"No indication of descent into
high-intensity protectionism" says Report on G20 Trade and
Investment Measures
A summary of the Report is as under:
The sharp contraction of the global economy that began in 2008 and
accelerated in the first quarter of 2009 has impacted deeply on
international trade and investment. The volume of world merchandise
trade is projected to contract in 2009 by 10 per cent, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows, which fell by 14 per cent in 2008,
are projected to plummet even further this year by 30-40 per
cent.
There is no indication of a descent into high-intensity
protectionism as a reaction to the crisis, involving widespread
resort to trade or investment restriction or retaliation. This
suggests that G20 members and other governments have so far
succeeded in managing the political process of keeping domestic
protectionist pressures under control.
In the area of investment, the thrust of G20 policy changes has
been, for the most part, towards greater openness and clarity, with
a substantial number of the policy changes found to be directed at
facilitating international investment and financial flows. G20
members also continued to conclude international investment
agreements. At the same time, some G20 Governments have established
support schemes that can discriminate against foreign-controlled
companies or raise barriers to outward investment flows.
In the area of trade, there has been policy slippage since the
crisis began and this has continued since the G20 London Summit in
April 2009. Some G20 members have raised tariffs and introduced new
non-tariff measures to protect domestic production in certain
sectors, notably steel and motor vehicles. G20 members have
continued to use trade defence mechanisms, in these and other
sectors too. Two G20 members have re-introduced agricultural export
subsidies for the dairy sector, measures that are generally
acknowledged to be among the most highly trade-distorting. The
fiscal and financial packages that have been introduced to tackle
the crisis favour the restoration of trade growth globally and they
are to be welcomed, but some of them contain elements - such as
state aids, other subsidies and "buy/lend/invest/hire local"
conditions - that favour domestic goods and services at the expense
of imports.
Overall, the incidence of new trade and investment measures taken
in response to the current crisis is not out of line so far with
what happened during previous downturns in economic activity. WTO
rules and its dispute settlement mechanism continue to provide a
strong defence against protectionism as do OECD rules and peer
monitoring and UNCTAD's monitoring of national and international
policies for foreign investment. However, trade and investment
policy risks remain and are likely to continue to do so until
economic recovery is well-rooted and job and business opportunities
have started to grow again.
The main risk is that G20 members will continue to cede ground to
protectionist pressures, even if only gradually, particularly as
unemployment continues to rise. The danger is of an incremental
build-up of "sand in the gears" of international trade that could
aggravate the contraction of world trade and investment and
undermine confidence in an early and sustained recovery of global
economic activity. G20 members should reflect on the contradiction
of using any measures that restrict or distort trade or investment,
and therefore that tax production and incomes, at the same time as
the main thrust of their policies to overcome the crisis is geared
to expanding aggregate demand. "Best practice" in current
circumstances, to accompany financial and fiscal stimulus, is to
reduce trade and investment restrictions so as to cut costs and
prices worldwide. Where subsidies can be afforded, their full value
as a stimulus for economic activity will come from targeting them
at consumption, not production, with consumers free to choose
internationally the goods and services that they buy.
The second risk is that measures taken temporarily to try to
protect jobs and business profits now from the effects of the
crisis will create a legacy of uncompetitive industries and
sectoral over-capacity that will continue to generate protectionist
pressures even after economic activity picks up again. The failure
of trade restrictions and subsidies to provide effective industrial
support in the 1970s and 1980s, and the long-term costs imposed on
world trade until they were unwound during the Uruguay Round, need
to be recalled. The same mistakes must not be made again.
A collective decision by G20 members to bring the Doha Round to a
rapid conclusion would be well-received by other WTO Members and
send an unambiguous signal that protectionist measures are not the
solution to this crisis and that measures taken to combat the
crisis will be quickly unwound. Concluding the Round will
substantially narrow the scope for introducing new trade
restrictions or raising existing ones; where WTO disciplines are
currently weak, or their coverage is limited, governments face
greater difficulties to resist protectionist pressures. It would
also generate a new stimulus package for the world economy that
would not depend on public finances and that would benefit directly
developing countries, who as a group have been by far the worst
affected by the crisis.
Pending the conclusion of the Doha Round, the "do no harm"
principle points to the value of a strong commitment by G20 members
not to introduce new trade restrictions and trade-distorting
subsidies, including those that are regarded as being consistent
with WTO rules. The most recent Declaration at the L'Aquila Summit
on 8 July 2009 is a welcome development by "...stressing the
importance of fully adhering to the standstill commitment and the
commitment to rectify protectionist measures adopted in London to
avoid further deterioration of international trade, including
refraining from taking decisions to increase tariffs above today's
levels".
*Full joint report issued under the responsibility of the
Director-General of the WTO, the Secretary-General of the OECD and
the Secretary-General of UNCTAD can be accessed at:
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/trdev_dg_report_14sep09_e.doc
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