the experience of the delays since project inception, is that there is no evidence that the factors driving inertia at NARI have been overcome<sup>23</sup>.
- Are the significant lab staff capacity constraints identified by Mr Sbaraglia (see the additional example in the box on capacity weaknesses in procurement of lab supplies) not a challenge to the reliability of the lab results? It is unclear why the lab staff cannot prepare a technically robust set of specifications for the procurement of supplies. How soundly based, therefore, is the consultants’ conclusion on the operational status of the NARI lab?

**Box 1: PROCUREMENT AT NARI LAB**

The procedure to purchase the materials for the laboratory, (*according to what has been explained by the lab technicians*), is the following:

- the laboratory prepares the request for materials
- the ministry prepares the tender, pay(s) in advance and buy the materials
- the lab receives the materials.

Since often there is no(t) enough knowledge to prepare technical specifications (and sellers often do not have the necessary technical expertise) the lab (often) receives goods unusable. For example, in the laboratory there are at least 20-30 automatic pipettes new never used; at least 10 boxes of guard columns for HPLC new but which cannot be used because the holder sent are not suitable for these guard column.

The (procurement) procedure should be changed as follows:

- The laboratory prepares the demand of materials and technical specifications and if necessary require the assistance of a consultant (not a seller).
- The Ministry prepares the tender.
- The laboratory evaluate(s) the offers of (alternative) seller(s).
- the Ministry pay(s) in advance the 70-80% for the purchase of materials.
- The laboratory receives the materials controls them and sign(s) the final acceptance.
- The Ministry pays the difference.

In this way the responsibility of purchases goes to the Laboratory which certainly has more expertise to verify whether the materials meet the requirements.

Source: NARI Lab Final Report, M Sbaraglia. Sept 2015

2.3.6.7. On the other hand, the NARI laboratory is reportedly participating in several other capacity building programmes such as the Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa (PACA) of the AU, which has provided them new Vicam equipment to test the overall aflatoxin levels of the samples and the AflaSafe programme funded by the USDA that aims at reducing aflatoxin content in produce by spraying SNO1 (toxic fungus) in the groundnut fields<sup>24</sup>. It is possible that the combined effect of the momentum of these various initiatives, when combined with the ITC intervention, may be to secure the eventual completion of the accreditation process.

2.3.6.8. One incidental event is the reported funding by the USDA of the chemical management of aflatoxin. The evaluation team understands that the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) have promoted integrated pest management (IPM) of fields. The complementarity of the

<sup>23</sup> However, the possible positive effect of other capacity building interventions is noted below.

<sup>24</sup> Source: File Note of field visit of E. Luotonen, 11 August 2015

USDA intervention with the SCED IPM intervention was affirmed in a comment to the draft evaluation report detailed in comment ID 46 (Appendix 12).

- 2.3.6.9. The MIE is reportedly considering an interim measure of securing certification of Gambian produce by an external entity at reduced price (Progress Report, June 2015). In a comment (ID47, Appendix 12) to the draft report, the MIE confirmed that it has linked FSQA to an accredited test laboratory in Germany for testing for aflatoxin while the NARI lab is still under the process of accreditation. The lab was chosen following a call for tender to make sure that the test fees of this lab are most competitive. FSQA has reportedly used the services of this lab to identify the sources and points of contamination of groundnuts.
- 2.3.6.10. During the meeting of the evaluation team with Groundnut sector stakeholders, they communicated a factor that may reduce their incentive to comply with the requirements of the SCED. They reported that the Chinese market is increasing in importance and is less strict about aflatoxin levels. They acknowledged that this is likely a transitional matter, i.e. the Chinese are likely to eventually adopt the stricter standards of the West. However, this development may have a demotivating influence in the short to medium term. A related concern was the constant change in EU standards for aflatoxin, with the requirements becoming stricter with the passage of time. Stakeholders feel that they are chasing a moving target, which again raises the attractiveness of emerging markets with less rigorous requirements.
- 2.3.6.11. The quality documentation that was reported at 50% complete in June 2015 (Table 7) is now reportedly complete.
- 2.3.6.12. Overall, the NARI process can be said to be at an advanced stage with fine-tuning required to attain the project objectives. The momentum of activities within the SCED and other partners may provide the necessary impetus to completion after the close of the SCED.
- 2.3.6.13. *The role of TGSB & FSQA.* In January 2015, the MIE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to fund the activities of the FSQA in the implementation of the sector standards developed by TGSB. The satisfactory output of TGSB in the development of Quality Assurance Frameworks and sector standards was reported at the MTE. This MOU was to support awareness raising, development of technical regulations and capacity building for FSQA inspectors. An implementation completion report was delivered by the FSQA on 30 November 2015. The Authority noted the delay in the remittance of the agreed funding, with the first sums not received until June 2015. Further, as at the report date, approximately \$5k (five thousand dollars) was reportedly still outstanding for remittance from the MIE.



### 2.3.7. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance – Farmer Field Schools

2.3.7.1. The experience of FFSs was discussed during each of the sectoral meetings (appendices 7 to 9). The reported performance of the SCED is shown in the table below.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Output 2.6, 2.8 &amp; 2.11: Enhanced farmer capacity to grow groundnuts, cashew &amp; sesame of better quality and higher productivity through Farmer Field School</b>													
Number of FFS set up in each sector	At least extra 20 sessions of FFS conducted on each of the sectors (g/nuts, cashew & sesame)	0	10	10		20	20	0	10	22		-12	160%
Number of Master trainers available for each sector in quality control	At least extra 5 master trainers for each sector have acquired knowledge and skills and delivered training program to training facilitators (extensions workers and farmers-trainers)	0	15	0		15	15		15	2		-2	113%
Number of core trainers/facilitators trained for each sector in quality control	At least 30 training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) have been trained and are able to conduct FFS	0	120	0		120	150		120	12	20	-12	125%
Number of farmers trained for each sector in quality control	At least 600 farmers have improved their capacity to grow sector commodities (G/nut, Cashew & Sesame) of better quality and higher productivity	0	300	300		600	754		300	454		-154	126%

**Table 8: Activities relating to Farmer Field Schools**

Source: MIE Progress Report for January to June 2015

2.3.7.2. The quantitative targets have been met by the MIE. Some Gambian stakeholders are persuaded that the impact of past FFS and this SCED intervention have lasting results on the development of farming practices. Others expressed concern that the Gambian market for produce does not adequately discriminate between the produce of farmers who follow the best practices promoted by FFSs. This can serve as a disincentive to farmers.

2.3.7.3. Overall, there is apparent satisfaction with the support received. The SCED reports do not, however, place the intervention “supply” in the context of the overall “demand” for such support for the sectors. It is therefore difficult to assess the overall contribution to the demand. In principle, there is much scope for scaling up FFS interventions, given the importance of the agriculture sector to employment, incomes and food security in The Gambia.

2.3.7.4. It is expected that the Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture will take over the responsibility for implementation of FFS across different sectors in collaboration with the sector associations. There will require a formal agreement between the NIU, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Sector associations. The evaluation team is not in possession of such an agreement at this late stage in the project lifespan. This clearly poses a threat to the sustainability of the project<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Stakeholder clarification (comment ID 7, Appendix 12): The goal of the project is for institutions and stakeholders to have the knowledge and skills to manage and implement FFS. First, the FFS manuals were developed and handed

2.3.7.5. The MIE has made outreach contact to other development partners who may provide resources for continuation and scaling up of the SCED interventions<sup>26</sup>. It is understood that the FAO can potentially assist in the sustainability of farmer field schools in its future projects and build on ITC's intervention in this area. The likely source of funding for the FAO support is the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) support to The Gambia.

**2.3.8. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance – Downstream Intermediaries**

2.3.8.1. The project has given support to enterprises targeting domestic and export markets to provide them with the systems and processes that will allow them to compete more effectively on the basis of quality of produce processing and packaging.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Output 2.5: Enhanced food safety of groundnuts through implementation of HACCP and pre-requisites such as GAP and GMP</b>													
Number of operators sensitized on HACCP	10 (Baseline Included)	1	9			10	30			30		-20	300%
Number of operators implementing pre-requisites (GAP; GFP, GHP, GMP.)	3 (Baseline Included)	1	2			3	7			7		-4	233%
Number of operators implementing HACCP	3 (Baseline Included)	1	2			3	7			7		-4	233%
Level of compliance to aflatoxin Codex requirements	high =4	Low =1	moderate	high =4		4	1	0	1			3	47% <sup>27</sup>

**Table 9: Activities relating to Downstream Intermediaries**

Source: MIE Progress Report for January to June 2015

2.3.8.2. The status of support to downstream intermediaries is shown at Appendix 5. The evaluation team conducted in-depth interviews with two private sector enterprises and one public sector entity receiving support under this project element. In addition, a Trainer-cum-Counsellor (TcC) of the HACCP intervention received an in-depth interview. The record of the interviews is shown at Appendix 6.

2.3.8.3. As at 30 June 2015, only two of the seven entities were in a strong position to target HACCP certification by the end of the project (see Appendix 5). The MIE was of the opinion, after a field visit in August 2015, that 2-3 could be ready for certification by September/October. As at the preparation of this report in December 2015, it was not expected that any entity would be certified before the end of the project. However, it was learnt that the keenest entities are

over to the Minister of Agriculture by the Minister of Trade. During the handing over the Minister of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary all affirmed that the manuals will be used as a reference document for FFS for the sector. The manuals were also presented to all Agricultural Regional Directorates. In addition, 40 extension workers, 195 farmers from sector organizations were trained as trainers by the project and over 2000 farmers have been trained and skilled in FFS. With this fact there is reason to believe that there is sufficient capacity and skills to manage and implement FFS either by MOA of farmer organisations. At least 3 projects of MOA (Cowpea, NEMA and FSADEP) are implementing FFS and those trained in the project are the ones managing them.

<sup>26</sup> Source: File Note of field visit of E. Luotonen, 11 August 2015

<sup>27</sup> From the audit exercise 7 samples out 15 were within 4 ppm, the Codex Standard



committed to certification. One entity confirmed to the evaluation team that it expects to be ready by February 2016, which will coincide with the planned visit of an external certifier facilitated by the project (Appendix 5).

2.3.8.4. Interviews with selected beneficiaries revealed an apparent high level of satisfaction with the HACCP and packaging support received from the SCED. This was marked even in the entity that had the lowest level of compliance in June 2015. They reported that the effect of the interventions had been to increase sales and access to markets through the increased credibility of their produce with their target markets.

2.3.8.5. Challenges encountered by this project element included:

- Level of commitment of management in entities that were slow to compliance;
- Retention of staff trained in HACCP processes;
- Low level of education attained by some staff allocated to HACCP training;
- Inability to commit the resources required to close the infrastructure gaps identified during the HACCP process;
- Possibility of moral hazard, where commercial entities who may be able to finance a viable business investment are reluctant to invest whilst they anticipate external grant support. This is particularly likely where some entities, as has been the case for some SCED beneficiaries, have been the recipient of recent support from other donors in addition to SCED.

2.3.8.6. It is possible that the additional benefits of certification enjoyed by the first set of certified entities will prove an incentive for others to pursue the goal. Given that the certification of the current candidates has been subsidised by the SCED, the cost of external certification may prove a counterbalancing hurdle.

2.3.8.7. To address this possibility, the MIE has discussed the possibility of TGSB positioning itself as a certification body<sup>28</sup>. It will need to have the ISO 22000 lead auditor course. Funding will need to come from national sources or from another external project. This will be essential to the sustainability of the SCED outcomes. The effectiveness of FSQA in enforcing the application of TGSB standards will also be an important contributor in generating momentum among entities who have yet to commit to the HACCP process.

## 2.4. Component B: Trade Information (TI)

### 2.4.1. Objective & Design

2.4.1.1. The Trade information component was designed to enable The Gambia's private and public sector to access relevant trade related information through MOTIE's information services, particularly in the first instance, to the sesame and cash nut sectors.

### 2.4.2. Targeted Key Indicators

2.4.2.1. The logical framework correctly identified demand-side indicators as criteria for success:

- Increased usage (of at least 25%) of MOTIE's information services.
- User satisfaction increases from initial baseline established at start of project.

<sup>28</sup> Source: File Note of field visit of E. Luotonen, 11 August 2015

### 2.4.3. Review of Implementation: Indicator Performance

2.4.3.1. As can be seen in the section reviewing operational performance, the project focused on supply-side indicators. This was understandable given the initial challenges in establishing the organisational network, systems, processes and delivery channels for the TI network. The network was formally launched in June 2014, at which point the mid-term evaluation was under way. It was expected that the time since the MTE would have been spent on stimulating demand for the service. There appears to be little to show to meet that expectation.

### 2.4.4. Review of Implementation: Disbursements

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Component B: Trade information		482,398.42	462,120.72	20,277.28

**Table 10: Budgeted vs Actual Disbursements – Trade Information**

Source: MIE data

2.4.4.1. The detailed expenditure statement is shown at Appendix 11.

### 2.4.5. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Project Outcome 3: Policy makers, TSIs and businesses (particularly producers, processors and exporters of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame; ensuring women are included) capacitated to access relevant trade information and produce prospective market studies.</b>													
<b>Output 3.1 Trade information infrastructure established</b>													
Availability fully furnished trade information service office space	Fully furnished trade information service workstation established	1	0	0		1	1	1				0	100%
Availability of information processing equipment, systems and access to high-speed Internet service	Computers and servers provided	17				17	17	17				0	100%
	DSL Internet connection with a minimum data download speed of 3 megabits per second		1			1	2		1		1	0	200%
	EUROTRACE trade statistics management database installed		1			1	1		1			0	100%
	Fully operational and resourceful trade information portal for Gambia			1		1	1		0.8	0.2		0	100%
Number and types of market news bulletins (MNB) produced disseminated	3 Issues of MNBs on Groundnuts	0	3			3	8			1	8	2	260%

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	ANNUAL TARGETS				Total: targets	Total progresses	PERFORMANCE TRACKING				BALANCE TO TARGET	% ACCOMPLISHED
		2012	2013	2014	2015			2012	2013	2014	2015		
<b>Output 3.2 Trade information management skills of local stakeholders enhanced. Trained staffs are committed to manage the Trade Information Reference Centre.</b>													
Number of officers whose trade information management skills have been enhanced	30 officers from various trade support organisations trained in the sourcing, analysis and processing of market information and production of Market News Bulletins, three staff of MOTIE skilled in trade information sourcing and management, two staff of MOTIE skilled in the application of EUROTRACE trade statistics management software	32	34	1		67	84	32	27	18	7	-17	125%
Number of trade support institutions benefited from trade information capacity building training	20 TSIs benefit each year from various capacity building	19	18			62	81	19	18	1	43	-19	130%
<b>Output 3.3: Trade information network efficiently used by public and private stakeholders.</b>													
Existence of institutionalised trade information network	A national level Gambia Trade Information Network officially established and operational	0	1			1	1		0.5	0.5		0	100%
Number of TSIs actively committed to contribute to the resources and operation of the trade information network	16 trade support institutions or associations officially commit to operationalize a dynamic information network	0	16	0		16	20		20			-4	125%
Availability of virtual trade information networking platform	Virtual web-based platform, namely The Gambia Trade Information Network, established to facilitate information sharing and exchange		1			1	1		0.5	0.5		0	100%

**Table 11: Activities relating to Downstream Intermediaries**

Source: MIE Progress Report for January to June 2015

2.4.5.1. It is evident that outputs 3.1 and 3.2 are supply-side outputs. They appear to have been fully met. Interviews with beneficiaries (see Appendix 10) support the satisfactory delivery of these outputs, subject to a few teething systems challenges such as the clear agreement and adherence to an input calendar among producers of information and the consequent commitment to an output calendar by MOTIE. Further, inspection of the website portal suggests that some sectors, notably cashew, may be more active than others. For example, the “market news” segment of the website, when accessed on 16 December 2015, included 16 posts by the cashew sector and none from other sectors.

2.4.5.2. MOTIE has secured a government budget for a number of items that provide assurance of the functioning of the supply-side of the TI System, namely: The Trade Information Centre, the Trade Information Portal<sup>29</sup> and the Trade Information Network. This commitment increases the likelihood of sustainability in the medium term. Long term sustainability must come from clear demonstration of demand-side benefits to those engaged in competitive commerce as well as to national and sectoral policy-makers.

2.4.5.3. Output 3.3 is clearly a demand-side output that should be measured in terms of the user experience, in compliance with the expectations of the log-frame. An examination of the three activities under this output shows that they are, unexpectedly, supply-side activities. Although some work was done, in the baseline report, to establish demand-side parameters, the evaluation team has seen no evidence follow-up to this in the work of the MIE or MOTIE. Ultimately, the usefulness of the TI system must be established by demand-side feedback.

## 2.5. Component C: Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study

### 2.5.1. Objective & Design

2.5.1.1. The SCED envisaged a comprehensive feasibility study on inclusive tourism in The Gambia which includes an action plan and a fully-fledged project proposal for follow-up implementation of proposed activities.

### 2.5.2. Targeted Key Indicators

2.5.2.1. The logical framework correctly identified the following indicators as criteria for success:

- All elements included in the terms of reference are reflected in the study;
- Public and private stakeholders have been consulted;
- The study and its action plan are endorsed by GTA and other national stakeholders.

### 2.5.3. Review of Implementation: Indicator Performance

2.5.3.1. The log-frame indicators have been fully met.

### 2.5.4. Review of Implementation: Disbursements

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Component C: Inclusive tourism		49,046	46,151.85	2,894.15

**Table 12: Budgeted vs Actual Disbursements – Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study**

Source: MIE data

2.5.4.1. The detailed expenditure statement is shown at Appendix 11.

### 2.5.5. Review of Implementation: Operational Performance

2.5.5.1. In addition to the log-frame indicators, the MIE responded to calls from national stakeholders for resources to be mobilised to implement the proposal generated by the study. It was felt that implementation was a vital element to the utility of the exercise.

2.5.5.2. The MIE targeted the hosting of a donor round table in Geneva in conjunction with WTO meetings in June 2015. However, this target was not met. The MIE and the NIU have also sought

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.gambiatradinginfo.org/>

alternative ways to mobilise resources for the Inclusive Tourism Project in consultation with MOTIE and the EIF Donor Facilitator in The Gambia. It was expected that a donor roundtable could be facilitated before the end of 2015. As at the date of this report, there are no indications of the likelihood of this event.

2.5.5.3. When contacted by the evaluation team, national stakeholders declined to make themselves available for interview on the basis that there is no change since the MTE i.e. the absence of funding meant that they could not meaningfully engage in further evaluation discussions. Given the delay, when funding is eventually secured, changes are likely to be needed to the original version of the project plan to reflect inevitable changes in the strategic and operational environments of the sector.

### 3. Analysis & Findings: Attainment of Objectives

#### 3.1. Introduction

3.1.1. Given the activities and outputs analysed in the previous section, this section seeks to assess the extent to which the objectives expected in the log-frame have been met.

#### 3.2. Component A1 – Development of Sector Strategies for Cashew Nut & Sesame

3.2.1. The overall objectives of this component were:

- An increased capacity of public and private institutions to support and stimulate exports of cashews and sesame through the provision of relevant and accessible trade support services.
- Improved public and private dialogue in the cashew and sesame sectors to formulate and manage export development strategies that are relevant and realistic.
- Empowered stakeholders in the cashew and sesame sectors capable of contributing to export development activities for their sectors, including female stakeholders.

3.2.2. The evidence base was considered in sections 2.1 and 2.2.

3.2.3. *Increased capacity for the provision of relevant and accessible trade support services that stimulate exports.* In assessing the attainment of this objective, the evaluation team had regard to the entirety of effects from all components of this tightly integrated project. The primary public actors are MOTIE, GIEPA, NARI, MOA, TGSB, FSQA and the GTA. The main non-state actors are NAWFA for Sesame<sup>30</sup>; ASPA for Groundnuts, CAG for Cashew; and the cross-cutting Gambia Chamber of Commerce & Industry (GCCCI).

3.2.4. The contributions of public actors to enhanced trade support services are all improved by this project. The overall assessment of the evidence suggests that this improvement may be positive but not sufficient to fulfil the project's overall objectives. There were significant delays in the finalisation and launch of the sector strategies due to public sector inertia. Trade information services managed by MOTIE have yet to attain full effectiveness of service. Vital laboratory services from NARI were inordinately delayed and have yet to attain the goal of international accreditation. The MOA has yet to confirm the post-project management of the Farmer Field Schools. On the other hand, TGSB appears to have met all objectives for quality frameworks and standards and is positioning itself for a desirable post-project role as HACCP certifier, which should be encouraged. More work needs to be done to crystallise the policing role of the FSQA in relation to TGSB standards, but initial facilitation has been delivered by this project.

<sup>30</sup> NAWFA is the apex of the Sesame Growers Associations (SGAs).

3.2.5. The CAG appears to have been the most effective of the non-state actors as evidenced by the preponderance of its outputs in the Trade Information website. The evaluation team also attended its annual general meeting in November 2015 that was financially supported by this project. A broad range of stakeholders were present who seemed engaged with addressing the challenges of the sector. The role of ASPA appears to have been diluted by a change of government policy that displaced its coordinating function in the liberalisation of the sector. NAWFA appears to be challenged in managing its services as evidenced by the unaccounted loss of tarpaulins supplied by the project and the unclear effect of the seed multiplication support delivered by the project. Again, the conclusion must be that the improvement in non-state actors' capacity is broadly positive but not sufficient to deliver the overall project objectives<sup>31</sup>.

3.2.6. *Improved public and private dialogue to deliver sector strategies.* The longitudinal literature evidence reviewed by the evaluation team suggests that the strategy development process resulted in significant engagement of all actors. The cross-sectional interviews also supported this conclusion as did a review of the final strategies for the CN and SS sectors.

3.2.7. *Stakeholders empowered to contribute to export development for their sectors.* This objective is logically linked to the first two, assessed above. The conclusion is thus that much has been done, but more needs to be done by national stakeholders after the project – to seize the opportunities offered by the project activities.

### 3.3. Component A2 – Quality Enhancement of CN, GN and SS Sectors

3.3.1. The overall objective of this component was:

- Improving the incomes of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame farmers and firms along the value chain by increasing their export opportunities through enhanced quality management and a strengthened business support environment.

3.3.2. The evidence base was considered in section 2.3.

3.3.3. This objective has “means” and an “end”. The “end” is the improvement of incomes along the value chain. The “means” are the facilitation of enhanced quality management and the improvement of the business support environment. Again, the integrated design of this project requires a look to the contribution of other components to this objective.

3.3.4. The improvement of the *business support mechanisms* was examined in section 3.2 above. It concluded that satisfactory, but insufficient progress had been made. The remaining journey must be completed by national stakeholders after the formal closure of the SCED.

3.3.5. The *enhancement of quality management* was the primary focus of the activities of component A2. This entailed work on cross-cutting sectoral regulation & quality certification, Farmer Field Schools and downstream intermediaries/firms. As discussed in paragraph 3.2.4 above, much progress has been attained and a momentum has been built that leaves the related goals within reach. However, most related goals will not be secured within the formal lifespan of the SCED, leaving the initiative to national stakeholders to sustain focus until the ends are secured, post-project.

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<sup>31</sup> MIE clarification (comment ID 54, Appendix 12): the project has supported capacity building of NAWFA and CAG in terms of good governance and reaching out to their constituencies for creating ownership of the sector and disseminating information on the strategies to farmers.

3.3.6. This brings us to the “end” sought by this component’s objective i.e. the increase in value chain incomes. Although the primary indicators of the log-frame rightfully focused on this measure, it was not formally tracked by the M&E systems of the SCED – an important oversight that cannot be easily remedied by an evaluation coming at the end of a lengthy chronological change process. In the interviews conducted by the evaluation team with some firms that benefited from HACCP quality support, there was unequivocal assertion that the process had helped in the growth of their business and incomes. However, the extent of such improvement could not be readily quantified. The message from stakeholder meetings about the effect on upstream farmers was not as clear. There was some concern expressed that the markets did not adequately discriminate between farmers who complied with quality assurance processes and those who did not.

3.3.7. In conclusion, there is some indication that incomes have improved, even with the incomplete state of the delivery of the means intended to facilitate this improvement. In the absence of formal monitoring of this effect by the project during its lifetime, the extent of any improvement cannot be definitively identified.

### 3.4. Component B – Trade Information

3.4.1. The overall objective of this component was:

- To enable The Gambia’s private and public sector to access relevant trade related information through MOTIE’s information services, particularly in the first instance, to the sesame and cashew nut sectors.

3.4.2. The evidence base was considered in section 2.4.

3.4.3. The Trade Information system, network and website delivery medium are established but are yet to attain full functional effectiveness. The CN sector appears the more robustly responsive of the three primary produce targeted by the SCED for the TI system. The production and coordination mechanisms require fine-tuning, especially through the effective use of input and dissemination calendars. The demand-side monitoring of user satisfaction is markedly under-developed. Although the log-frame correctly focused on demand-side indicators, they were not formally tracked by the project.

3.4.4. The objective of this component is within the grasp of national stakeholders, but will require a concerted effort, post-project to be realised in full.

### 3.5. Component C – Inclusive Tourism Study

3.5.1. The overall objective of this component was:

- A comprehensive feasibility study on inclusive tourism in The Gambia which includes an action plan and a fully-fledged project proposal for follow-up implementation of proposed activities.

3.5.2. The evidence base was considered in section 2.5.

3.5.3. The objective was met in full to the apparent satisfaction of all stakeholders. However, the national stakeholders requested that the MIE extend the objective to include the mobilisation of resources for the project proposal, within the lifetime of the project. Due to a difficult resource mobilisation context for The Gambia, this additional objective was not met. It is unclear whether there is any prospect of funding in the months following the project closure.



### 3.6. Overall Objective of the SCED Project

3.6.1. The overall objective of the integrated project was:

#### Overall objective for entire project:

Poverty reduction through activities that (a) strengthen targeted sectors competitiveness, (b) promote new business opportunities in domestic, regional and international markets and, (c) generate additional incomes and create employment

#### Objectively verifiable indicators:

- Expansion onto new markets with adequate spread across markets in the respective sectors
- Increased of sales (domestic, regional and international markets) in the respective sectors by 3%

3.6.2. The twin objectives are increasing incomes and reducing poverty. These are linked to the assessment of the similar objective of the Quality Enhancement component, which is logically a lynchpin of the project. The conclusions there are relevant to the overall project objective i.e. there is indicative evidence that some value-chain incomes (primarily intermediary firms) have improved, even with the incomplete state of the delivery of the means intended to facilitate this improvement. In the absence of formal monitoring of this effect by the project during its lifetime, the extent of any improvement cannot be definitively identified.

## 4. Analysis & Findings: Assessment of Effects

### 4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. This section conveys the conclusion of the evaluation team on the effects of the SCED project, utilising the seven evaluation criteria detailed in Appendix 1 i.e.

1. Relevance
2. Effectiveness
3. Efficiency
4. Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment:
5. Impact
6. Sustainability
7. Innovation, replication and scaling up.

4.1.2. The conclusions are based on the detailed findings on the implementation of activities described in section 2. To assist in the understanding of the evaluation conclusions, the evaluation team has deployed a 10 point scale to indicate<sup>32</sup> the level of satisfaction (10 being the highest level of satisfaction) secured on each criterion from the evidence examined by the team. This represents the considered judgement of the evaluation team given the evidence assessed and the cumulative experience and expertise of the team.

<sup>32</sup> i.e. it does not offer mathematical precision, but provides a considered estimate of likelihood that takes into account the available evidence when assessed in the context of the evaluation team's professional experience and expertise.

## 4.2. Relevance

4.2.1. The overall relevance of the project was positively affirmed at the MTE. This final evaluation agrees with that assessment, whilst providing a component based evaluation below.

Component	Evaluation of Relevance (Score of 10 is highest)
A1a- Development of Sector Strategies	10
A1b – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies	10
A2a- Quality Enhancement: Cross cutting regulatory oversight & quality certification	10
A2b- Quality Enhancement: Farmer Field Schools	10
A2c- Quality Enhancement: Downstream intermediaries	10
B- Trade Information	10
C- Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study	8


4.2.2. As shown in Figure 2, this is a tightly integrated project, with rational cause and effect relationships between the components that would amplify the overall effect of the intervention, in the event of successful implementation of all elements i.e. the whole would be larger than the sum of the parts.

4.2.3. The strategy development provided a long-term road map for the two of the three targeted sectors i.e. Cashew Nut and Sesame and sought to reinforce existing roadmaps for the third sector, Groundnut. This answered the key strategic questions including “why do we want to be?”.

4.2.4. The quality enhancement (QE) programme sought to address pressing short-term obstacles to the realisation of the long-term plans. QE spanned the full spectrum of the value chain in the three targeted sectors: from upstream farming activities, including cross-cutting regulatory oversight and quality certification, through to support for downstream intermediaries who process and/or trade for the domestic and export markets.

4.2.5. Similarly, planning and implementation of any kind, short or long-term, is only feasible when relevant information is available for taking strategic and tactical decisions in good time. The TI component was thus vital in the context of a poorly developed system in The Gambia.

4.2.6. The Inclusive Tourism study, if implemented, would provide immediate benefits to value chain actors through the improvement of market demand for their produce. However, it can be seen that this study does not, by itself, add to the systemic improvement actions offered by components A & B i.e. it is a desirable rather than a mandatory action. This is the basis of the lower relevance rating.



**Figure 2: Primary Cause & Effect Relationships of the SCED Log frame as illustrated by the Project Content Tree**  
 Source: Adapted from the EIF Tier 2 Project Proposal August 2011

### 4.3. Effectiveness

Component	Evaluation of Effectiveness (Score of 10 is highest)
A1a- Development of Sector Strategies	10
A1b – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies	5
A2a- Quality Enhancement: Cross cutting regulatory oversight & quality certification	7
A2b- Quality Enhancement: Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	9
A2c- Quality Enhancement: Downstream intermediaries	7
B- Trade Information	7
C- Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study	10

- 4.3.1. Sector strategies (A1a) and the Tourism component (C) are studies, and are thus relatively easy to deliver in full compliance with an objective – hence the high ratings. Implementation actions are much more challenging, hence their generally lower ratings.
- 4.3.2. The pilot implementation of sector strategies was hampered by the late development of the sector strategies, which were only formally launched in June 2014, well into the final phase of the project lifespan. This forced the MIE to take coping measures which lost some of the intended motivational linkages to the sector strategies. The late delivery of the strategies appears to be due to institutional uncertainties within the governance authorities that were beyond the control of the MIE. Some deliverables have been well received, such as the export packaging support to enterprises. Others have been poorly managed, such as the tarpaulin support to SS sector or of unclear benefit, such as the seed multiplication support to SS sector.
- 4.3.3. Support to regulatory institutions focussed on TGSB and the FSQA. The involvement of TGSB in establishing sectoral quality frameworks and standards appears to have been successful; with TGSB possibly positioning itself as a certification body for HACCP accreditation of enterprises after the end of the project. FSQA is expected to develop regulations and police the implementation of TGSB standards. Support was belatedly delivered in 2015 to FSQA for foundational activities in this regard. Despite logistical hurdles on the part of the MIE, they appear to have broadly met the set objectives of the support. Given the late start, the practical impact of their policing role will not be felt until after the end of the project and requires full support from the governance authorities.
- 4.3.4. Cross-cutting quality certification delivered support to the NARI for the upgrading of its laboratory to be able to meet international standards for certifying the content of aflatoxin I produce. This was a major concern at the MTE as it appeared unlikely to be fulfilled during the project lifetime. It was seen as an important hurdle to secure greater market access and value for Gambian produce, especially GN. Significant strides have been made by the MIE, going beyond the agreed scope of intervention and a basic level of operability has been established. The accreditation will not be secured within the project lifetime, but the momentum has been established for national stakeholders to reinforce to its conclusion within the near term. National stakeholders appear concerned at what they see as the ever tightening standards on aflatoxin tolerance by key Western markets. They appear to be tempted to circumvent this stricture by exploiting the emerging Chinese market which currently has a lower level of intolerance.
- 4.3.5. Quantitative goals for FFS have been met. There is, however, no contextual information allowing the evaluation team to place the results in the context of the overall demand for such interventions in the sectors. Has demand been 10% met? 20%? What is the contribution of other interventions, past and present? The information systems of the project do not address these important questions. National stakeholders appear broadly satisfied with the intervention although there is some concern that the current markets for produce in The Gambia may not adequately discriminate in price between produce from FFS compliant farms and those from non-compliant farms.
- 4.3.6. HACCP compliance support to downstream entities has been well received by beneficiaries and a few (3 or less) entities are poised to secure certification from an external body funded by the project. This certification will not happen within the formal lifetime of the project and is expected in February 2016 at the earliest. The market effect of certification may prompt other entities to subsequently seek certification. The extent to which this happens will be subject to the speed with which TGSB secures certification body status, bringing down the costs of certification.

4.3.7. The supply-side goals of Trade Information appear to have been reasonably met through the establishment of the basic delivery infrastructure. The operation of input and output calendars to manage the regular and reliable collation and dissemination of information is still at an early stage. The actual trade information may be lop-sided with some evidence that the CN sector is far more active. Further, there appears to have been inadequate effort to secure demand-side evidence of the reception of the TI service, as expected by the log-frame indicators.

4.3.8. Overall, most project objectives have been reasonably attained, given the challenging operating context. The momentum established should be sufficient for committed national stakeholders to take the project objectives to full fruition in the near term after the end of the project.

#### 4.4. Efficiency

Component	Evaluation of Efficiency (Score of 10 is highest)
A1a- Development of Sector Strategies	6
A1b – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies	6
A2a- Quality Enhancement: Cross cutting regulatory oversight & quality certification	6
A2b- Quality Enhancement: Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	6
A2c- Quality Enhancement: Downstream intermediaries	6
B- Trade Information	6
C- Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study	7

4.4.1. Time and cost are the major considerations in efficiency. Given the highly specific nature of the SCED activities, it was not practical to measure cost/benefit for components relative to external benchmarks. The overall administration cost to total project cost was budgeted at a reasonable 19%, within the 25% guideline ceiling identified from the experience of the evaluation team. However, the actual costs came in higher than budgeted, falling just short of 27%. This was still reasonably close to the 25% benchmark and may be attributable to the additional effort required to manage the complex challenges posed by time-related inefficiencies caused by national stakeholders.

4.4.2. Timeliness is a significant drag on the project deliverables. All components bar the Tourism study were much delayed in their implementation due to national challenges of coordination and action. This was highlighted in the MTE and continued to be a factor in the final stages of the project. There was some evidence of delays on the part of the MIE, as with the promised funding for the FSQA activities, but the activities appear to have been largely completed on time.

4.4.3. The Tourism study did not include a funding activity at the project design stage. However, the MIE accepted a call from national stakeholders for its inclusion. Due to a difficult external environment for funding of The Gambia, the targeted donors' conferences have not been secured in the project lifetime. It is very uncertain whether national stakeholders will be able to secure the funding in the near term. This is responsible for the reduction in the Tourism rating which would otherwise have been at 10.

#### 4.5. Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

4.5.1. The project information systems did not systemically track indicators for this criterion. This made it difficult for the evaluation team to establish compliance with the project objective.

4.5.2. Some of the programme components formally have a high participation of women; such as that of the NAWFA which was a focal point for the SS interventions. One of the seven enterprises selected for quality assurance support and eventual HACCP certification was led by a woman. However, it is not likely to secure HACCP status in the short term, although she expressed deep satisfaction with the benefits secured so far, from the SCED. She was convinced that, together with other past and current donor interventions, her domestic market competitiveness has been enhanced by the SCED.

#### 4.6. Impact and Sustainability

Component	Evaluation of Impact & Sustainability (Score of 10 is highest)
A1a- Development of Sector Strategies	6
A1b – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies	6
A2a- Quality Enhancement: Cross cutting regulatory oversight & quality certification	7
A2b- Quality Enhancement: Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	8
A2c- Quality Enhancement: Downstream intermediaries	7
B- Trade Information	6
C- Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study	5

4.6.1. There is a close relationship between the factors contributing to impact and sustainability in this evaluation, hence their combined assessment.

4.6.2. The Tourism study and the sector strategies may be compromised and risk some element of obsolescence for lack of timely funding for implementation. There is evidence that the MIE is has established contacts for the possible subsequent funding of sector strategy and related short term activities through the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF), hence the higher rating of strategies relative to the Tourism study.

4.6.3. Impact may be highest on the actions of TGSB, which has attained all sectoral goals for quality frameworks and standards. The amplification of those efforts may now rely on the policing efforts of the FSQA for which foundational support has been delivered but has yet to fully manifest itself on the sector markets. The eventual emergence of TGSB as a HACCP certifying body will also amplify the impact of the efforts delivered so far in preparing downstream entities for certification. The remaining uncertainty relating to the NARI laboratory has diluted the impact rating for component A2a.

4.6.4. FFS appear well received although the structures for maintaining the effort through Ministry of Agriculture do not yet appear completed. The impact and sustainability of TI services must necessarily be subject to the quality of reception by users, for which adequate systems of monitoring are yet to be established. However, the medium term effort may be assured by the inclusion of the service costs in the recurrent budget of the MOTIE.

#### 4.7. Innovation, Replication & Scaling Up

Component	Evaluation of Innovation etc (Score of 10 is highest)
A1a- Development of Sector Strategies	7
A1b – Pilot implementation of Sector Strategies	8
A2a- Quality Enhancement: Cross cutting regulatory oversight & quality certification	8
A2b- Quality Enhancement: Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	9
A2c- Quality Enhancement: Downstream intermediaries	8
B- Trade Information	8
C- Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study	7

4.7.1. By their nature, the studies offer less opportunities for these joint criteria, although they do offer scope for innovation in their development process and their output design. There is a pressing need for near term funding of the sector strategies in full, hence the high rating accorded to the implementation sub-component.

4.7.2. The policing activities of the FSQA need to be rapidly scaled up to provide an incentive for compliance with sector standards set by TGSB. Broadly, the literature on national competitiveness emphasises the importance of a positive cycle of setting, policing and elevating performance standards.

4.7.3. Within an effectively policed standards environment, the certification services offered by the NARI will have commercial value. This offers the opportunity for private sector competition in the provision of such services, possibly under a regulated/performance linked limited-term contract (subject to the scope for unbridled competition in the service<sup>33</sup>).

4.7.4. In principle, FFS offer the greatest scope for scaling up – subject to an assessment of the level of unmet demand in the sectors. In a properly policed environment, the demand for HACCP compliance by downstream actors is likely to escalate as it would affect access to both domestic and export markets. The establishment of TGSB as a local certification body would be an important pre-requisite.

4.7.5. Trade information is an essential lubricant to good and timely enterprise and policy-maker decision making. The TI is still at an embryonic stage of implementation. There is thus significant scope for generating further impact from this component.

### 5. Analysis & Findings: Institutional & Management Arrangements


5.1.1. This section assesses the appropriateness of overall institutional and management arrangements and how these have impacted the implementation and delivery of the SCED. It includes the coordination and collaboration arrangements with partners and other stakeholders.

5.1.2. In The Gambia, the Ministerial Aid For Trade Committee (AFTC) is the apex structure of EIF governance. The National Steering Committee (NSC) oversees the design and implementation of all EIF programmes including SCED. It meets quarterly. The NSC includes a mix of private and public actors. Its chair is the Permanent Secretary, MOTIE, who also performs the role of EIF Focal Point.

<sup>33</sup> A feasibility study would be needed to establish the scope for private sector participation.



This dual role has been questioned with some actors requesting for the chair to be held by a separate position from the Focal Point, given the checks and balances inherent in EIF governance. SCED has a dedicated Project Steering Committee (PSC) that provides tactical oversight to the implementation of the project plan. It is comprised of public and non-state stakeholders with a particular interest in the SCED<sup>34</sup>.



**Figure 3: Governance and management structure of SCED Gambia**

Source: Project Document and partner interviews



5.1.3. In practice, the role of the EIF Focal Point is a formal link to an important office who can, hopefully, act as a champion where needed. ITC acts as the Main Implementing Entity (MIE), with tactical support from the NIU and direct implementation contact with TSIs and other implementing partners and beneficiaries where practical. Project activities are driven by the relevant sections of the ITC, with the Office for Africa providing a conduit for the coordination of the activities of the ITC sections.

5.1.4. Project activities require the dedicated partnership of the MIE and the Gambia public and non-state sectors actors to attain the desired objectives. Although the programme seeks to deliver an impact on the international competitiveness of commercial (mainly private) sectors of the Gambian economy, the public sector is a critical partner in shaping the national business environment. The Gambian public sector operates in perennially elevated levels of environmental uncertainty with high rates of staff and ministerial attrition and redeployment. This intervention cannot be insulated from the effects of this uncertainty.

5.1.5. This final evaluation has been directly contracted by the procurement unit of the ITC to provide a service to the M&E unit of the ITC. The evaluator has been provided access to all relevant persons and documentation for the purpose of an independent review.

5.1.6. The evaluators have concluded that the documentary evidence demonstrates a rigorous and professional approach to the project management process by the MIE. The MIE maintains financial information on a functional-basis. But activity-based information is manually generated and is not routinely available for decision-making and control. It is understood that a new software is being

<sup>34</sup> The PSC has 16 members, of which 11 (69%) are local or international public sector bodies. The rest are TSIs with an interest in the deliverables of the programme. There is no representative of a private enterprise, nor is there any “independent” member with no ties to the public sector or TSI interests.

implemented that will provide this perspective of management information. Financial information and related operational information were made available to the evaluators upon request.

5.1.7. The findings reflect the information gained from interviews of stakeholders. The observation of the evaluators is that the NIU is staffed with capable personnel who form an effective partnership with the MIE.

5.1.8. Project governance, for an intervention targeted at the international competitiveness of commercial sectors, may have been overly reliant on public sector actors who are not always driven by the efficiency and effectiveness demands of the market.

5.1.9. Our overall conclusion is that the project management, monitoring, evaluation and control processes deployed by the MIE were reasonably consistent with best practices expected by the evaluation team. All other things being constant, this should be a high impact project. However, these competences were materially diluted by challenges encountered in fostering effective national cooperation to deliver the results that are within grasp. These factors are largely outside of the control of the MIE and reflect long term national challenges.

## 6. Lessons Learnt & Best Practices

6.1.1. Lessons learnt are consistent with the observations of the MTE.

### *Timeline of the SCED*

6.1.2. Given a lifespan of three years, the SCED started in June 2012, which a stakeholder described as untimely due to its coincidence with the busy season for the farmers targeted by the SCED. It reportedly had an adverse effect on activities undertaken at the onset with potential cascading impact. Sector strategies were not launched until June 2014 i.e. after two-thirds of the project lifespan, due to lethargy among key national actors. The important piloting of the sector strategies was deviated from design due to time constraints. The project had to be extended by eight months to increase the likelihood of impact.

6.1.3. The total effect of these considerations is that national context should inform project lifecycles. This would require a more demanding feasibility study leading up to the project plan. It would also demand greater organisational flexibility on the part of development partners. The possibility of suspension of activities whilst enabling conditions are re-established should be considered, if that will eventually support the difference delivered by the intervention.

### *Enhancing the optimal mix of public/private partnerships*

6.1.4. Key stakeholders highlighted the importance of ensuring that the institutional and management arrangements for the project to reflect the optimal mix of public and private responsibilities in attaining goals. The evaluators identified that the programme leadership and implementation was largely driven by national and international public sector actors. Especially in the West African region, the driving forces of the public sector and the commercial sector are poorly aligned and often are conflicting.

6.1.5. The challenges of the groundnut sector were identified in the DTIS 2007 as primarily resulting from public-sector interventions. The design of the SCED did not include any mitigating actions, and the problem reportedly continued during the project lifespan. The appointment of implementation coordinating bodies for the strategies was also reportedly significantly delayed and influenced by institutional actions, as was the launch of the strategies and the Trade Information Network.

6.1.6. The state-run NARI had reportedly been unable to meet expectations under the previous support from the West Africa Quality Programme, yet it was positioned as a key actor for SCED. Alternatives should be actively considered in such a context.

### **Assessing the capacity of Trade Support Institutions (TSIs)**

6.1.7. Key stakeholders were concerned that inadequate assessment had been undertaken at the outset of the capacity of TSIs to provide the required interventions on a sustainable basis. For example, the baseline report identified that NAWFA had under a previous project received investments that created a large number of Farmer Field Schools, the greater part of which had disappeared by the time of the SCED<sup>35</sup>. The SCED had not clearly put in place mitigating actions to cope with capacity constraints of TSIs and the potential dilution of its impact.

6.1.8. The poor management of the tarpaulin support to the SS sector further illustrates the challenges of some TSIs. Their poor financial self-sustainability is also a major hurdle to their effectiveness outside of donor funding.

### **Good Practices**

6.1.9. The evaluation evidence suggests a rigorous and professional approach to the project management process by the MIE. The MIE maintains financial information on both a functional-basis and on an activity-based format<sup>36</sup>. The project management, monitoring, evaluation and control processes deployed by the MIE were broadly consistent with best practices expected by the MTE evaluators. However, this was diluted by the observed lapses in monitoring some key logframe indicators and the weaknesses observed in supporting management decisions with broader information on the operating context. All other things being constant, this should be a high impact project.

### **Constraints**

6.1.10. The evaluation team observed isolated occurrences of untimely action and delayed funding by the MIE that had a potential to dilute the effect of the intervention.

6.1.11. Project activities require the dedicated partnership of the MIE and the Gambia public and non-state sectors actors to attain the desired objectives. Although the programme seeks to deliver an impact on the international competitiveness of commercial (mainly private) sectors of the Gambian economy, the public sector is a critical partner in shaping the national business environment. The Gambian public sector operates in perennially elevated levels of environmental uncertainty with high rates of staff and ministerial attrition and redeployment. This intervention cannot be insulated from the effects of this uncertainty on absorption capacity and impact.

## **7. Conclusions & Recommendations**

### **7.1. Conclusions on the Overall Effect of the Project**

7.1.1. The SCED is a well-conceived project. Given a challenging situation at the MTE, much effort has been delivered to secure a strong foundation for all components. Critical elements such as the quality enhancement and Trade Information programmes are now within the grasp of full effectiveness by national stakeholders – if they demonstrate the collective will to succeed. Delays

<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that at least one stakeholder claimed that the beneficial effects of those earlier FFS interventions were sustained in the farming communities.

<sup>36</sup> However, it was noted during this Final Evaluation that the activity based information was manually generated at the request of the evaluation team and was not readily available for effective project management by the MIE.

and challenges encountered during project implementation are not sufficiently consistent with this collective will.

7.1.2. The Quality Enhancement (QE) and Trade Information (TI) programmes can be seen as short-term solutions that pave the way for the attainment of long-term objectives embedded in the sector strategies and the Tourism study. Those short-term actions are well within the capacity of national stakeholders to deliver, subject to continuing support for selected elements, possibly from the 11th European Development Fund (the MIE has undertaken preliminary discussions on this funding possibility). However, the funding of the long-term actions is very uncertain and needs to be crystallised before the strategies lose relevance over time.

7.1.3. Partial implementation of the short term actions will not be enough, as it is the full implementation of these deliverables that offer the synergistic effects on national competitiveness.

7.1.4. For example, “almost” securing international accreditation for the NARI laboratory will not be enough. Only full accreditation will deliver the desired effects of the related project component. Similarly, establishing TGSB standards will not be enough. They must be effectively policed by, inter alia, the FSQA. Policed standards will not be sufficient; there must be a cost-effective national certifier of HACCP processes to allow enterprises to implement FSQA compliant systems.

7.1.5. Previously rated at an overall likelihood of impact of 50% at the MTE, the likelihood at the final evaluation has improved, probably to a level of 70% - reflecting the greater momentum on offer to national stakeholders – after the project extension - from tactical actions of the QE and TI components that require full implementation, preferably within the next 12 months - for synergistic impact.

7.1.6. It is noteworthy that lapses in the Monitoring & Evaluation system detailed in section 2 mean that it will be difficult to have conclusive evidence of impact, as key indicators specified in the log-frame for the overall objective and for component objectives were not monitored by the project.

## 7.2. Recommendations

7.2.1. We offer seven recommendations within four cross-cutting themes. The detailed recommendations are stated in the Executive Summary. This section is limited to the four themes from which the recommendations emerged.

7.2.2. **Cross-cutting issue #1/4:** Timeline of Projects: Given the issues that needed to be resolved before the fast-approaching end of the SCED, its implementation timeline was extended to 31 December 2015 as a response to the recommendation of the MTE. As at the final evaluation, key elements of some components are still incomplete. However, the additional time has allowed for the generation of momentum that should see the completion of outstanding activities, by committed national stakeholders, after the project closure. In general, we propose that the EIF should consider a flexible rather than a fixed timeline for the implementation of *future* projects. This would provide the space necessary for project managers to focus on impact driven action rather than input driven reaction. Project timelines should be tailored to the demands of impact in the country context rather than the convenience of the funding partner.

7.2.3. **Cross cutting issue #2/4:** Enhancing the mix of public/private participation in projects. In West Africa, although policy makers publicly adhere to the principle of the private and commercial

sectors leading economic growth and employment, in practice the sector is crowded out from economic space by the activities of the public sector. A prime consequence is the punishingly high cost of capital which was identified by the Gambia DTIS as a major constraint on long term investments and employment in the commercial sector. In principle, an intervention targeting the international competitiveness of the commercial sector should seek to attain an optimal mix of public and private sector participation that, in the national context, enhances the likelihood of attaining the desired project goals.

**7.2.4. Cross cutting issue #3/4:** Important deliverables are at an advanced stage of implementation and require sustained commitment of national stakeholders for ensuring their success delivery after the formal closure of the project on 31 December 2015. The Project Steering Committee should extend its lifespan until the all deliverables are attained.

**7.2.5. Cross cutting issue #4/4:** Project monitoring and evaluation systems must be designed to report on all indicators identified in the project logical framework. Wherever feasible, information must be presented within a wider national context in order to provide evidence of the contribution of a project to sectoral or national challenges or opportunities.

End of Document. Appendices follow.

## Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Final Evaluation

### 1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

**Background.** As agreed between the EIF and ITC, in line with the EIF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework<sup>37</sup>, a final evaluation of the project is expected to take place before the project is concluded. The evaluation is to be managed by the Evaluation Unit of the ITC. The evaluation will start in October 2015 and is projected to end in December 2015, with a draft report to be submitted November 2015.

The evaluation report will be made available to ITC management and project team, and by ITC to the Executive Secretariat of the EIF (ES) and the TFM, the EIF Donor Facilitator and the Focal Point who will share it with the PSC (for subsequent submission to the NSC), the national partners, and other stakeholders.

**ITC's role in the project.** The Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification (SCED) project is funded by the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) Trust Fund. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was appointed the Trust Fund Manager for EIF projects, and the International Trade Centre (ITC) was appointed as the Main Implementing Entity (MIE). Officially launched on 20 June 2012 in Banjul, The Gambia, the project was allocated a total budget of \$2,355,517. Initially the project had a lifespan of three years; however, after a midterm evaluation in 2014 the project was given a no-cost extension, resulting in a revised end date of 31 December 2015.

**Objective of the Project.** The project aims at responding to some of the trade-related development priorities of The Gambia as identified in its Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). The project's development objective is to reduce poverty through activities that:

- d) Strengthen targeted sectors competitiveness;
- e) Promote new business opportunities in domestic, regional and international markets; and
- f) Generate additional incomes and create employment.

The project targets at:

- Agri-sector specific support for cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame. Key focus will be on finding new export opportunities, product diversification, improved value-addition, quality enhancement and strengthened sector support institutions (Component A).
- Provision of sector cross-cutting assistance in the areas of trade information (Component B) and inclusive tourism (Component C).

The project further aims to achieve long-term sustainable impact by strengthening national capacities and EIF ownership throughout the implementation phase.

Due to the existing development challenges in each of the areas of intervention, the project further aims at leveraging additional resources from other development partners that are currently supporting The Gambia.

The project will contribute to achieving the following results:

- Increase sales of cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame in domestic, regional and international markets by 3 per cent.
- Establish a functional Trade Information Reference Centre within the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) with trade information resources made available to both public and private sectors and related skills and capacities strengthened.
- Design a project document ready for funding on the development of inclusive tourism in The Gambia on the basis of a feasibility study.

<sup>37</sup> Source: [http://fr-pt.enhancedif.org/documents/EIF%20toolbox/EIF\\_User\\_Guide\\_Compendium.pdf](http://fr-pt.enhancedif.org/documents/EIF%20toolbox/EIF_User_Guide_Compendium.pdf)

The project aims to build sustainable local capacities within the National Implementation Unit (NIU) and other trade support institutions (at national and sector level) through their active involvement in each step of the project cycle and thus enabling The Gambia to exert effective ownership of its trade-related development agenda.

### ***Project Description***

The approach rests in “learning by doing”, with local trade support institutions, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), and communities taking an active role in delivering project activities. As an EIF project, existing local institutions are given preference as implementing partners (if and where deemed sufficiently effective) to strengthen their managerial and operational capacities for ensuring project’s sustainability. The aim is to ensure effective and efficient coordination mechanisms between implementing partners (NIU, MOTIE, technical selected entities, and the Main Implementing Entity [MIE] the International Trade Centre).

The project’s agri-sector specific support to the cashew nuts, groundnuts, and sesame sectors strives to directly benefit the livelihoods of the farmers, processors and exporters by increasing the sectors’ competitiveness through training on production techniques, conformity with standards and other quality-related training interventions, while strengthening the existing quality control infrastructure, as well as facilitating the development of sector strategies where necessary.

With regards to the sector cross-cutting assistance, the development of a useful trade information system aims to further provide the country’s agricultural producers, processors and exporters, and their sector-based representations, as well as policy makers in and outside the targeted sectors with easier access to and better understanding of relevant trade related information. Further opportunities and synergies with the fast growing tourism sector, e.g. through backward linkages to agricultural producers, were assessed by conducting an opportunity study for the development of inclusive tourism activities in The Gambia within the framework of the National Tourism Master Plan.

The importance to strengthen the role of women along the project’s targeted value- and information chains, as well as to identify and mitigate any environmental risks where necessary, are taken in account in all activities. To the extent possible, the project is aligned with The Gambia National Gender Policy 2010-2020 which aims “to guide and direct all levels of planning and implementation of development programmes, with a gender perspective including resource allocation geared towards equitable national development”. The policy will contribute towards the realization of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) II, Vision 2020 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Regarding the MDGs, the project contributes directly to achieve MDG 1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) and MDG 8 (Develop a global partnership for development). In addition, since the project pays special attention to the gender dimension as well as the environmental impact, it is expected that implementation of activities will also contribute to MDG 3 (Promote gender equality and empower women) and MDG 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability).

In order to comply with the Paris Declaration and to ensure optimal resource-effectiveness, the project is closely aligned with previous and ongoing efforts to strengthen the selected sectors, where this is deemed advantageous for reaching the project’s objectives. For instance, synergies and complementarities between the current project and other similar initiatives developed in the area of agriculture by international development agencies such as ITC/ECOWAS/PACT II, FAO, IFAD, STDF, UNIDO, UNDP and the World Bank, will also be promoted.

### ***Project components and outcomes***

As set out in the logical framework (see Annex I) of the project document, the project is divided into three components, which include:

- Component A: Agri-sector specific support for cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame: Key focus is on finding new export opportunities, product diversification, improved value-addition,



quality enhancement and strengthening sector support institutions and sector strategy formulation for cashew and sesame.

- Component A 1: Development of sector strategies for Cashew-nut & Sesame.
- Component A 2: Quality enhancement.
- Component B: Sector cross-cutting assistance in the areas of trade information.
- Component C: Inclusive Tourism Development Opportunity Study.

The project also aims to achieve long-term sustainable impact by strengthening national capacities and EIF ownership throughout the implementation phase.

#### Outcomes of the overall project

The project outcomes include the following:

- Strengthened locally available structures and capacities to support business operations (all project components);
- Sector stakeholders enabled to develop inclusive sector strategies and follow-up on their implementation (Component A1);
- Increased export opportunities for the agricultural products cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame (Component A2);
- Policy makers, TSIs and businesses (particularly producers, processors and exporters of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame) capacitated to access relevant trade information and produce prospective market studies (Component B); and
- Potential for Inclusive Tourism Development assessed and recommendations provided to Government (Component C).

#### Outcomes for Component A 1 Development of sector strategies for cashew nut and sesame

Outcomes for component A 1 include:

- Participatory sector strategies developed and validated by stakeholders with prioritized implementation plans for cashew nuts and sesame sectors;
- Strategy implementation coordination bodies identified or established, functioning and referred to for advice on policy development and other planning issues; and
- Strategies, implementation plans and coordination bodies referred to and involved in policy decision-making processes in The Gambia.

#### Outcomes for Component A 2 Quality enhancement of groundnut, cashew nut and sesame sectors

Outcomes for component A 2 include:

- To upgrade testing capacity of National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) lab (for aflatoxin);
- To build the Gambia's capacity to develop sector standards for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame;
- To increase the quality and food safety of production of Groundnuts in Gambia in order to comply with technical requirements in international markets and enhance the increase exports;
- To set the framework for improving the quality of the cashew nuts sector in Gambia in order to become export ready and enhance farmer capacity to grow cashew nuts of better quality; and
- To set the framework for improving the quality of the sesame sector in Gambia in order to become export ready and enhance farmer capacity to grow cashew nuts of better quality.

#### Outcomes for Component B Trade information

Outcomes for component B include:

- To develop the information service infrastructure at the MOTIE and build related capacities for its effective usage; and
- Improve efficient access to relevant export and import information by the public and private sector through the establishment of effective, networked modes of access to, and delivery of, information.

Outcome for Component C Inclusive tourism opportunity study

Outcomes for component C include:

- Identify and assess the potential for the development of inclusive tourism activities in The Gambia.

### ***Project Coordination and Management***

At the country level, the project is coordinated by the EIF National Implementation Unit (NIU), in Banjul. The Permanent Secretary of the MOTIE was appointed EIF Focal Point. The Focal Point, with the support of the NIU is working on advancing The Gambia's trade mainstreaming. The NIU is located within the MOTIE premises and currently consists of a National Coordinator, a Finance Officer, a Programme Officer and an Administrative Assistant.

At ITC level, the project is coordinated by the Country Manager (CM) in charge of The Gambia within the Office for Africa Section under the general supervision of the Chief Office for Africa (Division of Country Programmes). ITC's technical sections are responsible for the delivery of inputs according to the logical framework and workplan. The main technical sections involved for the implementation of the project include:

#### Component A1:

- Export Strategy Section (Division of Country Programmes)
- Sector Development Section (Division of Market Development)

#### Component A 2:

- Enterprise Competitiveness Section (Division of Business and Institutional Support)

#### Component B:

- Trade Information Section (Division of Market Development)

#### Component C:

- Sector Competitiveness Section (Division of Market Development)

According to each component, ITC worked with relevant and reliable national TSI that could be both technical counterparts as well as beneficiaries of the project, as listed below:

#### Component A 1 Sector development and implementation

The direct technical counterpart is the Department of State for Agriculture (DOSA). However collaboration is expected with the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE), the Agribusiness Service Plan Association (ASPA), The Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC), the National Women Farmers' Association (NAWFA) and the National Cashew Farmers' Association (NCFA). International development agencies (FAO, IFAD, UNDP, the World Bank) present in The Gambia and working on agriculture will be consulted for further cooperation.

#### Component A 2 Quality enhancement

The proposed direct technical counterpart was the National Codex and SPS Committee (NCSPSC). However, technical work was primarily done with DOSA, NARI, sector associations ASPA, CAG and NAWFA, MOTIE, as well as international institutions working on SPS issues (STDF and FAO).

#### Component B Trade information

The direct technical counterpart is the MOTIE. Collaboration is expected with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, The Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS), The Gambia Revenue

Authority, The Gambian Tourism Authority (GTA), The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCl), the Ministry of Justice and DOSA for the establishment of the Trade Information Network.

#### Component C Inclusive Tourism

The main technical counterpart will be The Gambia Tourism Authority (through the Tourism Commission and the Tourism Board).

### **Midterm Evaluation 2014**

A midterm evaluation was completed in October 2014, which resulted in 14 recommendations.<sup>38</sup> The Midterm Evaluation (MTE) and its results were presented to all stakeholders in November 2014, and a management response and action plan was submitted to the ITC Evaluation Unit in December 2014.

The objective of the MTE was to confirm whether the project was performing towards achieving the targets set and to take remedial action where the programme might not be on track. The midterm evaluation found that the project was well conceived with potentially for significant impact on the international competitiveness of the targeted sectors and on enhancing incomes among vulnerable groups including women. The Main Implementing Entity (MIE), the International Trade Centre, has deployed best practices in the management, monitoring and evaluation of the project. The MTE found that the timeline of three years has materially diluted the impact. Thus, based on the MTE recommendations the project duration was extended with no cost implications until the end of 2015 instead of the original end date of March 2015.

Institutional weaknesses in key national implementing partners pose a serious threat to the sustainability of the related gains realised so far. According to the MTE team, as things stand (as of October 2014); the project had roughly a 50 per cent potential for successful impact. The crystallisation of the project objectives depended on the implementation of all related quality assurance processes. At the time of the MTE, there was a high risk that the critical accredited laboratory would not be available within the project lifetime.

## **2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

**Purpose.** With a view on the project mandate, strategies, and objectives, the main purposes of the final evaluation are to:

1. Assess the performance and results (including impact) of the project, through a consultative and participatory process; the progress made towards addressing the MTE recommendations will be taken into consideration as well; and
2. Generate findings, recommendations and lessons useful for ongoing and future projects and programmes.

**Scope.** The final evaluation will assess all elements of the project design, implementation, and management including processes, operations, and results. It will cover the period from start of project implementation to the present. The evaluation of processes will assess the management of the project cycle in relation to project delivery and timeliness, while considering roles, responsibilities and decision making processes.

The evaluation of operations will assess the extent to which results have been achieved, look at the overall contribution of the project to the project's direct beneficiaries and situate the benefits of the

<sup>38</sup> See: Midterm Evaluation of Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification in The Gambia, 2014, viii – xvi,

[http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/About\\_ITC/How\\_ITC\\_Works/Evaluation/Midterm%20Evaluation%20of%20Sector%20Competitiveness%20xport%20Diversification%20in%20The%20Gambia%202014.pdf](http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/About_ITC/How_ITC_Works/Evaluation/Midterm%20Evaluation%20of%20Sector%20Competitiveness%20xport%20Diversification%20in%20The%20Gambia%202014.pdf)

project in the national trade development context. In addition, the broader role of the ITC in supporting the identification of trade priorities, capacity building and/or transfer will be analysed.

### 3. SUGGESTED EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In line with ITC's Evaluation Policy and methodology, the evaluation will address the following questions (to be finalised in Inception Report):

#### **Relevance**

- Are the project objectives and design in line with ITC's corporate objectives, strategies, and strengths?
- Are the project objectives and design relevant to the development needs and priorities of the Government and primary stakeholders in the country?
- How coherent was the project in terms of how it fit in with the policies and programmes undertaken by the government and other development partners?
- Are the project objectives and design relevant to targeted beneficiaries needs and priorities?
- Was the need assessment conducted at the design stage sufficiently considered the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
- Was the implementation arrangement based on a stakeholder analysis?
- Was the implementation plan relevant and realistic in the country context?
- Were any major modifications made in the objectives and design during implementation? What are the reasons?
- Did the project benefit from available knowledge (e.g. the experience of other aid for trade projects, finding and recommendations of evaluations of similar interventions) during its design and implementation?
- What are the other major factors contributed to the assessment of the relevance?

#### **Effectiveness:**

- To what extent have the objectives of the project and outcomes of the components been attained both in quantitative and qualitative terms?
- If the project activities are not yet fully completed, is it likely that so far unattained objectives may be accomplished in full or in part in extended duration?
- What factors in project design and implementation arrangement account for the estimated results in terms of effectiveness?
- What major changes in the overall context (e.g. policy framework, political situation, institutional set-up, economic shocks, civil unrest, etc.) have affected or are likely to affect project implementation and overall results?
- From the primary stakeholders' perspective, has the project achieved the expected outcomes for each of the components? Why?

#### **Efficiency:**

- What were the costs of the intervention to develop specific project outputs (e.g. the cost to development trade information centre, the cost for quality accreditation for export)? The quality of works/supplies needs to be fully recognized for input/output comparisons.
- Is the cost ratio of outputs to inputs comparable to local, national or regional benchmarks? The benchmarks could be the cost of similar works undertaken by the government or other partners.
- Was the administrative cost comparable to that of other development partners?

- How much time did it take to set up the management and coordination structure before implementing other components? Was the project implementation period extended?
- Were input delivered in time and outputs achieved on time and on budget?
- What other factors help account for project efficiency performance?

**Impact:**

- What impact has the project contributed to in the terms of trade development, economic development, and poverty reduction?
- What is the potential impact generated in terms of social development, human development, rights and empowerment? What are the changes made by the project in terms of the capacity of local organisations and grassroots institutions?
- What is the impact generated in relation to environmental sustainability?
- Is there other specific potential impact aligned to the UN post-2015 sustainable development goals?
- Are there any other positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the project interventions? Why?

**Sustainability:**

- Was a specific exit strategy or approach prepared and agreed upon by key partners to ensure post-port sustainability?
- What is the likelihood that results/benefits will continue after EIF project ends? What factors militate in favour of or against maintaining benefits?
- Is there a clear indication that the government and/or other key partners have committed financial and human resources to maintain benefits and results?
- Are the project target groups and their organisations prepared to continue the project activities and benefits?
- Is the business environment conducive to the maintenance of the project's results?
- What is the consideration on environmental sustainability?
- What other factors account for the assessment of sustainability?

**Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment:**

- Was gender equality and women's empowerment integrated in project design and implementation arrangement?
- How did the project impact the gender equality in project areas and the lives of women beneficiaries? Has the project reduced gender-based inequalities in access to the resources and benefits of development?
- Has the project contributed to the advancement of women's equal rights in social, economic, and political development, including participation in decision-making?

**Innovation, replication and scaling up**

- What are the characteristics of innovation(s) promoted by the project which may benefit other aid-for-trade interventions? Are the actions in question truly innovative or are they well-established elsewhere but new to the country or project area?
- Was successfully promoted innovation documented and shared?
- Have the project approaches and innovations been replicated or scaled-up by other partners in the same or other countries?

#### 4. METHODOLOGY

Evaluation methods will be discussed during the briefing meetings with ITC at the beginning of the assignment. On this basis, the Evaluation Service Provider will decide on the evaluation methods that are most appropriate for the purpose of the evaluation. An inception report will assess the evaluability of the project, present initial finding and determine the evaluation methods to be used. These may include, but are not restricted to, a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods such as:

- Desk review, including major project documents such as the project document, progress reports and baseline data;
- Interviews with key stakeholders at ITC and in Banjul ;
- Evaluability analysis;
- Stakeholder analysis;
- Field visits; Surveys and/or questionnaires; and
- Case studies.

Triangulation between various data sources and methods to ensure the reliability and consistence of data collected. A detailed statement of the evaluation methods to be used for conducting the evaluation must be included in the Inception Report.

#### 5. MAIN DELIVERABLES

##### ***Inception Report***

The Inception Report should comprise two key analytical pieces: the initial findings based on desk review and early interviews, and the customized evaluation methodology.

##### ***Annotated table of content, evaluation report***

After the Inception Report has been endorsed by the Evaluation Unit, the service provider should provide the Evaluation Unit an Annotated Table of Content of the Evaluation report, for discussion. It should outline the main structure of the report and key themes for in-depth study. An ITC example is to be provided.

##### ***Draft evaluation report***

In line with the methods outlined in the Inception report and the Annotated table of contents, a draft evaluation report should be provided to the Evaluation Unit for comments. The draft will be subject to comments by key stakeholders, and the comments should be addressed accordingly. An Audit trail should be prepared, which will detail how the report has addressed or not addressed the specific comments of stakeholders and why. An ITC example is to be provided. .

##### ***Final Report and Learning Note***

In agreement with the Evaluation Unit, a final report should be submitted after having addressed the comments of stakeholders. For communication purpose, an Evaluation Learning Note focusing a key learning issue generated by the evaluation should be presented.

#### 6. EVALUATOR COMPETENCIES

The evaluation will be conducted by an Evaluation Service Provider. The Evaluation Service Provider will be responsible for the delivery of outputs as set out above in Section 5. In addition, the Evaluation Service Provider will be responsible for the redaction and transmission of the final report. The project team in Geneva and the EIF/NIU in The Gambia will assist the Evaluation Service Provider by providing reports and baseline information, planning and participating in interviews with key informers and stakeholders at local level.

The Evaluation Service Provider should have the following qualifications, experience, and competencies, which will be needed to effectively conduct the evaluation:

- Advanced degree in the field of project management, social science, development studies or another relevant field of study;
- Knowledge of the EIF operations, with technical competency in trade issues, particularly Aid for Trade;
- Demonstrated knowledge of and a strong record in designing and/or leading evaluations (including both qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods);
- Prior project/programme evaluation experience, preferably in trade-related technical assistance projects, including in-depth knowledge of evaluation principles, methodologies and tools;
- Skilled in data analysis;
- Expertise in results-based management (RBM) and capacity building;
- Knowledge of developing country economies, and knowledge of The Gambia; in-country experience would be an asset;
- Proficiency in English and excellent report writing skills, with the ability to write clear and concise analytical reports.
- Good facilitation, presentation and analytical skills;
- Ability to communicate effectively with various stakeholders including Government, Donors, private sector, and other beneficiaries;
- Excellent organization and time management skills;
- Strong interpersonal skills, with the ability to work with people from different backgrounds to deliver quality products within short timeframe; and
- Ability to be flexible and responsive to changes and demands; and to be result-based and open to feedback.

## **7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, WORKPLAN, AND TIMEFRAME**

### ***Managements Arrangements***

During project implementation, ITC (the MIE) ensures that the evaluation takes place in a timely manner. The ITC Evaluation Unit will manage the progress of the evaluation.

ITC

In accordance to the Project Evaluation Guidance Note, in preparing the evaluation, together with project staff, key stakeholders, the ITC will undertake the following:

- Consult with key stakeholders to prepare for the evaluation;
- Prepare a draft TOR for the evaluation including key evaluation questions (final approval is given by the ES and TFM);
- Manage the evaluation, including to hire the independent evaluation service providers; supervise the evaluation process, involve proper stakeholders in the evaluation process including the ES and TFM, ensure the quality of the evaluation deliverables, and conduct regular consultation and consensus building activities during the process.;
- Circulate the draft inception report to the NIU, ES, TFM, NSC and PSC for comments;
- Circulate the draft evaluation report to the NIU, ES, TFM, NSC and PSC for comments;
- Collect comments and send to the Evaluation Service Provider;
- Send the final evaluation report to the ES, TFM, NSC and PSC;
- Conduct communication and learning events, based on the evaluation findings, recommendations, and lessons; and



- Follow-up on the implementation of recommendations.

#### ES and TFM

- Participate in the consultations during the evaluation process and provide feedback, comments and clarify expectations on accountability and learning issues;
- Comment on and endorse the TOR;
- Comments on the Draft Inception Report and the Draft Evaluation Report; Comment on
- Endorse the Final Evaluation Report; and,
- Participate in communication, learning and follow up actions.

#### NSC and PSC

- Participate in the consultations during the evaluation process and provide feedback, comments and clarify expectations on accountability and learning issues
- Comment on the TOR; and
- Comment on the Draft Inception Report and the draft Evaluation Report; Participate in communication, learning and follow up actions

#### NIU

- Participate in the consultations during the evaluation process and provide feedback, comments and clarify expectations on accountability and learning issues
- Provide comments on the Draft Inception Report;
- Provide Comments on the Draft Evaluation Report, and the Final Evaluation Report.
- Participate in communication, learning and follow up actions

#### NIU and ITC

The NIU and ITC are jointly responsible for facilitating and monitoring the evaluation, including arranging stakeholders meetings, controlling quality of the report and consultation with local stakeholders, ES-TFM on the evaluation findings and conclusions.

#### ***Tentative timeframe for the evaluation process***

The implementation period of the evaluation process covers a tentative period between 1 October 2015 and 31 December 2015. Within this period, the estimated 28 work days would be required over a period of three months. Details of the timeframe and deliverables, as well as duration and an estimated number of work days are provided in the below table:

Timeframe and Deliverables	Duration	Est. Work days
<b>Service Provider completes initial round of desk review phase, including review of documentation and initial interviews.</b>	+ 2 weeks	6
<b>The Service Provider submits a <u>Draft Inception Report</u> to the Evaluation Unit of the MIE.</b>		
<b>Stakeholders' commenting on the Draft Inception Report</b>	+ 1 week	
<b>The Service Provider submits the <u>Final Inception Report and Annotated Table of Contents for the evaluation report.</u></b>	+ 1 week	4
<b>Data collection phase, including interviews in country, further data collection, field visits, survey / questionnaires, case studies, etc. The Service Provider should ensure regular communication with the Evaluation Unit of the MIE.</b>	+ 3 weeks	10

<b>Service Provider submits the <u>Draft Evaluation Report</u> to the Evaluation Unit of the MIE</b>	+ 1 week	4
<b>Commenting by the Unit</b>	+ 1 week	
<b>Commenting by key stakeholders,</b>	+ 2 weeks	
<b>Service Provider addresses comments and provides draft audit trails to the Evaluation Unit. At the end of this period the Service Provider submits the <u>Final Evaluation Report and draft Evaluation Learning Note.</u></b>	+ 1 week	4
<b>ITC transmits the Final Evaluation Report to the ES/TFM and all key stakeholders for endorsement. At the end of this period, the MIE approves the Final Evaluation Report.</b>	+ 1 week	
<b>Communication, learning and follow up</b>		

## 8. ETHICAL CODES OF CONDUCT

The evaluation will be undertaken in accordance with international norms and standards for the United Nations, ITC, and the EIF. Evaluations should be carried out in an ethical manner. The evaluation should take account of cultural differences, local customs, religious practices, gender roles and age throughout the planning, implementation and reporting on the evaluation. The Evaluation Service Provider shall have no past involvement with the project so that conflicts of interest are avoided and the credibility of the evaluation process and product is not undermined. The principles on avoiding conflict of interested should be referred to the relevant section in ITC Evaluation Policy 2015. The Evaluation Service Provider should avoid acceptance of gifts, and adhere to the highest technical ethical standards of evaluation. They should fulfil the criteria of professionalism, impartiality and credibility. In addition, they should:

- Ensure honesty and integrity of the entire evaluation process;
- Respect the security, dignity and self-worth of the respondents, project participants, and other stakeholders with whom they interact;
- Articulate and take into account the diversity of interests and values and protect the rights and welfare of individuals and institutions involved in the evaluations; and
- Produce and convey accurate information about the project's merit and value, provide information in confidence, and report impartially.

## 9. REFERENCES FOR THE EVALUATION

The reference materials for the evaluation include the following documents<sup>39</sup>:

- The project proposal document including the project logical framework which outlines the outcomes, outputs and activities, and corresponding indicators and assumptions;
- The memorandum of understanding (MOU) including the Board approval letter which indicates the approval conditions set by the Board for the implementation of the project;
- The monitoring and evaluation plan, progress reports and other relevant project documents such as supervision mission recommendations are also key sources of information for the evaluation process; and
- The Midterm Evaluation.

<sup>39</sup> Note: The documents will be made available to the Evaluation Service Provider at the onset of the evaluation

## Appendix 2: Schedule of Key Documents Reviewed for this Evaluation Report

### List of Key Documents reviewed for the Inception Report

Source: ITC

#	Title
1.	Amendment 2 to EIF between ITC and UNOPS
2.	Amendment I to Grant MOU from ITC TO Cashew Alliance of The Gambia (CAG) with the collaboration of the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE)
3.	ELF Board Meeting (June 19, 2014) Launching of Cashew and Sesame Sector Strategies (June 18, 2014) Launching of The Gambia Trade Information Centre (June 18, 2014)
4.	Gambia: Sector competitiveness and export diversification project - 2015 workplan
5.	Gambia: Sector competitiveness and export diversification project workplan 2015 (format following logframe sequencing)
6.	Grant MOU between ITC and The Food Safety and Quality Authority of The Gambia (FSQA) with the collaboration of Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE)
7.	Grant MOU from ITC to Cashew Alliance for The Gambia (CAG) with the collaboration of the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration & Employment (MOTIE)
8.	Grant MOU from ITC to National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI)
9.	Grant MOU from ITC to The Agribusiness Services and Producers Association (ASPA) with the collaboration of the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration & Employment (MOTIE)
10.	Midterm Evaluation of Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification in The Gambia (EIF Tier 2 Project)
11.	Mission to Gambia - Implementation of the HACCP Quality Component of the Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project.
12.	NFF - Mission to Berlin to participate to 2015 Fruit Logistical Trade Fair Edition
13.	Note for the file EIF Gambia: Project Steering Mission 16 & 17 December 2014
14.	Packaging needs assessment of Cashew nut, Groundnut and Sesame processors.
15.	Project change request form - Gambia: sector competitiveness and export diversification project
16.	SECTOR COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION PROJECT THE GAMBIA, Bi-annual Progress Report, January-June 2014
17.	SECTOR COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION PROJECT THE GAMBIA, Bi-annual Progress Report, July - December 2014
18.	SECTOR COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION PROJECT THE GAMBIA, Bi-annual Progress Report, January-June 2015
19.	Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project The Gambia, Quarter 1 Project Field Report, January - March 2015
20.	Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project The Gambia, Quarter 2 Project Field Report, March 2015 - June 2015
21.	Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project The Gambia, Quarter 3 Project Field Report, July-September 2014
22.	Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project The Gambia, Quarter 4 Project Field Report, October- December 2014
23.	The Gambia SCEDP NEWSLETTER SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2014

#	Title
24.	The Gambia SCEDP NEWSLETTER DECEMBER 2014 – FEBUARY 2015
25.	The Gambia SCEDP NEWSLETTER MARCH 2015 – MAY 2015
26.	The Gambia SCEDP NEWSLETTER June 2015 – July 2015
27.	Management Response Action Plan EIF Gambia FINAL_191214_v2
28.	2015 05 27 ITC MOTIE Report of 4 Mission Part 2_youdeowei
29.	2015 EIF Gambia Work Plan FINAL_modified for EIF
30.	Assignment Report Gambia Packaging 2015 09 03
31.	CAG MOU August 2015 signed by all parties 01092015
32.	CAG news article_march 2015
33.	EIF-Project sector competitiveness and export diversific
34.	Gambia_T2-001_SCED_BR-NCE_FINAL_18Feb15
35.	ITC Gambia IPM Field Guide 16 June 2015
36.	NAWFA ES MoU Amendment signed
37.	NFF_Lopez_March 2015
38.	NFF_Roberge_August 2014
39.	Note for File_Luotonen_24032015
40.	Project Change Request Form_signed Chief Director_4.03.2015
41.	Signed ITC ASPA MOU_FFS 2nd season
42.	Sustainability workshop_Outputs
43.	2015 06 12 ITC MOTIE REVISED Report 4th Mission Part 1 + Supplsement_youdewei
44.	ACA Code of Conduct Training Report (Final)
45.	CAG ES MoU Amendment signed
46.	CAG MOU FFS 2nd season signed by ITC CAG and MOTIE
47.	Consultancy Report_Landing Sonko- EIF FFS ITC
48.	FINAL REPORT_Sbaraglia_Nari Lab
49.	Hygiene Training_AUG2015_Ndenn
50.	MOU ES NAWFA signed by all parties
51.	NAWFA FFS 2nd season MOU signed by three parties received 08072015
52.	NFF_Luotonen Ramful_August 2015
53.	NFF_Roberge_May 2015
54.	Packaging Machine Handing Over Agreement
55.	SCEDP Sustainability news articlesMarch2015
56.	Signed ITC ASPA MOU_FFS 2nd season (1)
57.	Sustainability workshop_Slides

## Appendix 3: Schedule of Major Stakeholders

### List of Major Stakeholders for the SCED

Source: ITC Bi-Annual Progress Report Jan-Jun 2015

#### Group 1: ITC Staff

Acting Project Manager: Ms. Elisa Luotonen

Component	ITC Adviser	Technical Section
<b>Overall Project Coordination</b>	Mr Ekutu Bonzemba Ms Elisa Luotonen	Office for Africa, Division of Country Programmes
<b>Component A1a:</b> Sector strategy formulation (Sesame and Cashew Nut)	Mr. Charles Roberge, Associate Programme Officer	Sector Competitiveness Section
<b>Component A1b:</b> Sector strategy implementation (Groundnut, Sesame and Cashew Nut)	Mr. Ian Sayers, Senior Sector Development Officer: Agri-food Ms. Frederine Copy, Programme Officer, Fresh Fruits and Vegetables	Export Strategy Section, Sector Competitiveness Section
<b>Component A2:</b> Quality Enhancement (Sesame, groundnut and cashew nut)	Mr Khemraj Ramful, Senior Adviser, Ms. Ludovica Ghizzoni, Adviser	Export Quality Management, Enterprise Competitiveness Section
<b>Component B:</b> Trade Information	Mr. Martin Lopez, Associate Trade Information Officer Ms. Shitaye Lemma, Programme Coordinator, Market News Service	Trade Information Services Section
<b>Component C:</b> Inclusive Tourism	Ms Marie-Claude Frauenrath	Sector Competitiveness Section, Division of Market Development

#### Group 2: Consultants on various project components

Project component	National Consultant	International Consultant
<b>Component A1a:</b> Sector Strategy Formulation (Sesame and Cashew Nut)	Mr Fafanding Fatajo Mr Njaga Jawo Mr Mohammed Jammeh Mr Basainey Jammeh Mr Alpha Jallow	Ms Micaela Maftai Mr Isaac Ndungu
<b>Component A1b:</b> Sector Strategy Implementation	Mr Joseph Ndenn	Ms Micaela Maftai Mr. Richard Kettlewell
<b>Component A2:</b> Quality Enhancement (Sesame, groundnut and cashew nut)	Mr Dione Lamane Mr Seedy Fofana Mr Kutubo Sanyang Mr Ousman Bah Mr Joseph Ndenn	Dr Bruno Doko Prof Anthony Youdeowei Tom Owour Dr. Mauro Sbaraglia Ms Namrata Wakhhaloo Ms Roselyne Makau
<b>Component B:</b> Trade Information	Mr Alpha Bah Mr Seedy Bensouda Mr Gabriel Gomez	Ms Micaela Maftai Mr Aklile Mitiku Habtemariam Mr Pierre Ricau
<b>Component C:</b> Inclusive Tourism	Mr Alieu Secka Mr Daouda Niang	Dr Frederic Thomas
<b>Baseline Data Collection</b>	Mr Lamin Jobe	
<b>NIU Project coordination</b>	Mr Bai Ibrahim Jobe, EIF	

Project component	National Consultant	International Consultant
	Coordinator Mr Modou Touray, EIF Programme Officer Ms Fatoumatta Camara, EIF Programme Assistant	

### Group 3: Focal Points in The Gambia for the various project components

Project component	Focal Points and Technical Counterparts
<b>Sector strategy formulation</b> (sesame and cashew nut) – Component A 1.1)	Ms. Mama Mariama Saho, National Agricultural Research Institute (saho_11@yahoo.com)
<b>Sector strategy implementation</b> (groundnut, sesame and cashew nut) – Component A 1.2	Ms. Mama Mariama Saho, National Agricultural Research Institute (saho_11@yahoo.com)
<b>Quality Enhancement</b> (Sesame, groundnut and cashew nut)– Component A2	Dr. Omar Touray National Codex and SPS Committee (omartouray@live.com)
<b>Trade information</b> – Component B	Mr. Abdoulie Jammeh MOTIE (ajammeh@motie.gov.gm)
<b>Community-based Tourism</b> – Component C	Mr. Benjamin Roberts Ministry of Tourism and Culture Focal Point (msriibr2@yahoo.com)

### Group 4: Companies & TcC in HACCP programme

SME	Enterprise Representative	Designated TcC
Gambian Horticultural Enterprise	Mr. Abdou Rahman M.Jeng-Food Safety Manager Mr. Abou Suwaren-Assistant Food Safety Manager	Mr. Bai Dodou Jallow
CashewGam	Mr. Abdou Rahman Sillah, Assistant Manager Mr. Ebrima Demba-QC	Mr. Lamane S.Dione
Royal Enterprise	Mr. Sulayman Sowe, Procurement Manager	Mr. Bai Dodou Jallow
Reliance Oil	Mr. Sulayman Sowe, Procurement Manager	Mr. Bai Dodou Jallow
Jawneh and Family	Mr. Buba Jawneh, General Manager	Mr. Joseph Ndenn
Jal's Foods	Ms. Yassin Mbye Ms. Jorjo Njie	Mr. Joseph Ndenn
GGC	Mr. Buba Janneh-Plant Engineer Mr. Lamin Cham-Quality Inspector Mr. Ebrima Njie-Quality Control Manager	Mr. Lamane S.Dione, Mr. Joseph Ndenn

### Group 5: Sesame Sector Development Committee Members

SESAME Institution	Status
1. National Women Farmers Association (NAWFA) (Focal Point)	Non-state
2. National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI)	Public
3. Department of Agriculture (DOA)	Public
4. National Executive Committee of Sesame Growers Association	Non-state
5. University of The Gambia	Public

SESAME Institution	Status
6. Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Non-state
7. Com-Afrique	Private
8. National Standards Bureau	Public
9. Gambia Investment Export Promotion Agency	Public
10. Enhanced Integrated Framework (National Implementing Unit)	Public
11. Royal Enterprise	Private
12. Sandika Petty Traders Association	Private
13. National Transport Association	Private
14. ConorPlast	Private
15. Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC)	Public

**Focal Point:** Mr. Njaga Jawo, Executive Director NAWFA email: njagab52@yahoo.co.uk

**Note:** The Overall Technical Counterpart: Kutubo Sanyang, Senior Researcher NARI email: [mansanyang@hotmail.com](mailto:mansanyang@hotmail.com)

#### Group 6: Cashew Sector Development Committee Members

CASHEW Institution	Status
1. Jawneh & Family Cashew Processing Centre	Private
2. National Standards Bureau	Public
3. International Relief and Development	Non-state
4. ComAfrique Ltd.	Private
5. Cashew Alliance Gambia (CAG) (Focal Point)	Non-state
6. National Cashew Farmers Association	Non-state
7. Department of Agricultural (DOA)	Public
8. Gambia Banking Association	Non-state
9. Kombo Cashew Farmers Association	Non-state
10. National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI)	Public
11. Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA)	Public
12. Enhanced Integrated Framework (National Implementing Unit)	Public
13. Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC)	Public
14. Agro Product Buyers Association (APBA)	Non-state
15. Sandika Petty Traders Association	Non-state
16. Inter Agro Engineering	Private
17. AK Trading	Private
18. Little Star	Private

**Focal Point:** Momodou Ceesay, President Cashew Alliance Gambia (CAG) email: gamhort@qanet.gm

**Note:** The Overall Technical Counterpart: Kutubo Sanyang, Senior Researcher NARI email: [mansanyang@hotmail.com](mailto:mansanyang@hotmail.com)

#### Group 7: Groundnut Sector Development Committee Members

GROUNDNUTS Institution	Status
1. Agribusiness Service and Producers Association (ASPA) (Focal Point)	Non-state
2. Gambia Groundnut Cooperation (GGC)	Public
3. Commodity Traders and Dealers Association	Non-state
4. CPMS	Non-state
5. New Nut Company	Private



<b>GROUNDNUTS Institution</b>	<b>Status</b>
6. Hassan Cheng Enterprise	Private
7. United Trade Company	Private
8. National Transport Association	Non-state
9. Sandika Petty Traders Association	Non-state
10. National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI)	Public
11. Department of Agriculture (DOA)	Public
12. Gambia Investment Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA)	Public
13. Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI)	Non-state
14. Gambia Ports Authority	Public
15. Gambia Shipping Agency	Private
16. GAMSEM	Private
17. ASPA	Non-state
18. Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC)	Public

**Focal Point:** Mr. Abdoulie Khan, Secretary General ASPA email:

**Note:** The Overall Technical Counterpart: Kutubo Sanyang, Senior Researcher NARI email:  
[mansanyang@hotmail.com](mailto:mansanyang@hotmail.com)

#### **Group 8: Trade Information Committee**

<b>Entity</b>	<b>Status</b>
1. MOTIE (Focal Point)	Public
2. Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA )	Public
3. Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG)	Public
4. Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI )	Non-state
5. Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBoS)	Public
6. Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA)	Public
7. Registrar of Companies	Public
8. Gambia Competition Commission (GCC)	Public

**Focal Point:** Mr. Abdoulie Jammeh, Director of Trade, Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment email: [ajammeh@motie.gov.gm](mailto:ajammeh@motie.gov.gm), [abdouliejam@yahoo.com](mailto:abdouliejam@yahoo.com)

#### **Group 9: Quality Assurance Taskforce**

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Status</b>
1. National Women Farmers Association (NaWFA)	Non-state
2. National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI)	Public
3. Plant Protection Services: Department of Agriculture (DOA)	Public
4. Food Technology Services	Public
5. Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE)	Public
6. Cashew Alliance of The Gambia (CAG)	Non-state
7. The Food Safety and Quality Authority (FSQA)	Public
8. National Standards Bureau	Public
9. EIF NIU	Public
10. National Codex and SPS Committee (NCSPSC)	Public

Focal Point: Dr. Omar Touray, Chairman, National Codex and SPS Committee (NCSPSC)

Email: [omartouray@live.com](mailto:omartouray@live.com) **Note:** The Overall Technical Counterpart: Kutubo Sanyang, Senior Researcher NARI  
email [mansanyang@hotmail.com](mailto:mansanyang@hotmail.com)

### Appendix 4: Logical Framework of the SCED

	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Overall objective for entire project:</b></p> <p>Poverty reduction through activities that (a) strengthen targeted sectors competitiveness, (b) promote new business opportunities in domestic, regional and international markets and, (c) generate additional incomes and create employment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expansion onto new markets with adequate spread across markets in the respective sectors</li> <li>Increased of sales (domestic, regional and international markets) in the respective sectors by 3%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trade statistics</li> <li>Opinion leading trade press coverage</li> <li>Client satisfaction surveys</li> <li>Household poverty reports</li> <li>Baseline data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The country remains stable and free from civil war, negative parliamentary or ministerial interference or unplanned</li> <li>Monetary/banking/fiscal changes that negatively affect commerce</li> <li>No major environmental disasters</li> <li>The relevant trade support institutions remain intact and operational</li> <li>Counterparts and beneficiaries cooperate well</li> </ul>
<p><b>Project outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Strengthened locally available structures and capacities to support business operations</b> (all project components)</li> <li><b>Sector stakeholders enabled to develop inclusive sector strategies and follow-up on their implementation</b> (Component A1)</li> <li><b>Increased export opportunities for the agricultural products cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame</b> (Component A2)</li> <li><b>Policy makers, TSIs and businesses (particularly producers, processors and exporters of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame; ensuring women are included) capacitated to access relevant trade information and produce prospective market studies</b> (Component B)</li> <li><b>Potential for Inclusive Tourism Development assessed and recommendations provided to Government</b> (Component C)</li> </ul>			

#### Project Component A 1 - Development of sector strategies for Cashew-nut & Sesame

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
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Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b><u>Overall objective for Component A 1</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>An increased capacity of public and private institutions to support and stimulate exports of cashews and sesame through the provision of relevant and accessible trade support services.</b></li> <li><b>Improved public and private dialogue in the cashew and sesame sectors to formulate and manage export development strategies that are relevant and realistic.</b></li> <li><b>Empowered stakeholders in the cashew and sesame sectors capable of contributing to export development activities for their sectors, including female stakeholders.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of stakeholders participating in activities organized during the sector design process; sex disaggregated</li> <li>Number of public and private sector statements in support of export development</li> <li>Number of exporters in the cashew and sesame sectors receiving relevant assistance from TSIs; ensuring that women are benefitting</li> <li>Number of policies relating the cashew and sesame sector having been introduced or modified in support of export development</li> <li>Amount of Aid for trade received and disbursed for export development activities relating to the cashew and sesame sectors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Baseline studies</li> <li>Annual reports from recipients of assistance, sector producers and exporters;</li> <li>Media reports</li> <li>Parliamentary records and meeting minutes</li> <li>Roundtable progress review meeting minutes</li> <li>Other development agencies reports and case studies related to the sectors under consideration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The relevant trade support institutions remain intact and operational</li> <li>Markets in the sectors under consideration are not affected by unforeseen climatic or environmental disasters</li> <li>The country remains stable and free from civil unrest, negative parliamentary or ministerial interference or unplanned Monetary/banking/fiscal changes that negatively affect commerce</li> <li>Funding is allocated for the implementation of the plans of action for the cashew and sesame sector export strategies</li> <li>Representative stakeholders collaborate to the design and implementation of the plans of action for the cashew and sesame sector strategies</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Outcomes for Component A 1 (Steps 1-5 / Outputs 1.1-1.5):</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Participatory sector strategies developed and validated by stakeholders with prioritised implementation plans for the cashew nuts and sesame sectors;</b></li> <li><b>Strategy implementation coordination bodies identified or established, functioning and referred to for advice on policy development and other planning issues;</b></li> <li><b>Strategies, implementation plans and coordination bodies referred to and involved in policy decision-making processes in The Gambia.</b></li> </ul>			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Outputs 1.1 (Inception)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collection of baseline data completed and main gaps in sector development know-how identified. Sector specialist(s) and operational support needs identified;</li> <li>• Scope of ITC activities, outline ITC intervention plan &amp; budget revised. Initial development objectives and purpose of intervention agreed;</li> <li>• Stakeholders &amp; other development agencies involved in the sector identified and consulted (ensuring that women are represented) to confirm project outline, overall purpose and goals of sector development agreed upon.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities leading to Outputs1.1.</b></p> <p><i>1.1.1 Conduct one consultative round table meeting with key stakeholders to initiate ITC intervention held. Initial Inception meetings with government agencies and key value chain stakeholders in cashew nuts and sesame; market and sector research and exchange information with counterparts and existing buyers initiated.</i></p> <p><i>1.1.2 Organize initial round table meetings with government agencies and key value chain stakeholders in cashew nuts, and sesame sectors.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List of Core Team members</li> <li>• Meeting organized effectively.</li> <li>• Baseline data summarised and presented;</li> <li>• Quality of the baseline analyses for both the cashew and sesame sectors.</li> <li>• Sector specialists identified and available</li> <li>• Partnerships with other development agencies working in these sectors identified have been established</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members list</li> <li>• Project and agencies mapping</li> <li>• Project documentation</li> <li>• Agreements</li> <li>• Meetings reports</li> <li>• 3rd party reports</li> </ul>	

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Outputs 1.2 (Value chain diagnostic)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sector, current market, organization and performance evaluated;</b></li> <li>• <b>Priority capacity-building or export readiness interventions identified and potential resource requirements defined.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of stakeholders at the sector consultation on value chain diagnostics, ensuring that women are part of the process</li> <li>• Number of market tours conducted with sector representatives and producers from along the value chain</li> <li>• Working group minutes &amp; results</li> <li>• Draft action plans ;</li> <li>• List of stakeholders identified issues</li> <li>• Participation of other development agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation &amp; participants lists, sex disaggregated</li> <li>• Mission reports &amp; post mission presentations</li> <li>• 3rd party reports</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Outputs 1.2</b></p> <p><i>1.2.1 Evaluate results of current development projects and their experiences; Review and report on export potential, market and product opportunities fitted to capabilities of the Gambian exporters, buyers and traders. Review of intra-regional trade policy and competitiveness interfaces, the impact of current trade agreements, planned changes to the business environment, SME trade linkages, investment promotion and non-tariff measures for selected product sectors.</i></p> <p><i>1.2.2 Review sector capabilities and performance by possible visit by consultant sector specialists of producers &amp; processors. Identification and report on potential new markets or new ways to add value to existing products.</i></p> <p><i>1.2.3 Organize first multi-stakeholder participatory workshops (one for each sector) to present market opportunities &amp; assessment and outline potential technical assistance inputs required as well as sector development action plans.</i></p>			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b><u>Outputs 1.3 (Elaboration)</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Potential strategic activities and orientation discussed, refined and agreed upon with potential support partners;</b></li> <li>• <b>Initial linkages developed with sector importers and other international technical support services or buyer-supplier schemes;</b></li> <li>• <b>Investment and financing requirements assessed for installation of new production or supply chain equipment, new working practices learned.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results of meetings with relevant potential support institutions</li> <li>• Revised and strengthened draft action plans, potential vision, and potential implementing arrangement</li> <li>• Number of linkages developed with importers</li> <li>• Priority (component A2) implementation projects initiated</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Working groups minutes &amp; reports</li> <li>• 3rd party reports;</li> <li>• Documentation &amp; participants lists</li> <li>• Mission reports &amp; post mission presentations</li> <li>• Draft strategy documents</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Outputs 1.3</b></p>			
<p><i>1.3.1 Working groups undertake specific assigned tasks as required supported and coached by ITC and consultant sector specialists, liaising with other agencies, summarize learning and information gathered and prepare presentations for all value chain stakeholders in sector strategy formulation workshop.</i></p>			
<p><i>1.3.2 Promote visits of a selected group, ensuring that women participate, to value chain stakeholders and sector associations in other countries that have gained a competitive advantage (for example in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, China, Vietnam, Brazil, South Africa, Uganda and Malawi).</i></p>			
<p><i>1.3.3 Organize market orientation and promotion visits (including women farmers/associations), to international sector product trade fairs, manufacturers of appropriate equipment and buyers that operate equitable trade for supplier development schemes or potential visits to global or regional sector technical associations.</i></p>			



Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b><u>Outputs 1.4 (Validation)</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft strategies and plans of actions refined;</li> <li>• Sector development strategies &amp; detailed implementation plans finalised by stakeholders;</li> <li>• Structure of a Private-Public implementation management body confirmed (established) and its secretariat.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities leading to Outputs 1.4</b></p> <p><i>1.4.1 Organize multi stakeholder workshop to conduct group exercises to conclude detailed implementation activity planning, and to define &amp; prioritize objectives and overall development vision.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refined sector development strategies and implementation plans</li> <li>• Implementation management body's list of members, role &amp; responsibilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation &amp; participants lists</li> <li>• Validated strategy documents and plans</li> <li>• Working groups minutes &amp; reports</li> <li>• 3rd party reports</li> <li>• Proposed structure of implementation management body</li> </ul>	

<p><i>1.4.2 Elaborate the structure of the implementation management body, its members, role and resources to act as coordination hub for development agencies &amp; implementation coordination.</i></p>			
<p><b>Outputs 1.5 (Launch)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalised sector development strategies &amp; detailed implementation plans launched and validated by stakeholders;</li> <li>• Sector strategy implementation coordination bodies and secretariats identified or established and working effectively;</li> <li>• Regular progress reports of market and success stories provided for ITC and other resource partners.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final Strategy documents</li> <li>• Validation of implementation management body</li> <li>• Media reports of launch and pledges received</li> <li>• Periodic progress reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minutes of implementation management body meetings</li> <li>• Implementation reports</li> <li>• 3rd party &amp; media reports;</li> <li>• Pledge records</li> <li>• Independent evaluations by other agencies or buyers or 3rd parties of progress towards achieving development outputs</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Outputs 1.5</b>			
<p><i>1.5.1 Organize multi stakeholder launch event (one for all sectors) to present finalized strategy and implementation coordination body to stakeholders, donors and project resource providers ensuring that women are included.</i></p>			
<p><i>1.5.2 Launch of ITC-led pilot implementation of selected development activities defined by stakeholders in the strategies and linked with Components' B and C directly and in collaboration with other development agencies according to skills, equipment and technical assistance required.</i></p>			
<p><i>1.5.3 Coordinate pilot implementation activities defined in the strategies in each sector started by ITC under coordination of strategy implementation management body.</i></p>			
<p><i>1.5.4 ITC distance support continued over next 18 months.</i></p>			

<p><b>Output 1.6 (pilot implementation)</b></p> <p>Pilot market-oriented activities identified as “priorities” in the strategies’ action plans are effectively implemented.</p>			
<p><b>Activities to Outputs 1.6</b></p> <p>1.6.1. <i>Provide capacity building and business advisory solutions to selected sector association and TSIs taking cognizance of gender dimensions to enhance their capacities to design, develop and deliver relevant trade support services to exporters.</i></p> <p>1.6.2. <i>Strengthen sector associations (including appropriate women’s associations) in the area of advocacy, negotiation, marketing, preparation of buyer/seller meetings, client relations for more effective support to their members</i></p> <p>1.6.3. <i>Organize market-oriented activities in order to prepare producers and exporters to meet with buyers requirements (include the transfer a number of trade promotion methodologies and tools to selected TSIs as well as the organization of trade promotion events)</i></p> <p>1.6.4. <i>Develop business linkages between producers and exporters and potential buyers</i></p> <p>1.6.5. <i>Support producers and exporters to formalize business relations through partnership agreements (such as contract farming)</i></p>	<p><i>Indicators as agreed in the action plans validated strategies</i></p> <p><i>Revised service portfolio of selected TSIs (max 10)</i></p> <p><i>Trade promotion methodologies and tools transferred and used by selected TSIs.</i></p>	<p>Minutes of meetings                  Validated action plans                  Implementation reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding is allocated for the implementation of the plans of action for the cashew and sesame sector export strategies</li> <li>• Representative stakeholders collaborate to the implementation of the plans of action for the cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame</li> </ul>

**Project Component A 2 - Quality enhancement of Groundnut, Cashew-Nut & Sesame sectors**

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Overall objective for Component A 2:</b></p> <p><b>Improving the incomes of cashew nut, groundnut and sesame farmers and firms along the value chain by increasing their export opportunities through enhanced quality management and a strengthened business support environment.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Income levels of targeted beneficiaries increase from sex disaggregated baseline study</li> <li>Increased unit and total value of exports or domestic sales in the respective sectors</li> <li>(Exporter) client satisfaction towards rendered support services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sex disaggregated Baseline study</li> <li>Copies of new contracts and agreements with buyers or importers</li> <li>Documented reports from recipients of assistance, sector producers and exporters;</li> <li>Media reports</li> <li>Import country customs and buyer reports</li> <li>Other development agencies' reports and case studies related to the sectors under consideration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The relevant trade support institutions remain intact and operational</li> <li>Markets in the sectors under consideration are not affected by unforeseen climatic or environmental disasters</li> <li>The country remains stable and free from civil unrest, negative parliamentary or ministerial interference or unplanned monetary/banking/fiscal changes that negatively affect commerce</li> <li>NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) recruit right technicians, upgrade the lab by appropriate refurbishment. The stakeholders have strong and long-term commitment to maintain the accreditation status of NARI's lab (for aflatoxin)</li> <li>To ensure sustainability NARI should provide some funds in its budget to obtain accreditation on a cost sharing basis and for maintaining accreditation beyond the project</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome: To upgrade testing capacity of NARI's lab (for aflatoxin)</b>			
<p><b>Outputs 2.1</b></p> <p><b>Enhanced capacity of technicians on testing</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two-week study tour of three technicians conducted</li> <li>Two sessions of two-week hands-on training for technicians of NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) on testing</li> <li>Three technicians have acquired knowledge and skills on testing aflatoxin in CS and S products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mission's report</li> <li>Assessment before and after the training</li> <li>Feedback from technicians</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.1</b></p> <p>2.1.1 Organise a study tour for NARI's lab technicians on testing aflatoxin in a foreign accredited lab.</p> <p>2.1.2 Conduct hands-on in-house training at NARI's lab on testing, especially for aflatoxin(two sessions of two weeks).</p>			
<p><b>Output 2.2</b></p> <p><b>Accreditation against ISO/IEC 17025 of NARI's lab</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevant staff members upgraded their knowledge and understanding of method validation, quality control and estimation of uncertainty of measurement</li> <li>Proficiency testing programmes in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mission's report</li> <li>Accreditation status</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.2</b></p>			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
2.2.1 Provide advice to NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) to enable them to meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 (i.e. preparation of required documents)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accreditation of NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) obtained</li> </ul>		
2.2.2 Arrange for NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) to participate in international proficiency testing programmes			
2.2.3 Arrange for NARI's lab (for aflatoxin) to be accredited by a foreign accreditation body, member of the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC)			
<b>Outcome: To build the Gambia's capacity to develop sector standards for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame</b>			
<b>Output 2.3</b>  Standards and regulations developed for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NCSPSC members are enabled to develop sector standards</li> <li>• Working sessions for preparing sector standards conducted</li> <li>• Draft standards sent for public comment;</li> <li>• Public sensitization on newly developed standards</li> <li>• Standards are available for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission's report</li> <li>• Published standards</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.3</b>			
2.3.1. Provide technical assistance to NCSPSC to enhance the process of sector standards development			
2.3.2 Develop of standards for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame.			
<b>Outcome: To increase the quality and food safety of production of Groundnuts in Gambia in order to comply with technical requirements in international markets and enhance and increase exports</b>			
<b>Output 2.4</b>  Enhanced quality segregation of groundnuts by quality control inspectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 2 training events conducted</li> <li>• At least 20 inspectors trained</li> <li>• Inspectors have acquired knowledge and skills on grading and segregation</li> <li>• Selected CPMS facilities have been assessed and recommendations for improvement provided</li> <li>• Quality controls on grading and segregation have improved</li> <li>• Necessary tools distributed to and used by inspectors who are capable of using them</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspectors' list</li> <li>• Surveys conducted to assess the behavioral and technical improvement of quality control inspectors before and after the training</li> <li>• Feedback from inspectors</li> <li>• Missions' reports</li> <li>• Feedback from CPMS representatives</li> <li>• Equipment list</li> <li>• Feedback from inspectors on equipment</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.4</b>			
2.4.1 Develop/consolidate training material based on the Manual for quality control inspectors			
2.4.2 Conduct theoretical/practical training at Depot level (two sessions of two weeks each)			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
2.4.3 Undertake an assessment of CPMS facilities with respect to handling and segregation of received stock from farmers and provide recommendations for improvement	properly		
2.4.4 Purchase necessary tools and materials, i.e. moisture meter, probes/samplers and equipping Quality Control Inspectors with knowledge to use them			
<b>Output 2.5</b> <b>Enhanced food safety of groundnuts through implementation of HACCP and pre-requisites such as GAP and GMP</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At least one awareness building workshop conducted by the International Consultant for 30 farmers, CPMS Representatives, traders, Depots, Industrialist, Processors</li> <li>At least 5 recognized Trainers-cum-Counsellors (TcC) have acquired knowledge and skills on HACCP and pre-requisites such as GAP and GMP in the groundnut sector and able to advise operators</li> <li>At least one operator from each group of operators along the value chain has improved hygienic practice as per HACCP</li> <li>HACCP principles have been</li> <li>applied to the groundnut industry in the Gambia</li> <li>At least one awareness building workshop conducted by the trained TcCs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feedback from participants</li> <li>Training questionnaire</li> <li>Participants' list</li> <li>Missions' reports</li> <li>Surveys conducted to assess the behavioral and technical improvement of Trainer-cum-Counsellors before and after the training</li> <li>Operators' improvement plans</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.5</b>			
2.5.1 Organise workshop on "Building awareness on Food Safety System based on HACCP" conducted by the International Consultant			
2.5.2 Conduct hands-on training on "Implementing HACCP and Pre-Requisites" for Trainers-cum-Counsellors (TcC) and operators			
2.5.3. Conduct hands-on Training on "Implementing HACCP - hazard analysis and categorization of control measures" for TcCs and operators			
2.5.4 Conduct hands-on Training on "Implementing HACCP – internal verification" for TcCs and operators			
2.5.5 Organise workshop on "Building awareness on Food Safety System based on HACCP" conducted by the trained TcCs			
<b>Output 2.6</b> <b>Enhanced farmer capacity to grow groundnuts of better quality and higher productivity through Farmer Field School</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At least 2 master training events conducted</li> <li>At least 5 master trainers have acquired knowledge and skills and delivered training programmes to training facilitators (extensions workers and farmers-trainers)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participants' list</li> <li>Feedback from participants</li> <li>Missions' reports</li> <li>Surveys conducted to assess the behavioral and technical improvement of master</li> </ul>	

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.6</b></p> <p><i>2.6.1 Consolidate Farmers' Field School Approach using Guide on Implementation of FFS approach</i></p> <p><i>2.6.2 Develop curricula for trainers</i></p> <p><i>2.6.3 Conduct of training by Master Trainers to core training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) (eight weeks)</i></p> <p><i>2.6.4 Develop and implement a Groundnut Farmer Field School Programme through conduct schools for 25-30 farmers by the core facilitators (extension workers and farmers)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30 training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) have been trained and are able to conduct FFS</li> <li>• Farmer Field School Programme in place</li> <li>• At least 20 sessions of FFS conducted</li> <li>• At least 600 farmers have improved their capacity to grow groundnuts of better quality and higher productivity</li> </ul>	<p>trainers and trainers before and after the training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of farmers' capacity</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Outcome: To set the framework for improving the quality of the <u>cashew nuts sector</u> in Gambia in order to become export ready and enhance farmer capacity to grow cashew nuts of better quality</b></p>			
<p><b>Output 2.7</b></p> <p><b>Quality Assurance Framework for the cashew nut sector</b></p> <p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.7</b></p> <p><i>2.7.1 Conduct GAP analysis in the areas of quality and food safety of the value chain through development of a Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) based on ISO 22006 and the HACCP System</i></p> <p><i>2.7.2 Conduct three workshops to present the QAF, to validate interim data/report and get feedback and endorsement from stakeholders</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) developed and available</li> <li>• At least two workshops conducted to share QAF, totalling 30 participants</li> <li>• Level of satisfaction of the stakeholders and donors with the communication process during the development of the QAF</li> <li>• A pool of at least 3 national advisers with a clear understanding of the needs of the sector in the area of quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• QAF document</li> <li>• Missions' reports</li> <li>• Stakeholders' list</li> <li>• Feedback from stakeholders</li> </ul>	



Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Output 2.8</b></p> <p><b>Enhanced farmer capacity to grow cashew nuts of better quality and higher productivity through Farmer Field School Approach</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 2 master training events conducted</li> <li>• At least 5 master trainers have acquired knowledge and skills and delivered training programmes to training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers)</li> <li>• At least 30 training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) have been trained and are able to conduct FFS</li> <li>• Cashew nut production manual developed</li> <li>• Farmer Field School Programme in place</li> <li>• At least 20 sessions of FFS conducted</li> <li>• At least 600 farmers have improved their capacity to grow groundnuts of better quality and higher productivity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participants' list</li> <li>• Feedback from participants</li> <li>• Missions' reports</li> <li>• Before and after surveys conducted to assess the behavioral and technical improvement of master trainers and trainers</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.8</b></p>			
<p><i>2.8.1 Consolidate Farmers' Field School Approach using the Guide on Implementation of FFS approach</i></p>			
<p><i>2.8.2 Develop curricula for trainers and Cashew nuts production manual (adaptation of the Groundnut one already available)</i></p>			
<p><i>2.8.3 Conduct Training of (Master) Trainers (three sessions of two-week training) using the Cashew nuts production manual</i></p>			
<p><i>2.8.4 Conduct of training by Master Trainers to 40 core training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) (eight weeks)</i></p> <p><i>2.8.5 Develop and implement a Cashew nut Farmer Field School Programme through conduct of a minimum of 30 schools for 25-30 farmers by the core facilitators (30 extension workers and farmers)</i></p>			
<p><b>Output 2.9</b></p> <p><b>Task Force for Cashew nuts established</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guidance on frameworks and institutional arrangements</li> <li>• Task Force for Cashew nuts established</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation &amp; participants lists;</li> <li>• Validated documents and plans;</li> <li>• Working groups minutes &amp; reports;</li> <li>• Proposed structure of Task Force</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 2.9</b></p> <p><i>2.9.1 Establish a Task Force under NCSPSC for guiding the development and implementation of the Quality Assurance Framework</i></p>			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Outcome:</b> To set the framework for improving the quality of the <u>sesame</u> sector in Gambia in order to become export ready and enhance farmer capacity to grow cashew nuts of better quality			
<b>Output 2.10</b>  <b>Quality Assurance Framework for the sesame sector</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) developed and available</li> <li>At least two workshops conducted to share QAF, totaling 30 participants</li> <li>Level of satisfaction of the stakeholders and donors with the communication process during the development of the QAF</li> <li>A pool of at least 3 national advisers with a clear understanding of the needs of the sector in the area of quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>QAF document</li> <li>Missions' reports</li> <li>Stakeholders' list</li> <li>Feedback from stakeholders</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.10</b>			
<i>2.10.1 Conduct GAP analysis in the areas of quality and food safety of the value chain through development of a Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) based on ISO 22006 and the HACCP System</i>			
<i>2.10.2 Conduct three workshops to present the QAF, to validate interim data/report and get feedback and endorsement from stakeholders</i>			
<b>Output 2.11</b>  <b>Enhanced farmer capacity to grow sesame of better quality and higher productivity through Farmer Field School Approach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At least 2 master training events conducted</li> <li>At least 5 master trainers have acquired knowledge and skills and delivered training programmes to training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers)</li> <li>At least 30 training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) have been trained and are able to conduct FFS</li> <li>Sesame production manual developed</li> <li>Farmer Field School Programme in place</li> <li>At least 20 sessions of FFS conducted</li> <li>At least 600 farmers have improved their capacity to grow groundnuts of better quality and higher productivity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participants' list</li> <li>Feedback from participants</li> <li>Missions' reports</li> <li>Surveys conducted to assess the behavioral and technical improvement of master trainers and trainers before and after the training</li> </ul>	
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.11</b>			
<i>2.11.1 Consolidation of Farmers' Field School Approach using the Guide on Implementation of FFS approach</i>			
<i>2.11.2 Development of curricula for trainers and Sesame production manual (adaptation of the Groundnut one already available)</i>			
<i>2.11.3 Conduct Training of (Master) Trainers (three sessions of two-week training) using the Sesame production manual</i>			

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
2.11.4 Conduct training by Master Trainers to core training facilitators (extension workers and farmers-trainers) (eight weeks)			
2.11.5 Develop and implement a Sesame Farmer Field School Programme through conduct schools for 25-30 farmers by the core facilitators (extension workers and farmers)			
<b>Output 2.12</b> <b>Task Force for Sesame established</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Guidance on frameworks and institutional arrangements</li> <li>Task Force for Sesame established</li> </ul>		
<b>Activities leading to Output 2.12</b>			
2.12.1 Establish a Task Force under NCSPSC for guiding the development and implementation of the Quality Assurance Framework			

### Project Component B – Trade Information

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall objective for Component B:</b> <b>To enable The Gambia's private and public sector to access relevant trade related information through MOTIE's information services, particularly in the first instance, to the sesame and cash nut sectors.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased usage (of at least 25%) of MOTIE's information services.</li> <li>User satisfaction increases from initial baseline established at start of project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client usage statistics</li> <li>User survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MOTIE remains intact and operational</li> <li>MOTIE makes available adequate staff resources and office space.</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome:</b> To develop the information service infrastructure at the MOTIE and build related capacities for its effective usage			
<b>Output 3.1</b> <b>Trade information infrastructure established</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documented assessment of the trade information environment in The Gambia including establishing baseline levels of usage and user satisfaction of MOTIE's</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reports and related documents elaborated.</li> <li>MNS license agreement</li> <li>Administrative documents relating to acquisitions.</li> </ul>	

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 3.1</b></p> <p><i>3.1.1 Update the Trade Information Review of the Gambia through an analysis of the trade information needs of the business community (taking in to account specific needs of women), an assessment of the capacity of existing and potential information service providers to meet these needs and a review of the most efficient mechanisms for collecting and disseminating information. Particular attention will be given to the sesame and cash nut sectors although not at the exclusion of other sectors.</i></p> <p><i>3.1.2 Prepare a Trade Information Service Development Plan, that will include details of the staffing, information resources and equipment required to enable the efficient operation of the MOTIE information service.</i></p> <p><i>3.1.3 Establish the mechanisms for the identification, collection/acquisition, processing and dissemination of relevant trade information.</i></p> <p><i>3.1.4 Acquire recommended information resources, furnishings and equipment, including ensuring fast internet connectivity.</i></p> <p><i>3.1.5 Provide ITC's Market News Service (MNS) Reports on selected sectors to MOTIE and establishment of a License Agreement with MOTIE to enable wider dissemination of MNS market intelligence reports to the Gambian business community.</i></p>	<p>information services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trade Information Service Development Plan elaborated and endorsed by relevant stakeholders.</li> <li>• Information resources, equipment and furnishings acquired.</li> <li>• Implementation of development plan</li> <li>• MNS disseminated to business community.</li> <li>• Relevant information products and services launched.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Statistics of delivery of services to clients.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Output 3.2</b></p> <p><b>Trade information management skills of local stakeholders enhanced. Trained staffs are committed to manage the Trade Information Reference Centre.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased levels of information management skills of MOTIE staff.</li> <li>• Increased levels of information research and analytical skills of selected public and private sector users.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports and related documents elaborated.</li> <li>• Evaluation of training and coaching programs</li> <li>• Manuals for the operation of the trade information service</li> <li>• Number of hits to relevant on-line sources of information</li> </ul>	

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Activities leading to Output 3.2</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Portfolio of services</li> </ul>	
<i>3.2.1 Strengthen the information management skills of the staff of the information services team at the MOTIE through group-training programmes and on-site coaching programmes, including a gender lens to the training. This could include: 6 Gambian officers participating in TITP, 3 Gambia-based workshops and on-site coaching of core information team in the Ministry</i>			
<i>3.2.2 Develop a range of information services and products to be offered to its clients, such as, but not limited to: Inquiry reply service, alert services, Directory of exporters as well as market profiles in the cash nut and sesame sectors.</i>			
<i>3.2.3 Develop the skills of MOTIE's technical staff in statistical management through the provision of appropriate training (e.g. Training through Eurotrace, if appropriate, or design a customized training programme for staff).</i>			
<i>3.2.4 Develop the capacity to produce market intelligence newsletters (similar to ITC's MNS reports) covering latest developments and trends in local, regional and major overseas markets, price information, and regulatory updates on selected products, including cash nut and sesame sectors.</i>			
<i>3.2.5 Conduct workshops for the public and private sector to raise awareness about the information service.</i>			
<b>Outcome: Improve efficient access to relevant export and import information by the public and private sector through the establishment of effective, networked modes of access to, and delivery of, information.</b>			
<b>Output 3.3</b> <b>Trade information network efficiently used by public and private stakeholders.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consultative workshop with potential stakeholders of the trade information network, ensuring that women are part of the process</li> <li>Documented guidelines for the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Online availability of the portal</li> <li>Manual for the operation of the network</li> <li>Client satisfaction survey.</li> <li>Number of hits on portal</li> </ul>	

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Activities leading to Output 3.3</b></p>	<p>implementation of mechanisms for exchanging and disseminating trade information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Portal available for network members and clients and showing increased usage over time</li> </ul>		
<p><i>3.3.1 In addition to the MOTIE, draw on the results of the Trade Information Review to identify other Gambian organisations that could potentially be partners in a national trade information network. These could include institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture (e.g. Department of Planning), Ministry of Justice (Attorney General's Companies Register), Customs, Competition Commission, Gambia's Statistical Office, Gambia Revenue Authority, the Central Bank, Ports Authorities, Gambia Horticulture Enterprise, Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, trade associations, research organisations and academic institutions.</i></p>			
<p><i>3.3.2 Conduct a workshop with potential network partners with a view to arriving at a consensus on the development and operation of an information network.</i></p>			
<p><i>3.3.3 Develop the appropriate administrative, legal and operational procedures required to operate the information network effectively</i></p>			
<p><i>3.3.4 Establish a mechanism (e.g. forum, association) that will enable the information officers of the network's partner organizations to meet on a regular basis.</i></p>			
<p><i>3.3.5 Design and develop a trade information portal to facilitate the virtual sharing, exchange, and dissemination of information both between partner organisations and to The Gambian public and private sectors. The design of such a portal would draw on international experiences with the actual development, hosting and ongoing technical maintenance being handled by a Gambian company.</i></p>			

**Project Component C – Inclusive Tourism Opportunity Study**

Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
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Outcomes/Outputs/Activities	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Outcome: Identify and assess the potential for the development of inclusive tourism activities in The Gambia.</b>			
<p><b>Output 4.1</b></p> <p>A comprehensive feasibility study on inclusive tourism in The Gambia which includes an action plan and a fully fledged project proposal for follow-up implementation of proposed activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All elements included in the terms of reference are reflected in the study</li> <li>Public and private stakeholders have been consulted</li> <li>The study and its action plan are endorsed by GTA and other national stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews</li> <li>Surveys</li> <li>Minutes of the validation</li> <li>Workshop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political stability</li> <li>Cooperation of national stakeholders involved in the tourism development and promotion</li> </ul>
<b>Activities leading to Output 4.1.</b>			
<i>4.1.1 Organize interviews and surveys with hoteliers, micro producers, ensuring that women are part of the process etc. for data collection</i>			
<i>4.1.2 Identify of most suitable sites in terms of potential and current tourism flows and infrastructure.</i>			
<i>4.1.3 Analyze of the value chains of horticultural products and of handicraft, assessing the demand from hotels, tour operators and tourists. It is then necessary to identify the parts of the value chain where pro-poor changes are likely to occur and where eventual blockages can be removed through ITC interventions. Based on the capacity to remove these blockages and their market potential, we then select specific products to focus the project intervention.</i>			
<i>4.1.4 Identify and select products and services, communities are likely to supply, based on their level of qualification, group organisation and equipment. A baseline socio-economic survey is carried out in each community to define the starting point against which all forms of development have to be assessed</i>			
<i>4.1.5 Draft the opportunity study</i>			
<i>4.1.6 Organize validation of the study</i>			
<i>4.1.7 Develop a fully fledged project proposal (led by NIU)</i>			



## Appendix 5: Status of Support to Downstream Intermediaries

Source: MIE Progress Report January to June 2015

Enterprise	Documentation Done	Progress Status		% Compliance with CODEX HACCP	Contact by Final Evaluation Team
		Status of Documentation	Closure of infrastructure gaps		
<b>Gambian Horticultural Enterprise</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews completed  Monitoring records also forwarded for use	All documents forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue  Can be issued by 27 <sup>th</sup> July 2015	Most infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have been closed	Documentation -80%  Infrastructure /General GMP - 80%	Telephone interview with M. Ceesay, Managing Director, 16 Dec 2015. Expressed full satisfaction with support received. Expects the visit of the external certifier by February 2016, by which time he expects to be fully ready.
<b>CashewGam</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews completed  Monitoring records also forwarded for use	All documented forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue  Can be issued by 27 <sup>th</sup> July 2015	Most infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have been closed	Documentation-80%  Infrastructure /General GMP - 80%	
<b>JFCPE (Jawneh &amp; Family)</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews completed  Monitoring records also forwarded for use	All documents forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue  Can be issued by 27 <sup>th</sup> July 2015	Most infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have <b>not</b> been closed	Documentation-80% Compliance  Infrastructure /General GMP - 30%	In-depth interview (see Appendix 6)
<b>GGC</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews <b>not</b> completed  Monitoring records also <b>not</b>	All documents forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue.	Most infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have <b>not</b> been closed. However, repairs of the roof	Documentation-50% Compliance  Infrastructure /General GMP -	In-depth interview (see Appendix 6)

Enterprise	Documentation Done	Progress Status		% Compliance with CODEX HACCP	Contact by Final Evaluation Team
		Status of Documentation	Closure of infrastructure gaps		
	forwarded yet to enterprise for use	Can be issued soon after	have been done and gaps raised do not seem to be serious gaps that can compromise food safety	50%	
<b>Royal Enterprise</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews <b>not</b> completed  Monitoring records also not forwarded yet to client for use	All documented forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue  Can be issued by 27 <sup>th</sup> July 2015	Most infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have <b>not</b> been closed. There seems to be a lack of top management commitment in this firm.	Documentation-50% Compliance  Infrastructure/ General GMP - 10%	
<b>Reliance Oil</b>	PRP, SOP, HACCP plans, HACCP manual reviews <b>not</b> completed  Monitoring records also <b>not</b> forwarded yet to enterprise for use	All documents to be forwarded to enterprise for final review before issue  Can be issued soon after	Most of the infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have not been closed. There seems to be lack of top management commitment in this firm	Documentation-50% Compliance  Infrastructure/General GMP- 10%	Interviewed as part of a larger group of beneficiaries – see Appendix 8
<b>Jal's Foods</b>	SOP and PRP reviews <b>not</b> completed  Monitoring records also <b>not</b> forwarded yet to enterprise for use	The reviewed SOP and PRP to be forwarded to enterprise for implementation.-Firm not going for HACCP certification	Most of the infrastructural gaps raised during the gap analysis have not been closed	Documentation-20% Compliance  Infrastructure/General GMP - 30%	In-depth interview (see Appendix 6)

## Appendix 6: Interviews with Beneficiaries from the Quality Enhancement Interventions

- #1 – General food processing- Ms. Yassin Mbye, Proprietor, Jal’s Healthy Foods
- #2- Cashew – Mr. Buba Jawneh, General Manager, Jawneh & Family
- #3- Groundnuts – Mr. Ebrima Njie, Quality Control Manager, Gambia Groundnut Corporation
- #4 – HACCP Trainer Cum Counsellor – Mr. Bai Doudou Jallow

### **CASE 1: JAL’S HEALTHY FOODS (OWNED & MANAGED BY YASSIN MBYE)**

Jal Yassin as she is popularly known is an enthusiastic woman who began her food processing business as far back as 1999 using a small enclave area of her own personal Kitchen where she makes different kinds of pre –made foods such as Coos Coos, Corn , vegetable pre-processed foods and other cereals that are easy to finish from cooking.

There maybe other reasons that may have motivated Jal Yassin to start her food processing, packaging and labeling business but the most convincing reason is the fact that she likes food. Driven by this desire she wanted to improve the quality of food handling and preparation. This was also mainly due to the fact that many women in the Gambia at the time were not trained on basic ethics in food preparation and handling. Thus she used this opportunity to start up what today becomes a thriving SME enterprise income earner for herself and her family.

According to Jal Yassin, between 1999 and 2004 she was able to employ only 3 people owing to the size and scope of her business. But realizing the need to expand she embarked on searching for new opportunities, thus conducting market research as well as connecting with good Samaritans. This research paid off in the early 2000 when she was invited on several training programmes in food processing and hygiene standard methods both in country and the sub-region. These trainings include:

- A local training on Food Technology courtesy of the Ministry of Agriculture held in 2000
- An international leadership conference and training in Food Processing, Packaging and Labeling using (cereals, vegetables and perennial crops) held in Mali in the year 2000.
- Another training on Hygiene Standards and Quality Control methods also held in Mali in 2004
- Received technical assistance from The Gambia Standards Bureau (TGSB) where she also serves as a Technical Committee Member
- Received assistance in the form of Quality food screening and testing of staff from FSQA

These trainings have indeed improved my skills and awareness in food processing, handling and storage techniques, hence brought in a change in my style of work and administration she said. I also joined ASSET (Association of Small Scale Enterprises in Tourism) in 2006 whose main role was to help me in creating a marketing platform to be able to sell my products on a larger scale locally. These moments also culminated an expansion in my business and I was able to increase my employees to 8 staff by 2008. Probably many of these successes were not all because of the trainings alone, a significant contributor to my expansion could be credited to the unwavering support of my customers who kept on encouraging me to do more. Today, as I speak, **“I am happy to tell you that I now have my own Outlet”** although still located in my compound, it is however a standalone outlet away from my usual small kitchen.

### **BENEFITS FROM EIF/ITC/SCED PROJECT INTERVENTIONS**

According to Jal Yassin, she was first invited to a meeting by the International Trade Centre (ITC) on the Enhance Integrated Framework (EIF) project in 2012. Since then I received several trainings that

augmented my skills and understanding in food processing and other quality control mechanisms. Some of the trainings I received included:

- HACCP training programme – this involved high quality hygiene standards, critical control systems in food preparation and handling amongst others
- Food safety standards – Before I used to leave some of my foods on the floor but after this training I realized this was not a right thing to do.
- Quality control systems in general food processing etc
- The SCED Project also helps me to understand standard exporting techniques.

Reflecting on the impact this project made to her the following were received according to Jal Yassin:

- I was able to access a packaging and labeling machine
- With technical support and advice, I now have a small processing centre in my House
- I received training on Hygiene best practices
- I was able to expand and now exposed to a wider customer base
- I also received training on business support techniques such as writing business proposals
- I received training on environmental management
- Ethical considerations and staff management
- Built an extra room for business expansion

Commenting on why she is unable to access the export market, Jal Yassin said that was mainly due to lack of a packaging and labeling machine. Her research also revealed that access to good packaging machine will sharply increase her opportunities in the export market. Another area she thought can be useful is the completion of the NARI Laboratory which is ear marked for testing Aflatoxin to enhance the quality of food produced in readiness for export markets.

#### **DIFFICULTIES FACING JAL YASSIN ON THE SCED PROJECT**

Jal Yassin is very much proud of the SCED Project that she barely has any problems now. However she would like to see an increase in the number of enterprises doing business to improve the Gambian economy. She cannot also wait to explore the export market once her packaging and labeling machine arrives. This in her own words she gladly shares..... *“I really thank God with this EIF project”*

#### **CASE 2: JAWNEH & FAMILY CASHEW PROCESSING ENTERPRISE (MANAGED BY BUBA JAWNEH)**

Buba Jawneh is the General Manager of the Jawneh and Family Cashew Processing Enterprise. In an interview with Buba, he informed the consultants that his father sold 2 of his cashew farmlands to set up their cashew processing centre in 2008. With their meager knowledge in running a processing plant at that time, the Jawneh Family hired the services of a consultant from Senegal to train them on how to operate and manage the plant. Prior to receiving this training, the Jawneh Family used firewal manual engines to process up to 25kg of cashew nuts with a staff employee of 20 people.

In their quest to expand, the Jawneh Family received a boost in the form of equipments from the International Relief and Development (IRD) and USAID through a philanthropic gesture that was ushered as a result of a needs assessment done by these international aid bodies. The equipments donated include:

- Steam boilers
- Oven dryers
- Cutting machines
- Piling tables and
- Grading tables etc

In addition to these equipments, a further technical support to train 10 of their staff in Senegal in standard cashew processing e.g. nut counting which involved scaling up of cashew nuts to enhance quality control etc. The General Manager further revealed that as part of their marketing strategy they signed a contract with a Switzerland company in 2012 in order to export their products. This contract warranted an increase in production hence an increase in the number of staff to 100 employees.

### **BENEFIT OF THE EIF/SCED PROJECT INTERVENTIONS**

When asked what was the state of your project prior to joining the EIF Project? Buba Jawneh reiterated the fact that they were already hitting the road, but further admitted that the EIF Project has indeed boosted their capacity in many other ways including:

- Training on HACCP processes and other quality control methods
- Before the EIF intervention we were not implementing standard packaging systems but now that we received training in this area, we are doing well
- HACCP also improved our understanding on effective and efficient food handling and manufacturing practices in which we can be environmentally sensitized to elements that maybe harmful to foods
- Jawneh and Family also received training on general hygiene practices on critical control and monitoring of hazards.

Commenting on the impacts of the EIF Project on their cashew processing enterprise, the General Manager stated that the project within a short period of time was able to help them access the following:

- Increase their sales as a result of an increase in customer base
- Hygiene methods improves their environmental cleanliness
- Understand standard and modern methods of packaging and labeling of their products
- Access to new packaging and labeling machine received in June 2015
- HACCP training was genuinely received and on time although a good number of their customers are curious to see their HACCP certificate for approval on HACCP training
- As a result of the interventions from the EIF Project, the Jawneh Family now produces SEVEN (7) Tonnes of raw materials of cashew.

### **DIFFICULTIES / SUPPORT NEEDED AT THIS MOMENT**

The General Manager of Jawneh and Family Cashew Processing Enterprise is a happy with their current developments registered but will not rest on his laurels as he said his enterprise would need support in the area of filling the pouches of the boxes in terms of packing. This is a special kind of machine that does such works, so access to that will further ease our work professional as we are getting ready for the export market.

### **CASE 3: AN INTERVIEW WITH EBRIMA NJIE – QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER GGC, 26 Nov 2015**

Mr. Ebrima Njie is the Quality Control Manager of the Gambia Groundnuts Corporation (GGC) which is now popularly referred to as the National Food Security Corporation (NFSC). Mr. Njie was first enrolled as a staff in May 1965 when it was called the Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) until 1993 when he took a voluntary retirement from active service. Due to his diverse experiences in the groundnut sector, Mr. Njie was again engaged in 1993 after a structural change in management and nomenclature (i.e. GGC) but this time however on contract basis. From 1993 to date he is serving the one time and most popular household name in the Gambia being the GGC.

Amongst his responsibilities on a daily basis include the followings:

- Inspection of the groundnuts (GN) and cashew nuts (CN) harvested for quality standards
- Institute quality control measures in handling and processing GN and CN

- Collecting, profiling and filing of phyto -sanitary certificates from the Gambia Ports Authority(GPA)
- Work with Maeskline and other shipping or forwarding and freight companies in terms of exporting GN and CN
- Coordinating a team of 30 staff working under the quality control department of the GGC.

### **BENEFITS FROM THE EIF INTERVENTIONS**

Despite gaps noticed in the dispensation of their duties, there were positive and cognitive benefits derived from the EIF project. These include:

1. Received training on the preparation for certification on ISO 17025 i.e. HACCP
2. Training received on market analysis tool
3. Training of two GGC laboratory staff was conducted between the 27<sup>th</sup> February to the 12<sup>th</sup> March 2013. Areas covered in this training included:
  - Quality systems management and organization
  - Quality system documentation and record control
  - Contact review and purchasing
  - Customer service
  - Quality system monitoring and measurement
  - Technical requirements

Commenting on the gaps, Mr. Njie said a gaps assessment was carried out in the nine GGC provincial Depots between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> February 2014. Findings showed that there were gaps in storage facilities of depots and the quality control testing equipments including material and transport (River Barges). These gaps if closed will enhance the segregation of groundnuts by quality especially aflatoxin. The ITC also provided quick aflatoxin test kits and moisture meters for all the GGC depots to test the quality of GN deliveries. Most of the gaps identified in the storage facilities and river transport fleets are now expected to be addressed by the International Development Bank (IDB) who is currently running a project with GGC.

Mr. Njie expressed happiness with the aflatoxin test kits and moisture meters provided by the ITC as very useful in their quest to provide the needed information on groundnuts for the control and management of quality standards.

Another area of intervention by the EIF Project was a four day capacity building training on packaging, labeling traceability conducted between the 17<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> June 2013. Knowledge obtained from this training is currently being replicated in our HPS groundnut production for export since this has become obligatory in international trade. Other trainings conducted through the project included a ten day training programme for quality control of groundnuts was held between 1<sup>st</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> October 2013. This involved training on:

- Basic concepts of quality
- Food safety and quality
- Food safety and quality issues for ground nut
- Solving quality related problems at CPMS and depot levels
- Quality control system
- Codex standards in groundnuts in the Gambia
- A working session to define the minimum specification for ground nuts to be purchased with reference to the standards developed by TGSB and FSQA 2011 (4 groups)
- The inspectors sampling manual: sampling, methods and procedures.
- Practical training on sampling
- Quality control testing procedures at the CPMS levels and other facilities
- Presentation of equipment for application of the testing procedures

- Record keeping for traceability
- Handling, storage and evacuation process after quality control
- Food safety and quality Act 2011 and its provisions for groundnuts
- Maintenance of equipment and facilities as part of quality control at depots and CPMS levels
- Communication along the value chain on quality and food safety issues.

Mr. Njie further gave a scenario of a study tour to Malawi and South Africa where the GGC was represented as part of a delegation that visited groundnut farmer association such as NESFAM, a ground processing plan such as AFRINUT and ICRISAT which was an international research institute for groundnuts between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> July 2013. He said the above name firms are working closely together in order to place edible groundnuts in the international export market especially Europe. He made emphasis that this initiative should be emulated by the Gambia so as to improve its production of groundnuts that would enhance international trade. The team in which he took part also visited a groundnut blanching plan (Blancom) in South Africa and PPECB which is an internationally accredited laboratory.

Mr. Njie made mention of another benefit of the EIF intervention in which two official workshops were held in January and May of 2014. These workshops were based on Implementing Food safety systems according to codex HACCP standards. Following the completion of the first workshop in January, a HACCP team was formed at GGC and is currently working ITC consultants both local and international towards ISO certification for early next year.

#### **CHALLENGES CURRENTLY FACING GGC**

Most of the problems are general, but key amongst them include the following:

- Problem of execution of the HACCP owing to the large scale and size of the GGC staff
- Out of the 4 staff from GGC who received training on HACCP, only one is left at GGC to train the over 200 staff members on shelling, grading and sorting plants.
- Prerequisite gaps on infrastructures maintenance such as
  - Unpaved grounds
  - Rehabilitation of storage facilities
  - Changing shelling machines
  - Staff retention is concern
  - Aflatoxin is still present in some products such as GN that is often rejected
  - Amount of exports to Vietnam who uses GN for oil stock is also low

#### **CASE 4 - AN INTERVIEW WITH BAI DODOU JALLOW (A TRAINER CUM COUNCILLOR) ON THE EIF PROJECT**

Bai Dodou Jallow introduced himself as a Technical staff of The Gambia Standards Bureau (TGSB). His functions include providing conformity assessments for the Bureau, helping the private sector standardize their products and services as well as develop an understanding on how to implement HACCP standards. He further alluded to the fact that HACCP has been mainstreamed and adopted into TGSB programmes for implementation. The main reason that attracted Bai Dodou to join this project was perhaps the capacity building aspect which he intends to replicate elsewhere when the need arises.

#### **CHALLENGES NOTICED ON THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENTS OF THE ENTERPRISES INVOLVED**

Bai Dodou revealed that despite a well conducted training on standards and HACCP processes provided to these enterprises (e.g. Jal's Foods, Jawneh Family, Royal Enterprise, GHE ) etc... there were noticeable gaps such as:



- Infrastructure gaps at sector enterprises such as good toilet facilities, cleanliness, equipments
- Commitment of their managements to making sure their staff are involved in developing these standards and training processes
- Availability of the HACCP team – at most staff attendance are minimal in number
- The level of education of the staff trained was also low – this was important because issues dealt with are of paramount importance and thus it calls for level headed personnel

#### **POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS IN OVERCOMING THE ISSUES ABOVE**

Bai Dodou was happy to report that although not all the issues were solved, a considerable number of them have been dealt with hence most of these issues were mild on general problems. Key amongst them were:

- Closing of the infrastructure gaps such as built toilets and environmental awareness etc. Although there is a lot to do in this area, 1 out of 4 enterprises was able to successfully meet all the infrastructure gaps. Jal's Healthy Foods received some exemptions on HACCP due to the many gaps noticed in her enterprise, instead she was asked to concentrate on the basic things such as pre-requisite programmes (PRPs).
- The private sector were sensitized on the need to recruit well trained people

Reflecting on the impact the EIF project made to these enterprises, Bai Dodou said the impacts are visible in the following areas:

- Most of the enterprise staff were trained on personal hygiene
- Training on cleaning schedules
- Toilets segregated from easily contaminated areas
- Rational flow that minimizes contact
- Improved overall standards in most of the enterprises.

## **Appendix 7: Meeting with Sector Beneficiaries – Cashew**

### **Minutes of the Meeting with the Cashew Alliance Component held at Baobab Holiday Resort 19/11/2015**

**Members Present:** Njaga Jawo (Exc. Dir. NAWFA), Landing Sonko (Plant Protection Manager –MOA), Abdurrahman Sillah (CashewGam), Demba Jallow (Master Trainer), Ida Gaye (CAG) and other members of Cashew Alliance of the Gambia during their Annual General Meeting (AGM)

Topic	Discussions	Conclusions	Comments by
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	Members who contributed to the discussions did introduce themselves giving their names, work place and position at work. The Cashew Alliance AGM brought together about 80% of their members that comprises of producers and exporters of cashew nuts in the Gambia	This was a brief interview where the consultants asked few members on the benefits obtained as well as challenges still visible after the EIF interventions. Due to the AGM many members were tired and so did not participate fully, nonetheless discussions went on	A large majority of members of the Cashew Alliance were present although access to them all proved a bit difficult because the consultants could not interrupt an ongoing AGM, however the consultants managed to squeeze in some relevant questions.

## BENEFITS OF EIF INTERVENTIONS

- a. It was bit difficult to understand why most of the members did not read or access the strategy document as only 3 people admitted seeing and reading it.
- b. Those who accessed the document did said the process of developing the document was highly consultative
- c. It was also evidently said that the process involved a wider spectrum of the cashew traders
- d. HACCP helps to improve our standards on quality assurance such as good labeling, hygiene practices and customer service. CashewGam especially did access medium and big companies in terms of marketing and selling of their products. We also now access a packaging machine
- e. Old planting methods were used before the training, but after the EIF interventions, modern standards were applied which resulted in improved yield of their crops. This was also achieved through consistent monitoring activities with farmers at FFSs.
- f. Farmers were also discouraged from using harmful chemicals such as bio-pesticides.
- g. Capacity building has enhanced FFS which resulted to knowledge acquisition of CAG members to improve production. Although the process from FFS was greatly minimized but this was mainly seen in the area of rice and vegetables instead of cashew production.

A limited number of the CAG praised the EIF interventions as useful and helpful. However, the consultants were also made to understand that those CAG members present on the AGM were not the same people present in most of the trainings during the EIF project.

- a. Njaga Jawo (NAWFA/CAG)
- b. Landing Sonko (Plant Protection Manager - MOA)
- c. Demba Jallow (Master Trainer, Technician cum Councillor for FFS)
- d. Abdurrahman Sillah (Cashew Gam/CAG)
- e. f. ...Demba Jallow (Master Trainer) Technician cum councilor
- g. Landing Sonko (Plant Protection Manager – MOA)



<b>CHALLENGES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. There is a need to protect young plants in small farms from animals.</li> <li>b. Although packaging machines are available, some CAG members still lack the techniques in good labeling of products. Machines are given a separate budget line for repair and maintenance in case any damages occur.</li> <li>c. Role of women participation still limited and this should be encouraged with better incentives to attract them in the cashew business. Attempts to speak to a woman proved difficult although she admitted to be very much interested to pursue cashew farming.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Demba Jallow (Master Trainer)</li> <li>b. Adourahman Sillah (CashewGam/ CAG)</li> <li>c. Ida Gaye (CAG)</li> </ul>
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RECOMMENDATIONS			
	<p>a. An area expert would be highly necessary for general maintenance and advice to reduce overdependence</p> <p>b. Support on processing materials to other sectors will increase competitiveness and diversification as well as involve more people with better equipments</p> <p>c. Value addition is highly necessary for all the three sector (CN, GN, SS)</p> <p>d. Most of the FFS are not using the conventional pesticides as some farmers are still learning and applying the new techniques. Liaising with MOA is vital who is currently promoting pest management and control systems.</p> <p>e. Cashew farming should be promoted as an all year round business simply because the FBN Bank suffers from dormant account savings when the cashew season is over. This situation is being considered at the bank for funding options</p>		<p>a. Demba Jallow (Master Trainer)</p> <p>b. Landing Sonko (Plant Protection Manager – MOA)</p> <p>Carlos Gomez (GIEPA)</p> <p>Landing Sonko (Plant Protection Manager – MOA)</p> <p>Ndey Bintou (FBN Bank)</p>

## **Appendix 8: Meeting with Sector Beneficiaries – Groundnut**

### **Minutes of the Meeting with the Groundnut Component held at the MOTIE 17/11/2015**

**Members Present:** Ousman Manjang (Gamcem), Ndambury Fatty (Gamcem), Maulana Betts (Gam Traders Ass), Abdoulie S. Khan (ASPA), Dawda Kebbeh (AGOR), Sulayman Leigh (AK AGRO), Dembor Jarju (APTA), Tamsir Saho (Sandika Assoc), Yahya Sawo (Inter Agro), Sanjay (Reliance Oil Mill), Sulayman Sowe (Reliance Oil Mill).

Topic	Discussions	Conclusions	Comments by
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	Every member present during the meeting made a personal introduction of name, work place and position at work. While most of the members were producers, only one exporter was identified (AK AGRO )	Everyone introduced him/herself	

<p><b>BENEFITS OF EIF INTERVENTIONS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>h. Almost all the members of the groundnut association (GN) were trained on the management of Aflatoxin, food hygiene, food handling standards and other farming best practices etc</li> <li>i. Periodic meetings held about GN development were indeed useful</li> <li>j. Introduction of Farmer Field Schools (FFS) was helpful especially in the reduction of aflatoxin in GN</li> <li>k. Training members on how to transport GN from one place to the other using modern standard methods that avoids contamination</li> <li>l. A laboratory was created to eradicate aflatoxin</li> <li>m. Moisture meters were provided</li> </ul>	<p>The EIF interventions mentioned herein as benefits were generally appreciated as these helped the GN association members in capacity building and raising awareness on various methods of safety leading to the reduction of aflatoxin in GN and other related products</p>	<p>Abdoulie S. Khan (ASPA &amp; Focal Point) Groundnut Association</p> <p>Ousman Manjang (Gamcem)</p>
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## CHALLENGES

<p>d. Some of the members who were given equipments (machines) cannot use it effectively due to lack of financial costs to maintain them. This also means members who do not have the ability to access such machines have to simply move out</p>	<p>As we speak only 2 GN association members were currently operating such equipments (Machines) i.e. Reliance Oil Mill and GGC (Gambia Groundnut Corporation)</p>	<p>a, b, c .... Abdoulie S. Khan</p>
<p>e. GGC and NARI did not have any specific indications of lab test on aflatoxin</p>		
<p>f. There was a need for NARI to upgrade most of the consumables before actual use</p>		
<p>g. ITC should look into the possibilities of funding the refurbishment of the lab as well as upgrade consumables</p>		<p>d. Maulana Betts</p>
<p>h. ASPA want to see the completion of the NARI lab and move on with their work as soon as possible</p>		<p>e. Abdoulie S. Khan</p>
<p>i. A change in policy greatly hampered members progress hence this does not allow free trade such as exporting decorticated GN. Thus value addition was highly necessary for farmers. This also means some mebers now take their produce to nearby Senegal and sell on "Lumos" i.e. local trade fairs</p>	<p>f. There were 6 exporters initially identified but only 2 remained in the marketing value chain simply because other GN farmers cannot afford the measures put in place by the new policies</p>	<p>f. Ousman Manjang</p>
<p>j. Government kept a firm control on GN which created a block in ASPA's understanding of what interventions were done by its members. These issues has further culminated into other GN producing firms to relocate to elsewhere such as Senegal and the sub-region</p>	<p>g. ASPA should have taken the lead as the representative of its member in order to better understand their fate and act accordingly.</p>	<p>g. Abdoulie S. Khan</p>
<p>k. Funding was an issue. This resulted in only 10 FFS being trained. There is a definite need for improvement in this area. Although Master trainers were trained but there was no monitoring from 2012 until October 2015 when only monitoring on weeding was covered....2 more monitoring are</p>	<p>h. All members unanimously agreed that the issue of lack of funds was a general problem to train farmers</p>	<p>h. Tamsir Saho (Sandika Association)</p>

<b>HACCP EXPERIENCES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Members trained on HACCP practices but there was no internal lab to do local initial tests that will avoid contamination with aflatoxin</li> <li>b. It was also difficult to meet EU standards as they constantly make cognitive changes to food safety standards, hence a need to alternate our exports to china</li> <li>c. Reliance did admit that they were not ready to invite external auditors to assess their level of preparedness for the export market</li> <li>d. The aflatoxin is made an issue over a lot of preferences, but we think the size of the nut matters more than the presence of aflatoxin observed in our GN</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Sulayman Sowe (Reliance Oil Mill)</li> <li>b. Abdoulie S. Khan</li> <li>c. Sanjay (Reliance Oil Mill)</li> <li>d. Ousman Manjang (Gamcem)</li> </ul>
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## Appendix 9: Meeting with Sector Beneficiaries – Sesame

### Minutes of the Meeting with the Sesame Association Component held at the MOTIE 18/11/2015

**Members Present:** Kemoring Trawally (NCC-NAWFA), Yassin Joof Jold (GRA), Awa Bittaye (MOFEA), Carlos Gomez (GIEPA)

Topic	Discussions	Conclusions	Comments by
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	Every member present during the meeting made a personal introduction of name, work place and position at work.	Stakeholders present introduced as: <b>GRA</b> – provides advice on tax, training and certification processes <b>MOFEA</b> – gives financial advice and support in strategy development <b>GIEPA</b> – promotes investment and development of sectors in SS <b>NAWFA</b> - Coordinates SS producers an addresses issues in the value chain	Most of the members were not present simply because they expected either a logistical arrangement or be refunded their transport fares. Lack of a budget for such meant they cannot attend. Others were resident in the rural areas and the same applies to them too.
<b>BENEFITS OF EIF INTERVENTIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n. Conducted awareness raising for the sector strategies on SS through radio programmes</li> <li>o. Introduction of Farmer Field Schools (FFS) was helpful especially in empowering us to make our own decisions in SS production, seed multiplication and monitoring of issues affecting SS growth etc.</li> <li>p. Women participation is now really high in the SS sector as they form the majority of our member’s country wide. Out of the 48,000 overall memberships, women constitute over 80% of this population around the</li> </ul>	Our benefits from the EIF interventions were more focused on raising awareness through FFS and radio programmes than building our capacities or providing the relevant market were we can sell our produce to. A market platform is something highly necessary for our members and still remains an issue	<p>a, b, ...Kemoring Trawally ( NCC – NAWFA &amp; Focal Point)</p> <p>c, d.... Njaga Jawo (Executive Director NAWFA) through an extended one –on –one interview</p>

	<p>country. Amie Kebbeh and Fatou Njie former president and secretary respectively of SS Ass are typical examples of recipients. They serve as coordinators, trainers and farmer producers.</p> <p>q. In 1999 NAWFA took over the coordination of SS from CRS producing about 60/ 80 tons per annum. Now after the EIF intervention total production capacity rose to 4000 tons in 2013/14 harvesting season</p>		
<p><b>CHALLENGES</b></p>	<p>l. Marketing remains an issue to be addressed for the general members of the Sesame Association. Members still struggle in accessing the right market, hence they resort on selling to middle men from Senegal and some Indian traders who often give an unreasonable price for SS</p> <p>m. Most of the oiling producing machines are warned out due to lack of effective utilization</p> <p>n. Investment in SS needs to be promoted more so as to access the export market. Now that more SS is produced, a lot of this are kept for long time without being sold</p>		<p>Kemoring Trawally</p> <p>Kemoring Trawally</p> <p>Kemoring Trawally</p>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o. Another problem affecting SS growing is the acute shortage of fertilizer, were this is available is mostly in low quantity</li> <li>p. None of the SS members took part in the HACCP training. This was a general oversight from the project</li> <li>q. In the strategy document SS was not captured as an export crop, rather as a third crop thus lacking recognition and marketing like the other sectors</li> <li>r. A policy change contributed to the slow progress of SS especially in funding areas. Perhaps ITC needs to look into this while local efforts to liaise with MOFEA and GIEPA will also have to be explored</li> <li>s. A complaint from the focal point coordinating the SS was that his wages have not been paid for the last 5 months leading to a concern but more so in motivating him to continue working in this area.</li> </ul>		<p>Kemoring Trawally</p> <p>Yassin Joof Jold (GRA)</p> <p>Carlos Gomez (GIEPA)</p> <p>Awa Bittaye (MOFEA) and Carlos Gomez (GIEPA)</p> <p>Kemoring Trawally (NCC -NAWFA)</p>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>j. NAWFA needs to work with MOFEA, GIEPA and other like minded organization to access funding as well</li> </ul>		<p>Awa Bittaye, Carlos Gomez and Kemoring Trawally</p>



	<p>as investors to market and sell Sesame products</p> <p>k. ITC should also consider funding opportunities for the SS sector and include it in the strategy document for onward development of the sector</p> <p>l. For the activities of the SS association to continue without interruption the wages/salaries of its coordinator should be paid on a regular basis.</p>	<p>All recommendations were agreed by members of GN present.</p>	<p>Yassin Joof (GRA)</p> <p>Kemoring Trawally (NAWFA)</p>
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## Appendix 10: Meeting with Sector Beneficiaries – Trade Information

Minutes of Meeting with Trade Information Network - SCED Project on 10/11/2015 @ MOTIE Offices

Members Present: Lamin A.K Touray (MOJ), Basainey Jammeh (GIEPA), Amadou Bojang (GRA), Lamin Bojang (GCCPC), Isatou Sarr (GBOS), Abdoulie Jammeh (MOTIE – Focal Point), Ousman Bojang (MOTIE), Yahya Samateh (MOTIE), Omodele Jones (FJP), Seedy Lamin Bah (FJP)

Topic	Discussions	Conclusions	Comments by
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	Every member present during the meeting made a personal introduction of name, work place and position at work.	Everyone introduced him/herself	All members were present except the Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG)



EXPECTATIONS			
	r. MOTIE expected an improvement on access to information from producers	a. Access to important information for TIN will be looked at again and improved	Abdoulie Jammeh MOTIE
	s. GBOS as producers of data expected capacity building (training) on equipments i.e. computers and uploading on TI system (website)	b. Training was done and we can now use the computers effectively	Isatou Sarr GBOS
	t. GCCPC as users of data expected a reliable information sharing and production or completion of a calendar of events	c. This will most definitely allow us do a comprehensive economic analysis of cases or data received	Lamin Bojang GCCPC
	u. GRA as producers of data expected capacity building. Although this was done, however there are still gaps as we have staffs come and go, thus a need to train new staff on our new system that is built on ORACLE.	d. We now have examiners who verify data inputted at GRA which is further verified by GBOS on the system and gaps found are analysed.	Amadou Bojang GRA
	v. GIEPA as users of data expected a reliable, accurate, timely and accessible information	e. Publishing of information needed to be planned systematically according to the required information on the TI system	Basainey Jammeh GIEPA
	w. MOJ as users of data expected information sharing of TIN with Operators. They also expected further training of unregistered business operators under the single window business registration Act (SWBR).	f. MOJ database will feed into TIN website	Lamin A.K. Touray MOJ

**CHALLENGES**

- t. Challenges related to trade issues such as MOTIE relying heavily on producers for access to information on trade. This was deemed unnecessary hence MOTIE are users of data, thus access to available data should be shared amongst TIN rather than producers keeping information for too long.
- u. Developing a calendar of activities was a challenge, but a matrix was done tentatively which will eventually evolve to the required calendar. A draft of that will be shared with consultants for update
- v. Noticeable problems were often encountered by GBOS who receives raw data from GRA that usually inputted by staff who were not trained. This raw data has to be cleaned and analysed using the EUROTRACE system and this often take time resulting into a delay in producing the required statistics.
- w. Another problem noticed is that data published provisionally is often misinterpreted as a final product by members rather than a semi finished one.
- x. Delay in calendar production is worrying because we at GCCPC being users of data cannot do our economic analysis of cases or data on the SCEDP as we do not have the capacity to analyse data or cases received without this calendar
- y. An ongoing training is required because some of our GRA trained staff leave for other jobs, thus we recruit others to replace them who will eventually also need an induction training. Another problem noticed by GRA was cross border trade data is not captured in the system
- z. Access is limited to internet connections for users. There is also no indicator to show the traffic flow of information. This is highly necessary
- aa. MOJ Business registration does not capture all the data in the single window business registration (SWBR)

- a. Access to information regarding trade was agreed to be produced in a timely manner.
- b. A draft of the matrix calendar was shared with the consultants. This is intended to be shared with members and together validate it before end of November 2015.
- c. GRA responded that they now have a tracking system built on ORACLE which eases data inputting methods and these delays are history now. GRA also agreed to liaise with MOTIE to publish data every 6 months
- d. GBOS further adduce that there is a problem in product quotes that is resulting in huge values in the data produced.
- e. Calendar matrix will be shared with TIN members before end of November 2015
- f. An appeal to capture cross border trade data was made to EIF/SCED. At this point, one of the consultants suggested that accreditation for already trained staff be provided.
- g. An alert system was thought to be relevant. Members agreed to design, prepare and send to MOTIE to include in their budget
- h. Training required for unregistered businesses under the SWBR

Abdoulie Jammeh,  
Director of Trade  
MOTIE

Ousman Bojang MOTIE

Isatou Sarr GBOS and  
Amadou Bojang GRA  
respectively

Isatou Sarr GBOS

Lamin Bojang GCCPC

Amadou Bojang GRA  
and Dr. Jones FJP  
Consultants  
respectively

Basainey Jammeh  
GIEPA, Abdoulie  
Jammeh MOTIE ,  
members consented on  
this idea

Lamin A.K Touray MOJ



**ACHIEVEMENTS**

- e. A lot of capacity building i.e. training of members on trade information sharing was carried out after the Midterm evaluations
- f. Based on these trainings, almost all TIN members are now able to upload information on website
- g. All the operations of the SCED Project are mainstreamed in the MOTIE budget
- h. For sustainability purposes, TI system will be alive and up running 2 years after the project phased out
- i. Database of MOJ will feed into TIN website

a & b. Members agreed that training was provided on how to upload information on website and that is not a problem for them now

c & d. As mentioned and emphasized by the Director of Trade Information MOTIE and a staff at MOTIE

e. As alluded to by the Business registrar at MOJ

Abdoulie Jammeh  
 Director of Trade  
 MOTIE (also doubles as  
 the Focal Point for the  
 TIN) and  
 Yahya Samateh MOTIE  
 staff respectively

Lamin A.K Touray

### Appendix 11: Activity Based Financial Information as at 30 June 2015

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
<b>Component A1a: Sector strategy formulation</b>	<b>ES</b>	<b>398,643</b>	<b>383,951.82</b>	<b>14,692.18</b>
Output 1.1: Collection of baseline data completed and main gaps in sector development know-how identified. Sector specialist(s) and operational support needs identified	ES	86,868	86,868	-
Output 1.2: Sector, current market, organization and performance evaluated; Priority capacity-building or export readiness interventions identified and potential resource requirements defined	ES	80,848	80,848	-
Output 1.3: Potential strategic activities and orientation discussed, refined and agreed upon with potential implementing partners; Investment and financing requirements assessed	ES	73,428	73,428	-
Output 1.4: Draft strategies and plans of actions refined; Sector development strategies & detailed implementation plans finalised by stakeholders; Structure of a Private-Public implementation management body confirmed (or established only if relevant) & its secretariat	ES	91,500	91,500	-
Output 1.5: Finalised sector development strategies & detailed implementation plans	ES	66,000	51,307.82	14,692.18

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
launched and validated by stakeholders; Sector strategy implementation coordination bodies and secretariats established and working effectively; Regular progress reports of market and success stories provided for ITC and other resource partners				
<b>Component A1b: Sector strategy implementation</b>	<b>SC</b>	<b>306,405</b>	<b>196,608.61</b>	<b>109,796.39</b>
Output 1.6: Pilot market-oriented activities identified as “priorities” in the strategies’ action plans are effectively implemented	SC	306,405	196,608.61	109,796.39
<b>Component A2: Quality enhancement</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>492,803</b>	<b>428,545</b>	<b>64,258</b>
Output 2.1 Enhanced capacity of technicians on testing & Output 2.2: Accreditation against ISO/IEC 17025 of NARI’s lab for groundnut, cashew nut and sesame	EC	50,000	40,000	10,000
Output 2.3: Standards and regulations developed for groundnuts, cashew nuts and sesame	EC	50,000	42,000	8,000
Output 2.4: Enhanced quality segregation of groundnuts by quality control inspectors	EC	58,900	45,000	13,900
Output 2.5: Enhanced food safety of groundnuts through implementation of HACCP and pre-requisites such as GAP and GMP	EC	60,000	49,508	10,492

Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Output 2.6, 2.8 & 2.11: Enhanced farmer capacity to grow groundnuts, cashew & sesame of better quality and higher productivity through Farmer Field School	EC	55,000	47,559	7,441.00
Output 2.7 (2.10) : Quality Assurance Framework for the cashew nut and sesame sectors	EC	58,000	46,000	12,000
Output 2.9 (2.12) : Two Task Forces (one for Cashew nuts and one for sesame) established	EC	90,000	90,000	0
Output 2.13 : Packaging and labelling value chain diagnostic for the three products	EC	70,903	68,478	2,425
<b>Component B: Trade information</b>		<b>482,398.42</b>	<b>462,120.72</b>	<b>20,277.28</b>
Output 3.1 Trade information infrastructure established	TIS	146,699	140,021.72	6,677.28
Output 3.2 Trade information management skills of local stakeholders enhanced. Trained staffs are committed to manage the Trade Information Reference Centre.	TIS	149,000	138,500	10,500
Output 3.3: Trade information network efficiently used by public and private stakeholders.	TIS	186,699	183,599	3100
<b>Component C: Inclusive tourism</b>		<b>49,046</b>	<b>46,151.85</b>	<b>2,894.15</b>



Activities	Responsible Technical Section	Allocation (US\$)	Expenses occurred by June 2015 (US\$)	Balance (US\$)
Output 4.1: A comprehensive feasibility study on inclusive tourism in The Gambia which includes an action plan and a fully-fledged project proposal for follow-up implementation of proposed activities	SC	49,046	46,151.85	2,894.15
<b>Coordination</b>	<b>OA</b>	<b>387,455</b>	<b>367,000</b>	<b>20,455</b>
<b>Sundry</b>		<b>84,670</b>	<b>61,330</b>	<b>23,340</b>
<b>Support</b>		<b>154,099</b>	<b>134,058</b>	<b>20,042</b>
<b>TOTAL GENERAL</b>		<b>2,355,517.00</b>	<b>2,105,330.00</b>	<b>250,188.00</b>

## Appendix 12: Comments on the Draft Evaluation Report

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
1	General Comment	The report is fine as it is addressing both successes and failures in program delivery and results including MIE and the government management of the project. The following are suggested for clarity.	Noted
2	General Comment	Be Specific rather than uncertain Evaluation team to browse for words that force uncertainties like: probably, it seems, it appears, etc., and change to language of certainty or conclusion.	The language was used where the evidence available points in specified direction, but where such evidence is not conclusive.
3	General Comment	May want to check for and avoid repetition; like repeating objectives in several places in the document.	Done
4	General Comment	Go through the entire document and ensure that all acronyms are accurate. This is particularly required for the acronym HACCP. In many cases it is incorrect,	Corrected.
5	General Comment	The pilot implementation activity of the cashew sector strategy of providing technical assistance and machinery to 3 enterprises should be mentioned in the report as support given to enterprises. 3 enterprises are now using high-quality durable packaging for consumer markets that include informative labels with bar codes, feature to open and close and presentable looks.	See response to comment ID45
6	Page 9, para 4	..... <b>“The project aims at leveraging additional resources from development partners that are not currently supporting The Gambia”</b> . This is a wrong statement. The sentence should rather read The project aim at leveraging additional resources from development partners	Done

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
7	E 2.2.2 (3)  E 2.3.6 (4)	The statement that “the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has yet to confirm their take-over of the post-project management of the Farmer Field Schools (FFS)” and “FFS appear well received although the structures for maintaining the effort through Ministry of Agriculture do not yet appear completed” does not seem to correspond to the principal goal of the project. The goal of the project is for institutions and stakeholders to have the knowledge and skills to manage and implement FFS. First, the FFS manuals were developed and handed over to the Minister of Agriculture by the Minister of Trade. During the handing over the Minister of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary all affirmed that the manuals will be used as a reference document for FFS for the sector. The manuals were also presented to all Agricultural Regional Directorates. In addition, 40 extension workers, 195 farmers from sector organizations were trained as trainers by the project and over 2000 farmers have been trained and skilled in FFS. With this fact there is reason to believe that there is sufficient capacity and skills to manage and implement FFS either by MOA of farmer organisations. At least 3 projects of MOA (Cowpea, NEMA and FSADEP) are implementing FFS and those trained in the project are the ones managing them.	The evaluation team's conclusion on the post-project role of the MOA is consistent with the evidence of the MIE progress reports. However, the supplementary clarification noted in the comment has been incorporated into the report. See E2.2.2, E2.3.6 and section 2.3.7.4
8	Page 11, para 3, second sentence	The sentence: “Further delays in their funding raise the rise of the obsolescence due to a changing operating environment.” This requires further clarity. Either provide evidence or lower the tone of the statement.	The statement is a risk assessment. It states that the usefulness of the strategies is time-bound. If they are not implemented within a reasonable time-frame, it is very likely that the realities on the ground will have changed to an extent that some of the strategic priorities will no longer be relevant. This is a fair statement in the circumstances and does not require further evidence to substantiate the risk assessment.
9	Page 11, para 3, starting from third sentence to the end of the paragraph	It is unclear as to how this links to the strategy, as these are results to be achieved by other components of the project.	E2.2.2 para 3 provides examples across the different components of the SCED to illustrate the assertion made about public sector actors in E2.2.2 para 2.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
10	Page 11, para 4, end of paragraph	The statement “...see multiplication support delivered by the project. Again, the conclusion must be that the improvement in private actors’ capacity is broadly evident but not sufficient to deliver the overall project objectives.” It is the combination of public and private that should be discussed not only the private. Cashew exports have increased so there must be some good collaboration for export development. Was this NARI?	The contribution of public actors was considered in para 3. The conclusion was the same. The seed multiplication issue related to Sesame and not Cashew. We did not find any evidence to causally link increases in cashew exports to the project efforts. However, we have mentioned in para 4 that the cashew alliance appears to be the most effective sector association.
11	Page 11, para 4	..... <b>“The unclear effect of the seed multiplication support delivered by the project”</b> . This statement seems a bit misleading as seed multiplication support is not associated with NAWFA but rather NARI. Last sentence starting with “Again”. What does it mean? Can we have more clarification?	“Again” was intended to refer to the similar conclusion on the contribution of public sector actors stated in para 2. The word has now been eliminated to avoid confusion. The seed multiplication was a service by NARI to sesame farmers for whom the oversight mechanism is NAWFA. There was, thus, joint responsibility for the deliverable.
12	Page 11, para 4, second sentence	This is not related to this component at least not to A1 – strategies.	See response to comment ID9
13	Page 11. First full sentence at the top of the page	The sentence: “The overall assessment of the evidence suggests that this improvement maybe be positive but that it is not sufficient to fulfil the project’s overall objectives”. This needs to be explained further and nuanced within the scope of the document. Provide more evidence to support the statement.	There appears to be a misunderstanding of the report layout. To clarify, an additional sentence has been added to E2.2.2 para 1. Further, clarifying words have been added to the final sentence of E2.2.2 para 2.
14	E 2.2.3. 4	“Most related goals will not be secured within the normal life span of the SCEDP” à what are these goals?	This is the executive summary. The details are in Section 2.3 of the main report.
15	E 2.2.3. 6	What is the indication that incomes have improved?	Anecdotal evidence as outlined in para 5. This is not definitive and is not satisfactory proof of effect.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
16	E 2.2.5 2.	MIE has offered its support for resource mobilization activities. Some elements of the project have been included in other proposals, such as the project identification document of the 11th EDF of the EU	The wording of para 2 has been amended to be more precise and a footnote added to included the assertion in this comment.
17	Page 13, para 2	It was not the national stakeholder that requested the MIE but resource mobilization was part of the design of the project and rest to the responsibility of the MIE and Government	Our reading of the project document does not find any responsibility for resource mobilisation on the part of the MIE.
18	Page 14, para 1	Effectiveness of the project should be measured on the overall project. Why only sector strategies (A1a) and Tourism component (c). The content tree on page 48 should be referred to remember the linkage of the different components of the project to determine the effectiveness of the project.	E2.3.3 has eight (8) paragraphs which consider the effectiveness (joint and individual) of all of the components
19	E 2.3.3. 5	This is what the final evaluation would need to find out through available data and interviews of sector and government stakeholders?	The evaluation team is not aware of any available data that provides this context. Any information from interviews of stakeholders that are based on verbal assertions are necessarily anecdotal and of limited value. The context should be part of the management information used to direct project design and implementation. It should not be the responsibility of the evaluation team to generate this information.
20	E 2.3.3. 6	Change HAACP to HACCP (HAACP is incorrect).  Also, correct the number of companies for certification; 4 companies are participating certification audit.	HACCP now corrected throughout the document. E2.3.3 para 6 now has a footnote indicating the MIEs assertion of 4 likely certifications. Our work indicated 2-3 likely certifications. So, we have recorded the MIEs current view.
21	Page 15, para 1, Efficiency	Time and cost are not the only major considerations in efficiency. Labor is also a major consideration. The objective of the project seeks to develop skilled labor for farmers to adopt best farming practices through farmer field school approach. It would therefore be important to evaluate or measure the extent to which the capacity built is or likely to achieve the desired	The deployment of all resources (including capacity building) to "achieve the desired results" is not measured by efficiency but by effectiveness. The latter is reported in E2.3.3

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
		results i.e. the ability to do things well and successfully.	
22	Page 15, para 7	<p>The report states that: “there appears to have been inadequate effort to secure demand-side evidence of the reception of the TI service”.</p> <p>The Trade Information Portal <a href="http://www.gambiatradeinfo.org">www.gambiatradeinfo.org</a> is the dissemination channel of information services produced at the MOTIE.</p> <p>This Portal has been provided with the functionality of back-trace reporting. This means that the system can generate and keep records like frequency of visit, downloaded documents, time spent in the various pages, most requested contents, etc.</p> <p>In this case, demand-side’s evidence of reception does exist.</p>	<p>If this functionality exists, the evaluation team did not find any evidence of its use in the management information systems of the TI. Demand side analysis would also need to go beyond the analysis of web-site visits. It will need to include a wider selection of potential as well as actual users to assess their satisfaction with the scope, quality and relevance of the TI information. We did not find evidence of this important action. We have, though, inserted a footnote about the MIE’s assertion of back-tracing website functionality (E2.3.3 para 7).</p>
23	E 2.3.3. 8	<p>How is the use of the term "Insufficient" justified?</p> <p>Final evaluation is to take a look at the progress made against these targets through available data</p>	<p>The basis for the conclusion of "insufficient" is outlined in the preceding paras 1-7 and detailed in the main report. The evaluation team has reviewed the progress made against the available data and concluded that the project is on track for effectiveness, but has not yet satisfactorily attained it.</p>

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
24	Page 16, para 2	Referring to the content tree of the project, the aim was to first conduct an inclusive Tourism feasibility study and based on the findings of the study develop a comprehensive project proposal. The Tourism study and the sector strategies of Cashew and Sesame were based on thorough consultations and projections. Therefore the possibility of obsolescence is remote.	All strategic plans are based on an assessment of a current state/conditions and a projection of a practical path to a desired future state. If the prevailing conditions change significantly, then the plan/path risks obsolescence. The longer that a plan goes without implementation, the higher is this risk of obsolescence. Thus, the evaluation team respectfully does not concur with the assertion that this risk is remote. It would only be remote if there is only a remote chance of significant change in the prevailing conditions of tourism sector since the plan was developed. Since we do not yet know when the project will be funded, we cannot conclude that the risk is remote.
25	E 2.3.6. 4	It was discussed and decided in the sustainability workshop in March 2015 that the sector organizations are on the driver's seat in sustaining the farmer field schools. The role of the MOA is to backstop the sector organizations in this and ensure synergies and information flow between different initiatives.	See response to comment ID7

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
26	E2.2.6 2	This is what the final evaluation would need to find out through available data and additional interviews of sector and government stakeholders?	See response to comment ID19. The generation of management information for decision making and control is the responsibility of the project implementation team. The absence of important direction and control information is indicative of weaknesses in projection direction and control. The scope of the evaluation team requires the identification of such weaknesses and any strengths plus their related implications. The evaluation team can take limited steps to assess the impact of missing information. But the evaluation team cannot be expected to generate primary data for management decision making and control.
27	E2.3.2 6.	The link between the components A, B and C is that through backward linkages the component C was designed to offer one market outlet for the agricultural products targeted with the project	This was noted in the evaluation report. The point made in the assessment of "relevance" is that the SCED did not include the implementation of the tourism project. So, the linkage was not demonstrated in practice. The other components of the SCED all involved real time implementation of activities with impact on the competitiveness of the targeted sectors. Thus, the study was of lower inherent relevance to the aims of the SCED.
28	E2.3.4. 3	MIE has not accepted a call for the inclusion of a funding activity. MIE has promised its support to the resource mobilization efforts of the national stakeholders and the EIF donor facilitator (Turkish Embassy). Resource mobilization was not supposed to be led by MIE	See response to comment ID17.



ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
29	1.5.1	The final evaluation should seek ways to assess the performance, results and impact of the project, i.e. search for existing national and international data to confirm if the results have been achieved. If data is not available, interviews and other desk research should be conducted. The final evaluation should be able to establish through analytical methods if the objective of 3% increased sales was attained or not	This is beyond the reasonable scope of our evaluation. It is the responsibility of management to ensure that it has sufficient information for the direction and control of its activities, as directed by its logical framework indicators. See response to comment ID 26.
30	1.7.5, table	Regarding the issue of ITC staff being interviewed after comments on the draft report: This is not what was agreed in the Inception Report.	Section 5.3.3 of the Inception Report: 5.3.3. <i>"In preparing our evaluation report, we shall consider the implications of these group discussion findings for the evidence gained from the desk review. Where needed, we shall have follow up one-on-one interviews of selected MIE or NIU or other implementing partner, to secure clarifications to inconsistent findings"</i> . We did not have reason to interview MIE staff as many of the issues that arose were similar to those found at the Mid Term Evaluation. We are, however, making arrangements for discussions with those MIE staff who require such, before the finalisation of this report.
31	Page 27, table	Top row of the table, below "actual numbers interviewed", where it states that none of the ITC staff was interviewed and that the plan is to still engage after the comments on the draft report. Interviews with ITC staff should have been done before the draft report was written.	See response to comment ID30

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
32	Page 29, 2.1.1.4	<p>Stating that it was planned that gender would be mainstreamed into the sector strategy process is incorrect. The project document states that the gender dimension will be taken in account along all steps of sector strategy and quality enhancement support in order to ensure that women are adequately represented not only in the production but also in the commercialization of the three selected products.</p> <p>This does not mean mainstreaming. Taken into account yes. The statement should be revised.</p>	The distinction is unclear to the evaluation team. But the statement has been revised.
33	Page 29, 2.1.3, fifth row	Remarks next to “amount of Aid for trade received...” an additional sentence needs to be added here in link, namely on the long planning cycle of programme, the challenging environment of the Gambia. Also, please note that 11EDF is looking into cashew and sesame ...according to the preliminary action fiche	Done
34	Page 29, 2.1.3, third row	Remarks next to “number of exporters in the cashew and sesame sectors receiving relevant assistance from TSIs; ensuring that women are benefitting” should be revised. Providing a list of participants, as in Appendix 3, is not validation of the TSIs receiving relevant assistance. Were the TSIs interviewed to confirm that they received relevant assistance?	The statement in the table affirms that TSIs and beneficiaries were interviewed and provides information on interview evidence that not all potential beneficiaries were aware of the programme. No revision considered necessary to these remarks.
35	Page 30, 2.1.5.7, fourth sentence	Sentence starting with “There were reportedly...” What is this statement making reference to? This should be removed.	The evaluation team makes a clear reference to the MIE report that is a source of this assertion. The statement is unambiguous and the need for removal is not understood.
36	Page 30, 2.1.5.7, second sentence	Sentence starting with “However, the donor roundtable...” The Round table was to be organized by the NIU and other national partners, with some support from the MIE. Please refer to coordination unit for more details.	A footnote has been added with the clarification received in this comment.
37	Page 30, 2.1.5.7, third sentence	Sentence starting with “Other attempts...” This should be nuanced, either provide more evidence or lower the tone of the statement. The GIEPA has budget for the coordination of meetings and CAG has secured support from ACI. Again, 11EDF is looking in these sectors.	This assertion was the conclusion drawn by the evaluation team from interviews including GIEPA and other stakeholders. The supplementary assertions in this comment have been incorporated in a footnote.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
38	Page 31, 2.1.5.7, last sentence	Sentence starting with “There is a...” They might lose relevance, but as they are linked to the NES (GIEPA) framework of coordination, some support will be provided to maintain them alive.	This assertion was the considered conclusion drawn by the evaluation team from its work. The supplementary assertions in this comment have been incorporated in a footnote.
39	Page 31, 2.2.4	The amount allocated to SC is not correct nor is the amount disbursed; It should read \$323k and disbursed \$252,639.02. Please refer to excel document enclosed giving all details by activities. Please note that this information has been provided multiple times to the project manager, country officer and financial assistant for rectification in the project portal in 2015 and no changes were ever made. Hence in the report it looks like SC did not spend almost 200k where in reality 70k were left unspent. Please note from the total expenditure \$252k only \$18,190 were allocated under Ian Sayers (SC) in the project portal, hence the discrepancies. The funds in the portal for SC were shown under OA.	See footnote added to 2.2.4
40	Page 31, 2.2.4.1	As a result of comments above, regarding corrections to the amount allocation to SC, the related expenditure in Annex 11 should be modified accordingly.	See footnote added to 2.2.4

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
41	Page 31, 2.2.5.2	<p>A MOU was signed with NARI for the seed multiplication programme. Within the MOU safeguards were put in place to ensure the distribution, control and record keeping of the whole activity, to ensure a proper follow up and control will be executed.</p> <p>Please find below an extract of the duties that NARI agreed to carry out when signing the MOU.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Organise and coordinate the, reception, storage, propagation, and distribution to sesame farmers and provide advice related to using the seeds;</li> <li>2. Design a seed multiplication training programme for the benefits of the representatives of the seventy two associations part of the NAWFA Association (National Women Farmers' Association);</li> <li>3. Organise follow-up training for the benefit of representatives of the seventy-two associations part of NAWFA;</li> <li>4. Ensure record keeping for seed multiplication and distribution and production results from farmers that receive seeds from NARI; and</li> <li>5. Submission to ITC of work plans at the start of activities, a training, storage, seed multiplication, propagation and distribution plan and record keeping plan for the activities above. In addition ITC will require a gender disaggregated list of training participants and recipients of seeds including their (national ID/passport details);</li> </ol> <p>Despite numerous attempts, both from Geneva and on the ground in the Gambia, SC nor OA could obtain the missing information from the MOU. Please find enclosed the email from OA explaining what had to be done with regards to the MOU.</p> <p>Furthermore the results of this activity has been limited due to climatic circumstances, <i>dixit</i> the Gambian counterparts, as the rain washed away the great majority of the seeds.</p> <p>As a result, this component faced major issues, and ITC was not able to resolve them due to unresponsiveness of the counterpart, despite of numerous tries.</p> <p>Please see email attached from OA on the matter.</p>	This information has been reflected in the report.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
42	Page 32, 2.2.5.3	<p><i>Supply of Tarpaulins to Sesame stakeholders.</i></p> <p>The need to purchase tarpaulins for the sesame sector emanated from NAWFA supported by the EIF coordination Unit, with the view of ensuring improved post-harvest procedures (in terms of drying and sorting) to be followed in accordance with the CODEX, pre-requisites to any sector and export sales development.</p> <p>As a result the project purchased 50 tarpaulins to be handed over the sector’s beneficiaries. In order to ensure proper management and sustainability of the equipment, an “equipment handover agreement” was signed between the executive director of NAWFA Mr Jawo and the National Coordinator of EIF Implementation Unit, Mr Ibrahim Jobe.</p> <p>In this agreement designed and based on a suggested model submitted to NAWFA and to the EIF Coordination Unit by ITC, the following sections are covered in the agreement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- modus operandi of the management of the 50 tarps;</li> <li>- pricing;</li> <li>- deposit;</li> <li>- fund management; and</li> <li>- sustainability plan in place</li> </ul> <p>NAWFA took over the responsibility of the handling of the 50 tarps, and a monitoring system was put in place, with the EIF team ensuring the good functioning of this system on the ground.</p> <p>The monitoring system to ensure fairness and sustainability encompassed the following clauses (extract from the equipment handover agreement signed by NAWFA and the EIF coordination team)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NAWFA to open a specific Savings Account at a local Bank to deposit revenues from the tarp rentals, which it will be used to purchase replacement tarps after some years. NIU should be one of the signatories to this account for first two years (2014 and 2015).</li> <li>2. NAWFA to send six monthly bank statement and summary of expenditure made from the funds to the NIU for verification.</li> <li>3. The NIU will from time to time undertake field monitoring missions to the groups that have been supplied tarps by NAWFA</li> </ol> <p>Please find Financial Management handover agreement Capacity Building email from the Development &amp; Strategy coordinating unit dating 07 01 2014 ensuring that the agreement had been signed with NAWFA as stated.</p>	

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
43	Page 32, 2.2.5.4	Implemented activities to the groundnut sector are missing from the report and should be added, including: 1. Pre-marketing event 20-21 October 2012 (MOU with ASPA) 2. Groundnut sector workshop Jenoi November 2012 (MOU with ASPA) 3. Groundnut sector and dissemination workshop Jenoi November 2013 (MOU with ASPA) 4. Two videos of the Malawi and South Africa study tour 2014 for dissemination purpose	Clarifications incorporated in a footnote to the main report.
44	Page 32, 2.2.5.5	The activity, Sector roundtable for discussion on packaging machines and buyer requirements, which took place in November 2014, should be included into the report.	Done
45	Page 32, 2.2.5.5.	Indicate that the packaging round table and the result of it being that 3 machines were procured and handed over to the most competitive enterprises according to assessment are directly linked and that they should be mentioned together. This should be included in the Export Packaging support which is currently indicated in section 2.2.5.5. It is requested that this the whole paragraph should be under 2.3 for Quality Enhancement.	Information about machines has been incorporated as a clarification footnote. The export packaging support was included within the "pilot implementation" component in the MIEs management reporting systems. It is thus retained within that component for the purposes of this evaluation.
46	Clause 2.3.6.8	The project has developed a training manual of Integrated pest management and trained farmers on Integrated Pest Management among other subjects like good agricultural practices, food safety and quality. There is NO CONFLICT of intervention whatsoever. IPM advocates the sensible use of pesticides purely on a needs basis in the context of using the best combination of other ecological/environmental management approaches for management of economic pests. Therefore the use of chemical management for aflatoxin can only be a component of the IPM strategies being adopted to address this problem. IPM is NOT equivalent to Organic agriculture which promotes agricultural production without application of any forms of agro-chemicals, with include chemical fertilizers, pesticides, growth regulators and the like. Organic production agriculture also adopts IPM strategies for the management of economic pests.	Report amended for clarification.
47	Clause 2.3.6.9.	MIE has linked FSQA to an accredited test laboratory in Germany for testing for aflatoxin while NARI lab is still under the process of accreditation. The lab was chosen following a call for tender to make sure that the test fees of this lab are most competitive. FSQA has used the services of this lab to identify the sources and points of contamination of groundnuts.	Report amended for clarification.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
48	2.3.7. 4	HACCP not HAACP	Amended
49	Page 43, para 3.2.3	Remove the close bracket after GEIPA and NARI.	Done
50	Page 43, para 3.2.3	Sentence starting “The main private actors are NAWFA...” Is it private sector or NGO. NAWFA is not the apex of the sesame sector. It is the Apex of SGAs. Correct the statement.	"private" changed to the more neutral "non-state". A footnote has been added to clarify the status of NAWFA.
51	Page 43, para 3.2.4, fourth sentence	Sentence starting with “Trade information services managed...” to the end of the paragraph. This is not related to the strategies directly but to the other components of project. This needs revision to link more generally to TSIs support...	The evaluation of this objective focussed on trade support "services" rather than trade support "institutions". It considered the contribution of the process of strategy development to creating cooperative conditions that facilitated the objective as it applies throughout all components. In this regard, the contribution of the Trade Information Services was seen as relevant.
52	Page 43, para 3.2.4, second sentence	Regarding “...but not sufficient to fulfil the project’s overall objectives.” This requires further explanation.	The incorrect word "satisfactory" has been replaced with the more appropriate "positive".
53	Page 44, para 3.2.5	Sentence starting with “The role of ASPA...” The ASPA was not supported under A1. Maybe it was under A1b? This should be clarified, but it is not correct as it currently reads.	See response to comment ID51 for the wider focus which allows the consideration of ASPA to trade support services within this window.
54	Page 44, para 3.2.5	From “...loss of tarpaulins supplied by the project and the unclear effect of the seed multiplication support delivered by the project.” The tarpaulins were related to A1b not A1...it should be mentioned that the project has supported capacity building of NAWFA and CAG in terms of good governance and reaching out to their constituencies for creating ownership of the sector and disseminating information on the strategies to farmers	See response to comment ID51 for the wider focus which allows the consideration of NAWFA/tarpaulins to trade support services within this window. The clarification on capacity building support has been added to the main report.
55	Page 44, para 3.2.5	Starting from “...loss of tarpaulins...” to the end of the paragraph. Again, this is PPP and I do not see a point on improved public private coordination.	See response to comment ID51.

ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
56	Page 51, 4.6, table	The first row of the table that refers to component A1a – Development of Sector Strategies. The reported score is 6; I need clarify on how this was determined. I do not specifically agree. Structural changes as done through the strategy takes longer but has a lasting effect.	section 4.6.2 of the report provides the basis for the rating, which the evaluation team considers to be appropriate given its extensive experience of similar strategy efforts in other projects within The Gambia and other West African countries.
57	Page 51, para 4.6.2, second sentence	Sentence states “There is evidence that the MIE is belatedly establishing contacts...” We have been in contact for more than two years. Provide justification as to how this is considered as belated.	The evaluation team was not aware of this contact during the mid-term evaluation. The word "belatedly" has now been deleted. However, the conclusions of the report are not considered to be affected.
58	Page 52, 4.7, table	Top row of the table regarding Component A1a – Development of Sector Strategies, the score is 5. I disagree ...strategies are not closed-end studies and there was a lot of work on building innovative management structures. This should be discussed with the evaluation team, or at least the team leader. I would love to discuss this.	The rating has been discussed with C Roberge. It was agreed that there is some scope for innovation in the development and design of strategies. The evaluation team maintained that implementation activities carry more opportunities in this regard. But it was agreed that the rating will be increased to 7 to reflect the discussion.



ID	Identifier	Question/ Comment	FJP Action
59	Page 55, para 6.1.9, and Page 56, para 7.1.6	<p>Contradiction: The evaluation team may want to clarify the contradictions of good practice against not reporting on some logframe indicators.</p> <p>6.1.9. The evaluation evidence suggests a rigorous and professional approach to the project management process by the MIE. The MIE maintains financial information on both a functional-basis and on an activity-based format. The project management, monitoring, evaluation and control processes deployed by the MIE were reasonably consistent with best practices expected by the MTE evaluators. All other things being constant, this should be a high impact project.</p> <p>However on Page 56, the paragraph below contradicts the above:</p> <p>7.1.6. It is noteworthy that lapses in the Monitoring &amp; Evaluation system detailed in section 2 mean that it will be difficult to have conclusive evidence of impact, as key indicators specified in the logframe for the overall objective and for component objectives were not monitored by the project.</p> <p>Also in the executive summary, the recommendation (pg22) notes that some project logframe indicators were not measured.</p>	The statement in 6.1.9 is now amended as the statement in 7.1.6 is considered appropriate.
60	Page 56, para 7.1.5	<p>Substantiate figures – the change from 50% to 70%</p> <p>Previously rated at an overall likelihood of impact of 50% at the MTE, the likelihood at the final evaluation has improved, probably to a level of 70% - reflecting the greater momentum on offer to national stakeholders – after the project extension - from tactical actions of the QE and TI components that require full implementation, preferably within the next 12 months - for synergistic impact.</p>	The figures are not intended to convey mathematical precision. They communicate the broad changes in the assessment of the evaluation team that significant improvements have been attained since the mid-term evaluation. These are not sufficient for full project impact within the formal lifespan, but are of an impetus that can be seized by national stakeholders to secure full impact subsequently.



<b>ID</b>	<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Question/ Comment</b>	<b>FJP Action</b>
61	Page 71, Group 1 ITC Staff table	Next to Component A1b, the first ITC Adviser listed is Mr. Charles Roberge. This is not correct. The name should only appear next to component A1a and not A1b. As part of A1a, I provided strategy management support to GIEPA, NCCs, CAG and NAWFA.	Corrected.
62	Appendix 11	In the Financial Matrix, is it expenses occurred or incurred?	cash basis - per MIE